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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the intra-Salafī disputes in the 1990s over the legitimacy of 
present-day rulers in the Muslim world and their status as Muslims. While these issues 
are theological in their essence, they are intertwined with the political milieu of the 
Middle East. Fundamentally, these intra-Salafī disputes pivot around the central 
question of the impact of implementing manmade law systems (instead of sharīʿah) on 
the legitimacy of the ruler. This study tackles this question and related issues that form 
the themes addressed in this study. 
It begins by providing a minimal definition of Salafism which identifies its main 
characteristics that distinguishes its adherents from other Muslim denominations. 
Chapter two and three discuss the disputes over whether present-day rulers meet the 
required qualification to qualify as legitimate rulers in Islam and hence what position 
Muslims should take towards them. Chapter four digs deeper into the theological aspect 
of these debates in order to ascertain the different views on what acts can and cannot 
strip a Muslim from his/her status as a Muslim. It begins by highlighting the importance 
laid on creed in Salafism and providing the general principles on belief and unbelief 
upon which all Salafī proponents agree. After that, it examines the disagreements 
amongst contemporary Salafīs over which criteria should be considered to determine 
that an act of omission or commission is sinful enough to cause unbelief. Chapter five 
investigates the accusations levelled against the prominent Salafī scholar al-Albānī in 
regards to deviancy from the teachings of Salafism on belief and unbelief as an example 
of the importance of this debate.  
This study demonstrates how intra-Salafī disputes evolved from a mere disagreement 
over the legitimacy of political opposition to the state to become an intense complex 
quarrel on the nature of the Islamic faith. It argues that political affiliations alone fail to 
explain intra-Salafī disagreements over politics and violence and only through accurate 
analyses of the underpinning doctrinal differences one can understand their divergent 
reactions to contemporary political issues. This research aims to contribute to the study 
of the Islamic governance genre as well as to the studies on Salafism which despite its 
rapid spread worldwide, remains a scarcely studied subject. 
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Chapter One: Introductory Chapter 
Introduction 
The study of Salafism 1 is relatively new in academia. Just over a decade 
ago, terms such as “Salafism ,”  “Salafiyyah”  and “Salafī” did not attract 
much attention among scholars and even less, if any, in the media.  
“Salafism” and its derivatives have been discussed by some 
scholars/historians in reference to the late 19 t h /  early 20 t h  century 
Islamic modernist  movement of Jam āl  al-dīn al-Afghān ī  and Muhammad 
ʿAbduh. 2  Other scholars dealt with these terms under the br oader 
umbrella of so-called “Islamism,”  “political Islam,” and “radicalism.” 3 
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “War on Terror” led by the United 
States, changed this situation considerably . Because it became known 
that  the terrorists were “Salafīs” ques tions such as “what is  Salafism?” 
and “what is the connection between Salafism and armed groups such as 
al-Qaeda?” became matters of concern for politicians and academics 
alike.  As a result,  interest in understanding the nature of Salafism began 
to grow. Scholarly books and books and papers proliferated; many 
workshops and conferences were organised to explore various aspects of 
“Salafism .” Furthermore, because the vast  majority of those who carried 
out the attack were Saudis 4 and terms such as Salafism and Wahhabism 
are usually,  used interchangeably, 5  the term Salafism became 
synonymous with extremism and violence. This line of thought 
                                                     
1 In this s tudy,  Salafi sm refers to  those Muslims who seek to  revive a  be l ie f and  
pract ice  o f I slam that  close ly resembles that  o f ear ly Musl im generat ions.  More 
deta i led  explanation of  Salafi sm wi ll  fol low la ter  in this chapter .  
2 See for  example:  Bro wn,  Reth ink ing Tradit ion in  Modern I slamic  Thought ;  Badawī ,  
The Reformers  of  Egypt .  
3 See for  example:  Fandy,  Saudi Arabia and the Poli t ics o f  Dissent ;  Wiktorowicz,  
“The Salafī  Movement  in Jordan.”  
4 Accord ing to  the 9/11 Commiss ion Repor t ,  15 of the 19 hijackers were  Saudis ,  
avai lable a t :   www.9 -11commission.gov/  (accessed 17 /04/2013)  
5 The connect ion be tween Wahhabism and Salafi sm wi ll  be discussed la ter  in this 
introductory chapter   
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developed in both Western and Arab media and—rather simplistically—
attributed the underpinning causes of 9/11 attacks to Salafism.6 
However, this generalisation was soon challenged by the rising 
awareness that  there existed Salafī  groups that not only used peaceful 
means to preach their message but also  categorically condemned the use 
of violence. Indeed, recent scholarship has shown that  some of the well -
known Salafī  scholars do not just oppose the use of violence for politi cal 
gain but go as far as portraying groups such as al -Qaeda as heretics . On 
this basis, such scholars have strongly rejected  any link between the 
teaching of Salafism and the doctrine of violent extremist  groups. 7  
Statement of purpose and review of existing scholarship 
The aim of the present research is to argue that divisions within Salafism 
over politics and violence are primarily caused by doctrinal  
disagreements and therefore cannot be adequately explained mere ly 
through a political  lens.  The first and most important fact  to bear in 
mind is that the Salafīs are far from a homogeneous group . Despite 
increasing scholarly interest in Salafism after 9/11,  this is still  not 
adequately appreciated by many who assert expert knowledge on the 
subject. In many cases,  this is due to their working with “the prism  of 
security studies,” 8  which does not allow them to distinguish between 
Salafism as diverse, internally divided school of thought and the violent 
actions of some of i ts branches.  
On the other hand, the doctrinal  fragmentations and divergences within 
Salafism, especially over politics and the use of violence are admittedly 
complex and overlapping, and scholars have been reluctant or unable to 
evaluate them adequately until recently.  However, since mid 2000s more 
                                                     
6 See:  John Hooper  and Brian Whitaker ,  “Extremist  view of I s lam unites terror  
suspec ts ,”   the Guard ian ,  26/10/2001;  “Salaf ī ’s  Links To Terror ,”  Skynews,  
30/08/2002  
7 Ol iver ,  The Wahhabi Myth ;  DeLong-Bas,  Wahhabi I slam .  
8  Meijer ,  Roel  (ed .)  " Int roduction"  in  Global Sa lafi sm :  Is lam’s New Religious 
Movement  2 .  
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fine-grained and thorough studies on Salafism and i ts key doctrinal  
tenets in particular,  have started to appear. 9  Several works dealt with 
specific aspects of the doctrine, 10 others have focused on exploring the 
tenets of the Jihādī trend of Salafism. 11 
The differences in approach discussed above, hav e affected the way in 
which scholarship on Salafism, even that which recognises its  internal 
divisions, has attempted to explain such differences.  The majority of 
studies,  among those using the “security studies” approach, as well as 
others,  remain focused on the political aspects of the different trends of 
Salafism rather than the underpinning doctrinal causes of such 
fragmentations. 12  Anatomy of the Salafī  Movement  written by the 
sociologist  Quintan Wiktorowicz and published in 2006 is ,  arguably,  the 
most influential work within Western academia,  to address the matter of 
divisions among the Salafīs and propose an explanatory categorisat ion. 
Wiktorowicz distinguishes three types of Salafīs: Purists, Politicos,  and 
Jihādīs .  According to Wiktorowicz, the Purists’ main focus is 
propagation through the purification of religion and education while the 
Politicos emphasise politics and assert  the right of God to legislate. 
According to Wiktorowicz, these two trends do not promote violence; 
only the third, the Jihādī trend advocates the use of violence to achieve 
the common goal of all  Salafīs ,  namely: turning the Muslim nation (al-
ummah al- islāmiyyah) to the exemplary model of the time of the Prophet 
and his companions .  
This categorisation is widely accepted amongst Western scholars such as 
Nedza, who presents us with an implicit  typology of Salafism that  she 
                                                     
9 The gro wing works on Salafi sm,  though predominant ly in the English language ,  are 
appear ing in o ther  European langauges also such as French,  German and Dutch.  For  
ins tance see :  Behnam T.  Sa id and Hazim Fou ad (eds .) ,  Salaf ismus:  Auf der Suche  
nach dem wahren I s lam  (Fre iburg:  Herder ,  2014);  Rougier  Bernard (ed .) ,  Qu'es t -ce  
que le  sa laf isme? ,  (Par is :  Presses  Universi ta ires de France,  2008) .  
10 Wagemakers ,  “The Tra nsformation of a  Radica l  Concept:  a l -Wala’  wa  al -Bara’ in 
the Ideo logy of Abu Muhammad Al -Maqdis i” ;  Meijer ,  “Commanding Right  and 
Forbidd ing Wrong as a  Pr incip le o f Socia l  Act ion.”  
11 Wagemakers ,  A Quiet is t  J ihad i .  
12 Haykel,  “On the Nature  of Sa laf ī  Thought and Act ion,” 34 .  
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does not (intend to) fully develop. She explores three major art iculations  
of Salafism; (i) Takfīrī,  (ii) Establishment and (iii) Saḥaw ī  Salafism. 13 
However, Wiktorowicz’s typology is problematic at several levels.  One 
of those who challenged Wiktorowicz’s categorisation, for instance, is 
Joas Wagemakers. In his work on the doctrine of the Jihādī-Salafī 
scholar Abū  Muhammad al-Maqdis ī ,  Wagemakers has shown that al-
Maqdis ī ,  who belongs to Jihādī-Salafī trend, “uses arguments, concepts 
and terms that prove he is very close to the quietist  (i .e. purists) creed.” 14 
Thus, the typology proposed by Wiktorowicz is  far too rigid and fail s to 
account for personalities such as al -Maqdis ī ,  who  straddle more than one 
of his categories—Purist  and Jihadist—thus undermining its  explanatory 
potential . 15  
The other criticism of Wiktorowicz’s categorisation is that i t  gives the 
impression that  each of the three trends is internally homogeneous,  with 
group members sharing the same views about all political affairs . This is 
not particularly accurate when one examines them closely.  Within each 
trend there are many ongoing doctrinal  disputes over crucial  issues such 
as political participation, the legitimacy of present Muslim rulers ,  and 
the accusations  of takfīr  (charge with unbelief).  Ignoring these internal 
disagreements oversimplifies the rich variety of opinions that exists 
within each of the abovementioned main trends.  
Wiktorowicz’s typology is also problematic because of the importance of 
recognition and status.  For example, going by his identificatory factors, 
                                                     
13 Justyna  Nedza,  “The  Sum of  i ts  Par ts  –  The Sta te  as Apostate  in  Contemporary 
Saudi Mil i tant  I slamism” in Camilla  Adang,  Hassan Ansari ,  Maribe l  Fier ro and 
Sabine Schmidtke  (eds.) ,  Accusat ions of  Unbelie f  in  I s lam: A Diachronic  Perspect ive 
on Takfīr ,  Br i l l ,  2015.  
14 Wagemakers ,  A Quiet is t  J ihadi ,  10.  
15 Another  cr i t ic i sm of Wiktorowicz’s typology that  has recent ly come to  my 
attent ion i s  Justyna  Nedza,  “‘Salaf i smus’:  Über legungen zur  Schär fung e iner  
Analysekategorie ,”  in Salafi smus:  Auf der Suche nach dem wahren I s lam ,  Behnam T.  
Said and Hazim Fouad (eds.) ,  (Freiburg:  Herder ,  2014) ,  89 -90.  Contrary to  her  la ter  
ar t ic le  mentioned  above,  here she depar ts  from Wiktoro wicz’s typo logy rather  than 
adopting i t .  
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the Purist trend would include figures such as ʿAlī al-Ḥalabī 16 (b. 1960) 
alongside those who are regarded as  senior scholars in Saudi Arabia. 17 
Conflating them is inadequate since the al-Ḥalabī never enjoyed the 
same prestigious status, within the Salafī proponents, as senior scholars 
such as Bakr Abū Zayd (1946-2008) or ʿAbd Allāh al -Ghudayyān  (1926-
2010).  This is  of particular importance especially if  we take into 
consideration that  these senior  scholars hold different views to al -Ḥalabī  
regarding important issues such as the debates on the validity of  
manmade laws and the employment of the doctrine of takfīr  of a ruler - 
both issues constituting core matters of intra-Salafī dispute.  For 
example,  in 2000, The Permanent Committee for Research and Legal 
Verdicts in Saudi Arabia  (PCRV), headed by the aforementioned two 
senior scholars in addition to Ṣāliḥ  al-Fawzān (b. 1935) and the muft ī  
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʾĀl Shaykh (b. 1943), issued a religious verdict (fatwā)  
against the publication of two books authored by al -Ḥalabī.  The 
Committee deemed his books to be a threat  to the Salafī creed because 
they “were based on the view of Murjiʾah 18 in regard to the concept of 
īmān.” 19 This is  a very serious charge from a Salafī  point  of view, since 
the question of īmān  is a defining line between Salafīs and other Muslim 
schools . The shaykhs further advised al -Ḥalabī to “strive to seek 
religious knowledge from trustworthy scholars .” 20 Thus,  this case shows 
                                                     
16 Al-Ḥalabī  i s  a  famous Jordanian scholar  and a  p roli f ic  wri ter  who played a major  
role  in the interna l  d isputes amongst  the  Salaf ī s  in the 1990s.  
17 By senior  scholars,  I  mean here the older  generat ion of scholars in Saudi Arab ia  
who were ei ther  appointed by the Saudi government  to  serve as o ff icial  muftī s  
(Muslim legal  exper ts  who give rul ings on rel igious a ffa ir s) ,  or  recognised for  the ir  
senior i ty by younger  scholars.  The scholars appointed by the  government o f Saudi 
Arabia s i t  e i ther  on the Board of  Senior  Scholars ( hayʾat  k ibār al - ʿu lamāʾ )  or  in  the  
Permanent Co mmittee for  Sc ient i f ic  Research and Legal  Verdicts ( al-Lajnah a l -
Dāʾimah l i  a l -Buḥūth a l - ʿ i lmiyyah wa  a l- I f tāʾ ) .  
18 One of the ear l ies t  I slamic sects that  emerged around the t ime of the c ivi l  war  
between the four th Caliph ʿAl ī  b .  Abī Ṭālib  (656–661)  and his successor  Muʿāwiyah 
b.  Abī  Sufyān (661/680) .  In  Salaf ī  l i tera ture,  the  sa l ient  feature o f Murj i ʾah  i s  their  
exclusion of deeds and actions fro m  the essence of fai th.  Chapter  F our  deals in dep th 
wi th  the  views of the Murj iʾah  
19 A copy of  the  verd ict  in  Arab ic is  ava ilab le at :  www.anti - ir ja .net  (accessed 
20/04/2013)  
20 Ibid   
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that i t  would be more accurate to distinguish between the category of 
senior scholars who enjoy more respect and acknowledgment amongst all  
Salafī  proponents and that  of the younger generation who may share 
some aspects with senior scholars but still  have their own distin ctive 
characteristics  as we shall see.  
Further, while the term Jihādīs  is to some extent, self-explanatory, the 
other two labels, Purists and Politicos are problematic since they do not 
imply distinguishable connotations for the peop le they are intended to  
define. All Salafīs consider themselves purists 21  and not all those 
labelled politicos are engaged in poli tics. If  we are to take the example 
of al-daʿwah al -Salafīyyah  (the Salafī  Call ) active in Alexandria in 
Egypt (DSA), 22 one finds that  before the  Egyptian revolution that  took 
place on 25 t h  of January 2012, this group was concerned only with 
nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. 23 Also, 
the DSA view politics as a diversion that  encourages deviancy 24 a feature 
that  in accordance wi th Wiktorowicz’s  Anatomy  makes them fit into the 
category of puris ts.  Yet,  DSA were always in disagreement with the 
Purist  scholars in Egypt such as Ṭalʿat  Zahrān (b. 1954) and Muhammad 
Raslān (b. 1955) who charge its  members of being ḥizbiyūn  (partisans),  a 
derogatory term used by the so -called Purists against the so-called 
Politicos. 25  
An alternative categorisation devised by Omayma Abdel Latiff in Trends 
of Salafism , 26 offers slightly better tools for understanding this diverse 
group of people:  
                                                     
21 Other  scholars use the term quiet is t s  instead of  pur is t  to  avoid  this  i ssue,  see :  
Wagemakers,  A Quie ti s t  J ihādī ;  Lav,  Daniel ,  Radical  Is lam and the Revival  of  
Medieva l  Theology ,  122  
22 A Salafī  o rganisa t ion founded  in mid 1970s by several  s tudent s  at  the facul ty o f 
medic ine at  Alexandr ia  Univers i ty  
23 Ghāzī,  Al-Sala fī yyūn f ī  Misr Mā baʿd a l -Thawrah ,  (Sa laf ī s  in Egypt a fte r  the 
Revolut ion) ,  Beirut ,  al- Int i shār al - ʿArabī ,  2012,  p .  74  
24 Ibid ,  p .  79  
25 See for  example ht tp: / /www.sahab.net / forums / index.php?showtopic=123697   
26 Omayma Abdel Lat i f f ,  “Trends in  Salaf i sm ,”  in  Michael  Emerson,  Kr ist ina Kausch 
and  Richard Youngs (eds) ,  I s lamis t  Radica li sa t ion:   The  Chal lenge  for  Euro -
Medi terranean Rela t ions ,  Centre  for  European Policy Studies,  Brusse ls,  2009,  p .  69  
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a)  Al-Salafīyyah al-ʿilmiyyah ,  (scholarly Salafism), which is 
concerned with the study of the holy text and Islamic 
jurisprudence.  This is an alternative to the Wiktorowicz’ 
purists, however,  this term is likewise,  problematic since the 
dedication of time and effort to studying and teaching the 
religion is a trademark of all Salafīs and can not be considered 
a denominator that  distinguishes one trend or group from the 
rest.  
b)  Al-Salafīyyah al-ḥarakiyyah ,  or activist Salafism, which 
describes both politically active Salafī groups and those groups 
that  are not polit ically active, but which occupy a place in the 
public sphere through thei r engagement in charity and networks 
of social  support  and religious education institutes.  This may in 
fact  be the most suitable category in which to place groups such 
as the DSA. 
c)  Al-Salafīyyah al-jihādiyyah ,  which concerns itself with armed 
conducts as a mean to implement Islamic rule.  
Despite its refinements, this categorisation is very similar to that of 
Wiktorowicz and hence  it suffers from the same inadequacies .   
As indicated above,  the principal reason for the prevalence of such 
imprecise categorisations is  the study of the internal Salafī  divisions 
through the prism of security studies. In fact , this can be said about most 
studies on Salafism in general. 27 Such studies are mainly concerned with 
answering one key political question, that is , why and under what  
circumstances certain Salafī groups prioritise militant activism. 
However, such single-minded focus is self -defeating, because divisions 
within Salafism over politics and violence are primarily caused by 
doctrinal disagreements and therefore cannot be ade quately explained 
from a mere political or social perspective.  In fact, what makes Anatomy 
of Salafism  so influential to this day is that unlike other publications on 
                                                     
27 Meijer ,  “Introduct ion, ”  2;  Haykel ,  “On the  Nature o f Salafī  Thought and  Action,”  
34.  
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this matter,  it  does touch on some of the Salafī  basic doctrinal tenets and 
addresses , although partially,  some of the doctrinal disagreement over 
the takfīr  of present-day rulers in the Muslim World.   
Therefore, there is a need to study and critically analyse, not only the 
doctrine of Salafism, but more importantly,  its varied interpretations  and 
understandings within the various contemporary Salafī  trends in the light 
of modern politics. The present research aims to open a new interpretive 
angle to “the anatomy of Salafism,”  in two ways: by focusing on the 
doctrinal causes of the internal Sal afī fragmentations, and accordingly,  
re-mapping the proponents of Salafism according to their reactions to 
several contemporary political  issues.   
This study contends that  understanding the various stances of the Salafī 
proponents and their discourses concerning politics and violence, 
requires us to perceive Salafism as an intellectual group that rationalises 
its opinions on social and political affairs first and foremost through 
their religious doctrine.  Indeed, Salafīs share a common method of 
dealing with the sources of Islam in order to extract religious opinions 
about different aspects of religious, social,  and political issues. They 
eagerly search for religious evidence to justify their positions.  A typical 
Salafī argument, as Haykal observes, is that  “unlike other Muslims, 
[they] rely exclusively on sound proof  - texts from revelation - as the 
basis for their views, and they adduce the relevant verses or traditions 
every time they issue a judgment or opinion.” 28  Thus, studying the 
doctrinal  causes of the internal divisions within Salafism is an important 
step towards achieving a broader, deeper, and most importantly,  an 
accurate understanding of Salafism in general and the different 
tendencies  within Salafism in particular.  
Aims of the Research and Research Question 
The main aim of this research is to offer an alternative insight into 
Salafism by pinpointing and identifying the key elements and the 
                                                     
28 Haykel,  “On the Nature  of Sa laf ī  Thought and Act ion,” 36 .  
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doctrinal  roots of the divergence between the proponents of this 
tradition. In doing so, the study develop an analytical  framework that 
enables a better understanding of the doctrinal diversity within the Salafī  
intellectual  tradition and how such difference lead to divergent  reactions 
to contemporary poli tical issues.   
In addition to this main aim, the research also has sub -aims that  can be 
summarised as follows:  
-  To develop a refined definition of Salafism based on a clear set of 
characteristics that distinguish a Salafī from a non -Salafī.  
-  To examine the different definit ions of  īmān  (faith) and kufr  
(unbelief) prevalent among Salafīs,  and the di fferent boundaries 
drawn by them in determining when a person ceased to be Muslim;   
-  To show how Salafī proponents hold opposing stances towards 
present-day regimes in the Muslim World,  and explain their 
justifications for their respective positions;  
-  To assess the attitude of Salafīs towards the status quo in the 
Muslim World and study the methods employed by those who are 
dissatisfied with it,  in order to alter the balance favour of Islam; 
and finally,    
-  To map and explain the conflicting Salafī stances tow ards politics 
and violence.  
Hypothesis 
In his Anatomy of the Salafī movement ,  Wiktorowicz hypothesises that 
the causes of the dissimilar positions taken by the various Salafī  factions 
lie in “the inherently subjective nature of applying religion to new iss ues 
and problems.” 29 Such suggestion implies that  divisions within Salafism 
are rooted merely,  in legal disagreements ( ikhtilāfāt  fiqhiyyah ) as 
opposed to creed (ʿaqīdah). This is even clearer when he asserts that  
                                                     
29 Wiktoro wicz,  “Anatomy of the Sa laf ī  Movement,”  208.  
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“The various factions of the Salafī communi ty are united by a common 
religious creed.” 30 In this research, I suggest that although this assertion 
proposed by Wiktorowicz is adequate regarding some disagreements such 
as the dispute over the permissibility of the use of suicide attacks in 
wars, creedal divergence has also played a major role in the internal 
splits .  
The present research raises three hypotheses:  
(i)  My first hypothesis is that the primary cause of the internal 
Salafī  conflicts can be attributed, directly or indirectly,  to one 
particular creedal issue, namely, the relationship between one’s 
outwardly actions and īmān .   
(ii)  In addition to the role of doctrine, I also argue for the key role  
of outstanding religious figures in creating a sharp sense of 
communal identity amongst his followers . The result,  in such 
cases,  is  the acceptance of the leader’s opinions as the truth 
and rejection all other opposing views.  
(iii)  My third hypothesis serves as a test  case to the first , by proving 
that the prestigious status enjoyed by Shaykh al-Albānī (1914-
1999) amongst Salafī proponents, have led some proponents of 
Salafism to adopt and develop his religious opinions over 
politics,  and this tendency played a major role in setting up the 
first steps for the divisions.  
Significance of the Study 
There are many reasons that  make a doctrinally aware study of internal 
Salafī  disputes over politics very significant. First ly,  a study of Salafism 
is timely, given that  Salafī  ideas and beliefs have become widespread 
inside and outside the Muslim World in the last  few decades ,  reportedly 
making it  one of the fastest growing forms of Islam in the world. 31 The 
                                                     
30 Ibid   
31 Accord ing to  several  media sources,  the German domestic  inte l l igence service 
annual  report  dat ing from 2010  s ta ted that  Salaf ism was the fastes t  growing I slamic 
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significance of Salafism became obvious in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, when it emerged as one of the big contributing factors in the 
politics of the region. 32  In order to comprehend the current polit ical 
developments in the region, one must study and scrutinise all political 
players including the Salafīs who are likely to play a significant role 
there.  
Additionally,  what also has become more apparent after the Arab Spring 
is the existence of various and even contradicting Salafī views on 
politics.  Awareness of such variety has only added to t he persistent 
ambiguity surrounding Salafism in general. Scholars and specialist 
observers often find it hard to distinguish between the different Salafī 
groups, let alone the media and ordinary people. Studying and 
understanding the Salafī divisions is therefore not only important, but 
essential in order to achieve clari ty of understanding regarding this 
powerful set of actors.  
Moreover ,  doctrine is the central plank of Salafī claim to authority. 
According to some observers, the populari ty of Salafism and its appeal 
to a wide range of Muslims inside and outside the Muslim World is due 
to its  claim of authenticity and “ its  seemingly limitless ability to c ite 
scripture to back these up.” 33  Salafī proponents often insist that the 
legality of stances towards re ligious,  political,  and social affairs lies in 
the evidences of the religious texts (i.e.  Quran and sunnah) backing such 
stance and not in the scholar defending them. Given this,  it  is essential  
to fill  the gap in our knowledge of Salafī  doctrine ,  and of the connection 
between their doctrines and their deeply divided politics.  
Finally, this research analyses some important materials that have not been addressed in 
existing scholarship on takfīr of the ruler who does not rule by sharīʿah. Some scholars, 
such as al-Ḥalabī, have been overlooked in recent works on the subject while his role in 
                                                                                                                                                           
movement  in the world .  See :  
ht tp : / /www.alarabiya .ne t/ar t icles /2012/04 /12/207289.html (accessed 12/05/2013)  
32 In 2012  par l iamentary e lec t ions in Egypt ,  Salafī  poli t ical  par t ies captured 25 
percent  o f the vote  
33 “On the Nature o f Sa laf ī  Thought  and Act ion ,”  p .  36  
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intra-Salafi debates is pivotal in the sense that it triggered robust responses from across 
the Salafi spectrum. Some academic work engage with al-Ḥalabī to some degree but 
none of them had access to the now very rare first edition of his heavily criticised book 
al-Taḥdīr. An analysis of its contents will markedly shift our understanding of the 
debates that ensued on īmān and kufr after the publication of his work. Similarly, in 
conducting this research, I consulted the original dissertation of al-Ḥawālī in addition to 
the edited version of that work in a later publication (that other scholars have had to 
reply on). The significance of consulting the original is that it has no mention of the 
criticisms levelled against al-Albānī, as opposed to the published version. 
Sources and Methodology 
This study is based, mainly,  on library and archival research. The data 
analysed here consists largely of the writing, speeches and other  
publications modern and contemporary Salafī  scholars on the different 
subjects discussed. The material studied includes books, articles, 
recorded or transcribed sermons and the religious verdicts of many 
prominent Salafī scholars obtained from the worldwi de web and 
collected during a fieldwork conducted in Egypt and Jordan. Salafīs are 
very active online and they make extensive use of new media 
technologies as a tool of education as well as a form of daʿwah  
(preaching). The results of these online activiti es are reflected in the 
availabili ty of an overwhelming amount of information, which one can 
easily access from anywhere in the world. On Salafī websites, thousands 
of books, forums of discussions, lectures,  and other kinds of digital  
material  are made available to all readers . One significant source base of 
this research is an extensive survey of such online sources, in Arabic and 
English languages , with a focus on material  dealing with politics and 
violence. That said,  I have been aware of  the dubious and precarious 
nature of information obtained from the worldwide web, and attempted 
to mitigate these problems by relying only on the official  websites of 
prominent scholars such as www.binbaz.org.sa/  of the former muft ī  of 
Saudi Arabia ʿAbd al -ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz (1910 -1999),  or of a particular 
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group such as www.anasalafy.com/  of al-Daʿwah al -Salafīyyah  in 
Alexandria.  
There are also websites that offer (mostly written) material of like -
minded Salafīs such as the website of Abu Muhammad al -Maqdisī  
www.tawhed.ws, which to my knowledge offers the largest amounts of 
material  authored by those that Wiktorowicz would label as Jihādīs .  
There are other websites that  represent anti -Jihādī  views such as 
www.sahab.net  and www.kulalSalaf iyeen.com/vb/ . Both categories of 
websites usually have links to other “trusted” websites, which present 
similar views. These links have proved useful to this research for  
grouping like-minded websites and scholars ,  even if like-mindedness 
does not necessarily imply identity of polit ical opinion . Of course, 
relying on online material , especially that of the Jihādīs  does come with 
the risk of the unpredictable closure of these websites. The website of 
al-Maqdisī  for instance, was shut down many times in the past  few years. 
To overcome this problem, all material related to his research was  
downloaded and saved as soon as it  was discovered, as a precautionary 
measure.  
In addition to modern and contemporary primary sources, the study also,  
makes use of classical sources that are frequently cited in the Salafī 
material , such as the works of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263 –1328) and Ibn al-
Qayyim (1292–1350). Other primary classical works are also,  referred to 
such as the sources of tafs īr al-Quran  (exegesis of Quran) and ḥadīth  
(the Prophetic tradition). Most of these books are available in PDF 
format and can be downloaded from the website www.waqfeya.com, 
which is arguably, the largest online library compiling primary Sunni 
sources.  
Further, the majority of the material studied here is in Arabic . As a 
native speaker and trained teacher of Arabic language, I have been able 
to rely read them myself, and all quotations used from such texts in this 
thesis are my own translations. However,  in some cases, I have also used 
English language translations of primary sources that  are made available 
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online by English speaking Salafīs,  though, at  times slight modifications 
to these translations are made in order to elucidate certain points.  
In addition to the primary sources, the researcher also, looks at works on 
Salafism produced by academic scholars.  Although, studies on the Salafī  
doctrine in general  are rare,  there has been some great  works on Salafism 
in the last few years,  which can help the purpose of this research.  
The research for this thesis began with preliminary reading of the 
available primary sources dealing with politics and violence, in order to 
develop a general  sense of their content. These works often take the form 
of statement and counter statement , thus revealing the t itle of the book 
or the name of the person they intend to refute or support . By collating 
this information, and by exploring the l ines of debate, it  was possible 
firstly,  to identify the main active leading figures involved in the intra -
Salafī  disputes and secondly, to define the central  themes and questions 
of these disputes .  This information provided a foundation for the 
following stages of the research.  
In the next phase of the research, in addition to taking observations 
during fieldwork, I divided Salafīs into four distinctive groups :  
traditional or senior scholars, Loyalists , Activists , and Jihādīs .  The 
purpose of such classification was not to lose sight of the heterogeneity 
and overlaps in such  groups in matters of politics ; i t  was intended as a 
preliminary framework for understanding and analysing that  complexity 
within Salafism. As per my preliminary classification, the  groups are as 
follows:  
The Senior 34  ʿulamāʾ:  This group includes the older generation of 
scholars who are recognised  for their religious knowledge across the 
Salafī  spectrum. At the apex of this category are three important 
scholars: the Syrian scholar Muhammad Nāsir al-Dīn al-Albānī ,  and two 
                                                     
34 I  have categorised these  scholars separa te ly as  “Senior” for  two main reasons:  ( i)  
the scholars  in  this  category belong to  an older  generat ion and  their  status as  grea t ,  
kno wledgeable scholars  i s  recognised by a l l  fac t ions  across Sa laf i sm;  ( i i )  the 
scholars in this category have not  d irec t ly engaged in these debates and were no t  the 
subject  o f accusat ions by the o ther  groups (J ihādī ,  Act ivist  and Loyal is t ) .  
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Saudi scholars ʿAbd al -ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz (1910-1999), and Muhammad Ṣaliḥ  
Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn  (1925-2001).  
The focus of the Senior scholars is mainly on religious education and the 
purification of religious creed and practice. Some of them spend their 
entire lives in teaching classes covering a number of religious subjects 
such as creed, jurisprudence ( fiqh), Quran exegesis ( tafsīr), and science 
of tradition (muṣṭalaḥ  al-ḥadīth). Broadly speaking, the Senior scholars 
do not engage in political activit ies and believe that violence and 
protests are not permissible.  These scholars are not engaged directly in 
the intra-Salafī disputes, though the views of some of them on the 
disputed matters are known and available in their writ ings and sermons.  
The Loyalists:  Members of this group are extremely loyal to present day 
states and call for an absolute subservience to present poli tical authority.  
This trend is also known by other labels such as Madkhalīs  or Jāmīs . 35  
The key characterist ic of this trend is their opposition to any form of 
political activism against the state in the Muslim World of the present 
day. They deem any overt criticism against the ruler to be a sign of 
deviation from what they call the correct method of Salafism (al-manhaj  
al-salafī al-ṣaḥīḥ).  They argue that  the correct  Salafī  method of 
opposing any un-Islamic policies is  by giving the rulers advice in 
private.  Revolutions, demonstrations,  and overt opposition to authority 
are a kind of sedition ( fitnah) that  only leads to civil strife. However, 
this position towards the state does not mean that they are totally 
pacifist,  “but rather obedience-minded people who would not hesitate to 
engage in armed warfare if given the order to do so by the ruler” as 
Haykal argues. 36  
The Jihādīs  or Jihādī-Salafīs: If the Loyalists are at one end of the 
Salafī  spectrum, the Jihādīs  sit  on the absolute opposite end. The 
adherents of this orientation have been the main focus of most research 
and media coverage. They are “those Salafīs who bel ieve that  jihad 
                                                     
35 Express ing an at tr ibution to  the Salafī  scho lars  Rabīʿ  Ibn Hādī a l -Madkhalī  (b .  
1931)  and Muhammad Amān al -Jāmī (1930 -1995)  respec tive ly  
36 “On the na ture  o f Salaf i  thought ,” p.  49  
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should not just be waged against  invading or aggressive non -Muslim 
enemies but should also be used in a revolutionary way against the 
“apostate” rulers in their own midst. ” 37 
The Activists (al-ḥarakiyyūn):  These are also referred to as Ṣaḥwīs  by 
some scholars, such as Lacroix in his study on Saudi Arabia, or as 
Politicos in Wiktorowicz’s Anatomy. This tendency consists of a wide 
range of Salafīs,  whose common feature is  their overt  opposition to 
present-day rulers in the Muslim World while stopping short of 
sanctioning armed rebellion. This tendency includes (i)  those who are 
directly involved in political activism , participating in elections and 
parliaments such as the members of al -Nūr Party in Egypt,  and (ii) those 
who are not directly involved in politics but nonetheless,  are known for 
their opposition to the state.  
Further,  as mentioned beforehand, most of the studies on the internal 
Salafī  disputes have looked at their political activism. The first phase of 
this research identified furthe r political topics that  have been subject to 
disputation inside the Salafī  School. These disputed topics are dealt with 
separately in order to answer the main question of this research: what are 
the doctrinal  causes of the internal Salafī  disputes over pol itics and 
violence?  
Under each of these topics, a descriptive approach is used to identify the 
points of agreement amongst Salafīs and when necessary, to distinguish 
Salafīs from non-Salafīs. For identify agreements, I refer to the works 
and statements of  those scholars who are regarded as authoritative by all 
Salafī proponents ,  such as: Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb, Ibn Ibrāhīm and al -
Shanqīṭī.  In turn, authoritative figures are identified by an exhaustive 
survey of Salafī polemical works (as discussed above), in which the 
opinions of the most respected scholars are quoted to bolster the author’s 
opinion. However, for the purposes of brevity,  I only refer to only one or 
two of such leading scholars  every time I evaluate the convergence or 
deviance of any Salafī text  from the norm. 
                                                     
37 Wagemakers ,  A Quiet is t  J ihādī ,  p .  9  
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After establishing what unites Salafīs with regards to a topic, the main 
elements of disagreement are identified and the doctrinal  grounds of 
dispute are analysed.  
With regards to  divergences ,  the study uses samples (from a book or 
from various publications of a scholar) bearing a range of  different 
views on the topic.  For instance, regarding the question of manmade 
laws, I rely mainly on the writings of al -Ḥalabī and al -ʿAnbarī 38  to 
determine the position of the Salafī  opinion that advocates  the 
legit imacy of present day rulers. The reason for choosing these two is 
because their works on this question seem to be the main reference s on 
which most debates on the subject are based . Even in English language 
Salafī websites, the majority of online debates rely heavily on them to 
determine their posit ion. 39  
Scope and Limitations 
If one closely examines the modern history of Salafism and studies the 
religious opinions of certain Salafī figureheads such as al -Albānī and Ibn 
Bāz, it  becomes apparent that opposing opinions and disagreements over 
various matters have always existed. However,  as the t i tle of this 
research suggests,  this study deals exclusively w ith disagreements over 
maters related to politics and violence in contemporary Salafism. Hence, 
disagreements over non-political questions are not addressed here.  
The study also focuses on three countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,  
and Jordan. The reason for choosing these three countries is  that  Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt have played key roles in the emergence and the 
development of modern Salafism. As for Jordan, although it did not 
enjoy the same role as the other two countries,  it  has become a key 
player after 1980 when al-Albānī moved there. Additionally,  Jordan is 
                                                     
38 An Egyptian scholar  who taught  for  some t ime in Saudi Arabia.  I  could not  find 
his date o f bi r th.  
39 See for  example:  www.Sa lafimanhaj .com;  www.Salaf ipubl ica t ions.co m (accessed 
22/05/2013)  
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the base for one of the most important figures in the intra -salafī  debates, 
namely al-Ḥalabī.  
Another limitation to this research is i ts timeframe. This research is 
looking at  intra-Salafī disputes during the 1990s starting from the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait .  
Thesis Outline 
Chapter One  defines Salafism as a concept and describes its main 
characteristics as a school of thought and as an approach to Islamic 
sources that distinguish Salafism from other Sunni interpretational 
traditions.  In doing so it  aims to answer the following questions:  what 
does the term Salafī stands for; and consequently,  who can be identified 
as Salafī? Also,  this introductory chapter aims to differentiate 
Wahhabism from Salafism and investigate whether the two terms refer to 
the same form of religious perception and practice .  As part  of defining 
Salafism, the study tries  to answer whether it  can be considered as an 
enlightened reform school aiming for the revival and progress of Islam 
and Muslim societies in the modern era , similar to the well-known 
movement of Muhammad ʿAbduh. 
Chapter Two  examines opposing Salafī views on obedience towards 
contemporary leaders who rule according to manmade laws and not the 
sharīʿah .  It  offers a detailed overview of the doctrinal grounds provided 
by proponents of the various Salafī opinions regarding the  desired stance 
towards the present day rulers in the Muslim World. In this connection, 
it  studies the conditions  they propose—in terms of actions and duties—
that  must be fulfilled by the ruler in order to be legitimate;  as well as the 
religious verdicts on obeying the leaders who rule according to rules 
other than sharīʿah .  The importance of these issues derives from two 
points. First,  they have been directly or indirectly the main cause of all 
fractions within Salafism. Secondly, the stance of each group towards 
present states is rooted in their theoretical  approac h towards the 
conditions of legitimacy.  
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Chapter Three  deals with the divisions amongst the Salafīs on whether 
or not the adoption of manmade laws as a system for legislation and 
governing is sinful enough to declare takfīr  on present-day rulers.  It  
attempts to investigate the opposing views on this issue and  discuss the 
religious evidences given by each party in order to justify their  view. 
Additionally,  the chapter examines the views of modern and 
contemporary senior scholars whose authority is recognised by all  
Salafīs engaging in these debates  on this issue. It  reveals  how the lack of 
explicit and detailed views on the question of manmade laws by those 
authoritative scholars has led the younger generation of Salafīs to differ 
over their actual  positions concern ing this question. 
The chapter concludes  that the pro-takfīr  view concerning this issue was 
the prevalent position amongst senior scholars and that al -Albānī was the 
first recognised Senior Scholar to express a different and more 
restrictive view. 
In an aim to find the common grounds that unite all S alafī tendencies 
regarding the concept of takfīr ,  Chapter Four, firstly provides a 
comprehensive account of the general Salafī  understanding of the these 
terms and the answers they give to the aforementioned que stions. Here, 
only the works of those scholars, who enjoy an authoritative status 
across the Salafī  spectrum, will be considered for analysis. This includes 
both classical  and contemporary scholars of such as Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263–1328), Ibn Qayyim (1292–1350),  and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703-
1792).  
Secondly, the chapter explores the fragmentations and conflicts among 
the various Salafī  groups concerning these concepts. Thus, the second 
part aims to explore some of the salient debates within contemporary 
Salafī groups and scholars regarding the definit ion of īmān  and kufr  and 
highlight the doctrinal  evidences on which each group rely in their 
argument against their opposition. Establishing the above should help the 
researcher and the reader alike to grasp how the concept of takfīr  
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(labelling someone as unbeliever) is addressed by the various Salafī 
groups engaging in these debates.  
Chapter Five  examines the accusations of irjāʾ  aimed at  the senior 
Salafī scholar al -Albānī by a number of Salafīs. In particular, it  focuses 
on the cri tiques raised by the promonent Activist  scholar al -Ḥawālī  in 
his book Ẓāhirat al -Irjāʾ  and how these accusations of irjāʾ  became a 
conviction amongst many Salaf īs that  al-Albānī  held non-Salafī  views on 
īmān  and takfīr .  This chapter aims to highlight the main doctrinal 
reasons behind these accusations and attempts to assess  the views of this 
eminent scholar on this issue. The chapter  reveals that one of the main 
reasons for these accusations stems from al -Albānī’s use of certain 
religious terms which is different to the conventional Salafī  usage  in 
Saudi Arabia.  
The Conclusion Chapter  concludes the research by highlighting and 
summarising the most important findings gained throughout the thesis.  It  
will reflect on the importance of doctrine and more specifically the 
relationship between īmān  and action in determining the divergences in 
political stances among the various Salafī  trends.  
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Chapter Two: Background and Context  
Defining Salafism 
Despite the great interest  given in recent years by academics,  jo urnalists 
and policy makers to Salafism ,  “relieving some of the confusion that 
beclouds the term continues to prove difficult.” 1 This confusion has led 
many of those interested in this relatively new field of research to blend 
Salafism with Islamism, radical  Islam, militant  Islam, polit ical  Islam, 
and the Muslim Brotherhood under one single phenomenon. 2 One of the 
main reasons for Salafism being so ambiguous and difficult to define is  
its fragmentation and the ongoing disputes taking place between its  
proponents over various matters related to politics and violence. For this 
reason, this study proposes to define Salafism by identifying its key 
denominators and by isolating characteristics that  distinguish Salafīs  
from other Muslims. By doing so,  it  will provide a minimal and broad 
definit ion that can help to distinguish a non -Salafī Muslim from a 
Salafī . 3 
Starting from an etymological perspective, Salafism (in Arabic, 
Salafīyyah) derives from the Arabic word salaf ,  which means that which 
has passed or preceded. 4 The word salaf  is  used in both Quran and ḥadīth  
in this linguistic connotation. The verse reads: “And We made them (the 
people of Pharaoh) a precedent (salafan) and an example to later 
generations.” 5  Also in a long ḥadīth  reported in Ṣaḥiḥ  Muslim ,  the 
                                                     
1 Lauzière,  "The Construction  of  Salafiyya ,"  369.  
2 See for  ins tance:  Fradkin,  "The His tory and Unwri t ten Fu ture o f  Salaf i sm.”  
3 Some scholars such as Haykel  and Nadza ( in her  ar t ic le  in German “Salaf ismus”)  
have a lso  ackno wledged  the need for  a  def ini t ion of the term Salafi sm tha t  does no t  
focus entirely on i t s  pol i t ica l  dimensions and dismisses i t s  theo logica l  o r igins.  Their  
work provides a  good star t ing point  for  fur ther  invest iga tion,  but  my work here  
offers  a  more  re f ined def ini t ion.  For  example,  Haykel  argues  tha t  the  
excommunica tion of Muslims who do no t  per form their  re l igious duties  is  
dis t inct ively Salafī .   However ,  as I  sho w in the fourth  chap ter  o f this  s tudy be low, 
the concept o f  be lie f  in  Sa laf ī  theo logical  wr it ings i s  more co mplex than that .   See:  
Haykel ,  “On the Nature of Sa laf i  Thought and Action,” 40.  
4 Wehr,  Hans,  and J .  Mi lton Co wan.  A Dic tionary  of  Modern Writ ten Arabic ,  422  
5 Quran ,  43:56.  
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Prophet  says to his daughter Fatimah: “…So fear Allah and be patient. 
And I am the best salaf  for you.” 6  
As such, our ancestors who have preceded us are our salaf  and we are the 
salaf  of those who come after us. Based on this meaning, the wor d salaf  
is used in the Islamic context to refer to:  (i) all  scholars who have 
preceded the person using the word , this being the pure etymological  
=connotation. (ii) The first  three generation of Muslims , including the 
companions of Prophet Muhammad (ṣaḥābah),  those who met them and 
learnt Islam directly from them ( tābiʿīn) and the generation that  learnt 
Islam directly from the tābiʿīn .  These three generations also known as 
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ  (pious ancestors) have always enjoyed a venerated 
status in Sunni Islam throughout Islamic history. This status owes to the 
famous ḥadīth  “The best of my people are my generation, then those who 
come after them, then those who come after them. Then there will be 
people whose testimony will  come before their oath, and the ir oath 
before their testimony.” 7  
Based on this ḥadīth ,  Salafīs argue that since those first three 
generations of Muslims had first -hand experience of the emergence of 
Islam and have been praised by the Prophet, therefore they should be 
held as a model for the way in which Muslims should live their lives. 
Wagemakers correctly observes that f or this reason, the Salafīs as “try to 
emulate the “pious predecessors” as closely and in as many spheres of 
life as possible and construct their beliefs, their behavio ur and their 
reading of the sources of Islam to further that  goal.” 8 The result of this 
approach is a distinctive form of engagement with the world 9 that ought 
to make it very easy, to identify a Salafī  based merely on certain outer 
behaviours  and outlook. A typical  Salafī for instance, would have a 
relatively a longer beard than other Muslims. Also men and women 
Salafīs  can be identified by their dress ,  which,  in many cases, is  distinct 
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8 Wagemakers ,  A Quiet is t  J ihadi ,  4 .  
9 Haykel,  “On the Nature  of Salaf i  Thought and Act ion,”  35 .  
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to their societal environments. Salafī  men are usually committed to 
wearing mid-calf Gallabiyyah whenever it  is  possible and women often 
wear baggy robes with some of them veil ing their faces.  
Having said that,  it  must be noted that t he desire to follow the first three 
generations is not confined to the Salafīs ,  but  it  has always been present 
in Sunni Islam. For this reason one finds the opponents of Salafism 
firmly refuse to make the term Salafism “a distinctive tag to incorporate 
one particular faction of Muslims.” 10  
What really distinguishes Salaf īs from non-Salaf īs in this connection is 
that the former do not just perceive these three generations as a mere 
blessed era in Islam but they also contend that their interpretation of 
Islam, modelled on that  era,  is the only true interpretation. Any other 
interpretation after the salaf  is  a prohibited innovation. This view is 
based on their interpretation of another famous tradition in which the 
Prophet  says that  the community will divide into seventy-three sects only 
one of which would be on the true path/ correct/correctly guided . When 
asked to describe that one true sect ,  he replied that they would be those 
who followed his path and the path of his companions.  In Salafī  
literature, this sect  is often referred to as al-firqah al-nājiyah  (the saved 
group) or al-ṭāʾi fah al-manṣūrah  (the victorious group),  which is also,  
by extension, the Salaf ī  term of self-description. 11 
Although Salafīs emphasise adherence to the Quran and ḥadīth ,  and 
argue for direct  access to them, they contend that  this alone is not 
enough for one to be on the pa th that the Prophet  marked as being the 
true/correct one. One must in addition, adhere to these scriptural texts 
based on how they were interpreted by the salaf .  After all ,  the salaf  
learnt Islam directly from the Prophet  and his companions;  therefore 
they were better equipped to interpret the tenets of Islam accurately.  
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This reasoning echoes that of the prominent companion Ibn ʿAbbās in his 
famous debate 12  with the Khawārij 13 It  is  reported that  following their 
secession from the army of the fourth Caliph ʿAl ī ,  Ibn ʿAbbās asked for 
the latter’s permission to go to their camp in order to debate with them. 
According to Sunni sources ,  the debate resulted in the repentance of 
about a third of the Khawārij . 14 
Ibn ʿAbbās started his debate by pointing to the fact that none of the 
companions of the Prophet was within the Khawārij  camp. He argued 
that just this fact on its own should cast  doubt about the legitimacy of 
the Khawārij  position. He states:  “I have come to you from amongst the 
Companions of the Prophet , the muhājirūn ,  and the anṣār  so that I may 
inform you of what they say.” Then after conceptualising the dispute as 
the understanding of the Khawārij  vis-à-vis the understanding of the 
ṣaḥābah ,  he goes on to explain/argue why the understanding of the 
ṣaḥābah  is  more likely to be accurate than those who came after them. 
Ibn ʿAbbās reasons: “since it  is upon them (ṣaḥābah) that  the Quran was 
sent down, they are more knowledgeable about the revelation than you, it  
was revealed amongst them, and there is  none of them amongst you.” 15 
As we shall see, such venerated reports of war -time factional disputes, 
from the early days of Islam, is  used  by the Salafīs  of the present day to 
construct sharp boundaries of their identity,  and also to 
uncompromisingly condemn all  others who do not conform to the 
standards they set themselves. In that  process of self -definition and self-
legit imation, some of the p rincipal concepts deployed  by the Salafīs are 
tawḥīd ,  bidʿah .  The next section presents the main characteristics that 
distinguish Salafism from other Muslims.  
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The Concept of Tawḥīd 
The notion of tawḥīd  plays a central role in the teachings of Salafism 
since it is regarded as the central foundation of Islam. 16 According to the 
Salafīs,  it  is  essential  to understand this notion and to realise that  it  is  
not only the first duty incumbent upon all Muslims but also the very 
reason for the existence of this univer se and everything in it. 17  
Aiming to recreate the purified Muslim society of the first  three 
generations of Islam, Salafīs  recurrently place great emphasis on the 
concept of tawḥīd .  For doing so, they base their arguments  on the 
teaching of many medieval s cholars as well  as the writ ings of 
eighteenth-century scholar and preacher Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb 
and his disciples.  A good example of this emphasis is  reflected in the 
immense quantity of Salafīs  commentaries upon and studies dedicated to 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s Kitāb al- Tawḥīd . 18 
In order to explain the essential  components of this concept, Salafī  
scholars divide tawḥīd  into categories;  some proposing two categories,  
and others three,  the triparti te division being most common among 
contemporary Salafīs.  These categories are:  
(i)  Tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah ,  literally means the Oneness of God in His 
Lordship.  This category implies a firm and definite belief that  Almighty 
God alone is the Creator, the Master and Owner, and the Command is for 
none but Him. In Salafī  teachings,  this type of tawḥīd  is not  emphasised 
quite as vigorously as  two other types, ironically because they believe 
that  very few people disagree that God is the sole creator of the 
universe. They are also aware that subscription to this type of tawhid is 
not,  in itself sufficient, for even Arab polytheists at  the time of the 
Prophet  Muhammad believed in this type of tawḥīd  but that  did not 
prevent them from being classified as polytheists. 19  Thus,  although 
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17 Ibid ,  50 -54  
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ʿUlamāʾ bi  Kitāb  al -Tawḥīd .   
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affirming tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah  is  a requirement for Muslims, the Salafīs  
do not believe it to be the main reason why Allah sent His messengers. 20 
(ii) Tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt  (the Oneness of God’s names and 
attributes):  this type of tawḥīd  requires Muslims to affirm the names and 
attributes which have been affirmed for Him in the Quran and the 
Prophetic traditions without taḥrīf  (distortion),  taʿṭīl  (denial), taʾwīl  
(al legory),  or tamthīl  ( likening) of their literal  meanings.  This type of 
tawḥīd  pertains to certain expressions found in the texts of the Quran 
and the ḥadīth–that attribute or seem to attribute human traits to God —
upon which there have been intense and unresolved disputes amongst 
Muslims scholars throughout Islamic history.  To this day, the dispute 
over how Muslims should approach these passages is st ill  disputed 
resulting in accusations and counter-accusations of misguidance.  
On the one hand, there are the Ashʿarī  and Māturīdī  schools of thought 
to which arguably the vast majority of scholars in the Muslim world 
adhere. These schools firmly avoid the literal meaning of these 
expressions championing instead a method of metaphorical interpretation 
(taʾwīl).  This approach is founded on the Quranic verse “there is  nothing 
like (mithl) Him, and He is the All -hearer,  the All -Seer.” 21 This verse, 
they argue, requires that one must eliminate any anthropomorphic 
elements from God. Thus, al l texts bearing a possible anthropomorphic 
meaning should not be interpreted literally but understood 
metaphorically. 22  As such, “God’s hand stands for His pow er and His 
sitting 23 on the Throne means His rule over the world” 24 rather than li teral 
seeing and sitting in a human fashion.  
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24 Abrahamov,  “The Bi-La  Kayfa  Doctr ine and i t s  Foundations in  Is lamic Theology,” 
365.  
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The Salafīs  on the other hand, contend that God should be described 
literally (ʿalā al-ḥaqīqah) as He describes Himself and as the Prophet  
describes Him, without further investigation to the modali ty of these 
attributes (bi lā kayf). In their view, the affirmation of the literal 
meaning of God’s attributes does not entail likening Him to created 
beings because they belong to the knowledge of the unseen ( ʿi lm al-
ghayb).  This kind of knowledge is beyond human comprehension, 
theories, and analogies.  Thus, one must  accept these attributes without 
ascribing corporeal  qualities to God , neither denying them, nor 
interpreting them metaphorically. 25  This method is in accordance with 
what Abrahamov describes as the orthodox stance adopted by Ibn 
Ḥanbal,  Ibn Qutaybah (d.889) and more interestingly al -Ashʿarī (d. 935), 
the founder of the school of Ashʿarīs . 26 
The Salafīs certainly,  do not disagree with Abrahamov’s observation as 
they do argue that their approach is based on the creed of the se early 
salafī  scholars  vis-à-vis these texts.  To support  their stance, Salafīs  
often cite a statement attributed to the founder of the second school of 
law: Mālik b. Anas (d. 795) .  He was asked about the Quranic verse; “The 
Most Gracious (Allah) rose over ( istawā) the Throne.” 27  It  is reported 
that  the questioner asked kayfa istawā  (how did He rise)? To which 
Mālik answered:  
“Al-ist iwā  is not unknown (ghayr majhūl ), but the state is not intelligible 
(al-kayf ghayr maʿqūl ). The belief in it  is an obligatory ( al-īmān  bih 
wājib),  and questioning it is  a reprehensible innovation (al-suʾāl ʿanh 
bidʿah).” 28 
It  is due to these two distinct approaches that the S alafīs have been 
accused of believing in anthropomorphism and at times labelled by some 
of their opponents as mushabbihah  (assimilators) and mujassimah  
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(anthropomorphist  or corporealists).  In return, the Ashʿarīs  and 
Māturīdīs  are considered by the Salafīs to be muʾawwilah–those who 
improperly use allegorical interpretations for God’s attributes.  
Notably,  despite their intellectual  connection wi th Wahhabism, this type 
of tawḥīd  is given a much greater emphasis in contemporary Salafism, 
compared to that  given to it  by Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb and his students. 
Similarly,  the significance of this type of tawḥīd  tends to be greater out 
outside Saudi Arabia than it is inside the kingdom. This can be attributed 
to the changing nature of challenges facing Salafism historically and 
geographically.  Undeniably,  despite the fact that Salafism is growing 
rapidly,  Ashʿarīs  and Māturīdīs  are still  dominant forces outside Saudi 
Arabia.  Also, historically the different stances over the question of 
God’s attributes are arguably amongst the greatest causes for disputes 
and sectarian debates between the scholars of these schools. Thus this  
emphasis reflects  contextual challenges faced by the Salafīs ,  and their 
attempts to counter the theological arguments presented by scholars of 
other schools.   
Having said that,  it  must be noted that  despite the importance given to 
this type of tawḥīd  in their teachings,  Salafīs do not consider failing to 
adhere to their interpretation of this type of tawḥīd  to be kufr  as is the 
case in the next type. Those engaging in allegorical or metaphorical  
interpretations of God’s attributes are classified as innovators 
(mubtadiʿah),  which is  pejorative term used in Isl amic context against  
deviant Muslims, but not quite as damning as kāfir .  
(iii) Tawḥīd al-ulūhiyyah :  this type implies singling out God alone for 
all worship. It  requires not worshipping anything along with Him, 
whether i t  be an angel, a Prophet, a pious person, a tree, a stone, the sun, 
the moon, or any other created being. 29 It  also entails that there should be 
no intermediaries between the worshipper and God. This type is the most 
important of them all as it  is  not only the decisive factor to determine 
who is a believer, but also places one’s blood  (that is , life) and property,  
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under God’s protection ,  ensuring civil rights . Most of the writ ings of Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and his students are devoted to the definition and 
explanation of this type  of tawḥīd .  The Salafī  understanding of this type 
of tawḥīd  is  also the main reason for the charges in Muslim polemics 
against the Salafīs in general  and the Wahhabīs in particular ;  that  is,  that  
they are following the same misguided path as the Khawārij . 30 
The Salafīs  believe that the failure in singling out God in His ʾulūhiyyah  
results in shirk  (polytheism), the opposite of tawḥīd .  Etymologically,  
shirk  expresses the notion of association or partnership. As a term, shirk 
denotes associating partners with God in His lordship, or worshipping 
Him. Theoretically speaking, since Islam is a monotheistic religion, all 
Muslims advocate the concept  of God’s oneness.  All Muslims hold that 
any practice that  implies worshiping anything other than God constitutes 
polytheism. After all ,  the oneness of God is embedded in the declaration 
of faith that  requires Muslims to believe in one God without a partne r 
and that He should be worshipped alone.  
However,  what sets the Salafīs  apart from the others with regard to this 
concept is  not only this tripartite typology but most importantly their 
expansive definition of worship.  This is  to say, from a Salafī  perspective 
the meaning of worship is not confined to performing the more apparent 
ritual  practices such as prayers and fasting but it  is  expanded to include 
types of veneration and supplication. Because they believe that  tawḥīd 
al-rubūbiyyah  is not enough to grant one a status of Muslim, shirk ,  in 
their view, encompasses far more than the obvious practices of idolatry 
and denial of the oneness of God. Many popular practices such as the 
veneration and supplication of holy trees,  tombs, sacred si tes and the 
intercession of saints that is very present in Sufism and popular Islam, 
are all seen as a form of worship that entail attributing associates to 
God. In this regard, the stance adopted by the  Salafīs  is more extreme 
than that of other Muslims who are more tolerant towards such practices.  
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Indeed, most non-Salafī  scholars argue against  the Salafīs  that  the 
proclamation of the declaration of faith should be sufficient to assure 
one’s status as a Muslim. For them, these practices ,  though reprehensible 
and sinful, they do not suffice to declare kufr  on those who still  carry 
out the core Islamic commandments.  
Non-Salafī  scholars not only disagree with the Salafī  understanding of 
tawḥīd  but also strongly oppose their typology to the extent of likening 
it to the Christian trinity.  Al-Tandīd bi man ʾaddada al - tawḥīd  is  
arguably the most famous contemporary book in this genre.  Its author 
Ḥasan b. ʾAlī  al -Saqqāf ,  who is known for his robust opposition to 
Salafism in general and al -Albānī in particular, explains why he believes 
that the Salafī typology of tawḥīd  does not fit  with the notion of 
Salafism. The basis of his argument is the fact that this typology in itself 
is a “reprehensible innovation that  [only] appeared in the eighth century 
of hijrah  (13 t h) ,” 31 this being a reference to Ibn Taymiyyah. According to 
Al-Saqqāf ,  the main purpose for this typology is to allow Salafīs  to 
pronounce takfīr  on those who do not agree with them. Al -Saqqāf 
strongly disapproves the distinction between tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah  and 
al-ʾulūhiyyah .  He stresses that  the Salafī  notion that  the polytheists 
believed in the lordship of God is totally wrong, misguided, and based 
on a shallow perceptive. The polytheists , he argues, did not believe at all  
in the existence of God and for this reason they were asked in the Quran 
to contemplate and ponder on their surroundings that are proofs for His 
existence and lordship. 32  Thus those who subscribe to tawḥīd al-
rubūbiyyah are indeed distinct from polytheists, and are Muslims.  
It  is  worth noting here, that unlike the Salafīs ,  their opponents in general 
and Al-Saqqāf in particular hold that the grounds for identifying shirk  
cannot be an act  in itself but the belief behind it :  if someone believes 
that that something else enjoys a trait  of His lordship , then, and then 
only does that  person commit shirk .  Thus, according to Al-Saqqāf mere 
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acts of veneration such as cringing and prostrating before a tomb of a 
Prophet or a saint and calling for help are not forms of worship. Though 
he concedes that these acts may well  mean worship ,  and that  people may 
use words that  equate such acts with worship,  yet  in proper Islamic 
sense, such acts can be  considered worship only when done out of the 
specific belief  that the venerated person or object  –be it a Prophet  or 
saint or something else—possesses a divine quality.  
Innovation in Islam 
Based on a number of scriptural texts, 33 Sunni Muslims believe that  Islam 
is the final message from God and it is  complete. Henc e, they believe 
that  any act of worship without a sound scriptural reference is a 
prohibited bidʿah  ( literally,  innovation, but meaning deviance).  The 
committing of bidʿah  in matters of religion is  a deviant act,  since it  is  an 
implicit statement that Islam as revealed to the Prophet was not 
complete. 34  Further, in Islamic terminology, bidʿah  is  the opposite of 
sunnah 35  and it can be a modification to an already existing 
procedure/method of worship,  such as reciting the Quran aloud in the 
afternoon prayer or extending the time of fasting during Ramadan to 
midnight. It can also be an invention of a completely new ritual practice 
or belief such as adding a sixth prayer to the five prescribed prayers.  
However, the Salafī  conception of bidʿah  is more restrictive than that of 
most of non-Salafī  Muslims. As Lauzière says, the Salafī  approach 
“narrows the scope of acceptable Islamic practice,  and they remain wary 
of extra scriptural  influences and sources of knowledge in religious 
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matters.” 36  Because of the Salafīs’  strict  approach to  bidʿah ,  they 
consider some popular ri tual practices such as the celebration of the 
Prophet  Muhammad’s birthday (mawlid) and certain modes of collective 
chanting or dhikr  ( li terally,  mention; implying ritual  mentioning of God) 
as reprehensible innovations. These practices represent the hallmark of 
Sufī ritual and have been practiced for centuries . Despite this,  the 
Salafīs  believe that they were not part of the practice of the first three 
generations after the Prophet,  but only subsequentl y added by the Sufis, 
along with other popular rituals. Likewise,  the Salafī  understanding of 
bidʿah  is the reason behind their rejection of drawing on ʿilm al-kalām  
(dialectical  theology) in order to interpret  the verses related to God’s 
attributes.  
It  is worth noting here, that for the Salafīs ,  bidʿah  has two meanings, a 
linguistic meaning, and a terminological one. The former is more 
general, it  includes all kinds of innovations whether related to matters of 
religion or not.  In  this sense, not every inno vation is considered 
reprehensible  by the Salafīs .  Modern scientific inventions may well  be 
called bidʿah  but only in view of them lexically being termed an 
innovation. Religiously speaking they are not considered a form/instance 
of bidʿah .   
In salafī literature, the terminological  usage of bidʿah  is  restricted to 
religious matters; all  innovations that fall  in this category are considered 
reprehensible and rejected  by them. The foundation of the Salafī  view is 
their characteristic interpretation of the following ḥadīth :  
Beware of the newly invented matters, every newly invented 
matter is bidʿah ,  every bidʿah  is misguidance, and every 
misguidance is in hellfire. 37 
Salafīs  interpret this ḥadīth  as referring to all new religious matters, 
without any restriction or exception. This  generalisation differs from the 
perception of the non-Salafīs ,  such as the scholars of al -Azhar,  who 
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restrict the designation of reprehensible bidʿah  to those religious matters 
that  are in conflict with the established principles of sharīʿah . 38 In this 
view, new matters in religion must be judged to  see whether they 
actually contravene the sharīʿah ,  i f they do, then they must rejected and 
classed as a reprehensible bidʿah .  On the other hand, any good religious 
practice or interpretation that is introduced, which does not run counter 
to any of the sharīʿah  sources, is praiseworthy (bidʿah ḥasanah).  The 
holders of this view do not reject the above-mentioned ḥadīth ,  but 
contend that the word “every” (kull) does not always indicate an absolute  
generalisation. 39  This is because this can be an instance of  a general  
statement with specific exceptions ( ʾām makhṣūṣ), such as the use of kull  
in the Quranic verse: “Destroying everything by the command of its 
Lord.” 40 The word “everything” in this sentence is restricted specifically 
to everything that  God wanted to be destroyed and not absolutely 
everything (as kull would literally imply). We know this  because the 
verse indicates afterwards that certain homes were left intact “So they 
became such that nothing could be seen except their dwellings.” 41 
The interpretation  of the aforementioned ḥadīth  as an instance of  ʾām 
makhṣūṣ  is based on other traditions in which, for example, the Prophet  
says:  
Whoever introduces a good practice (sunnah ḥasanah) he will 
receive the reward for it  and the reward of all those who 
practice it [after him] and whoever introduces an evil practice 
(sunnah sayyiʾah) then he will carry the burden of it  and the 
burden of all  those who practice it [after him]. 42 
This ḥadīth clearly demonstrates that the concept of innovation was 
distinguished by the Prophet into various types - the good and 
praiseworthy types as well  as the bad and reprehensible types –  there 
was no blanket prohibition against  innovation. In addition, there are 
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other reports, in which many of the companions are reported as having 
carried out various acts based on their personal  reasoning without a like-
for-like precedent. On the basis of these texts, the non -Salafī  scholars 
say that  the default  position is not to simply reject  any new matter in 
religion but and instead point to the Prophet’s two-fold atti tude toward 
his companions when they initiated certain practices of their own accord 
(that is, without Qur’anic or Prophetic instruction).  He accepted those 
acts of worship and deeds which were conformable with the principles of 
sharīʿah  and rejected those that were in conflict with it. 43 Therefore,  “not 
every newly invented matter in ʿibādāt (acts of worship) or  muʿāmalāt 
(social practice) is  reprehensible.  Rather, they can be classified under 
any of the five categories of sharīʿah  (the obligatory, recommended, 
prohibited, offensive, and permissible) depending on how the sources of 
Islam apply to them.” 44 
As a matter of fact ,  these two distinctive interpretations  of the concept 
of bidʿah  can be traced to two divergent classical  definitions. The first 
one is the definition given by the famous Shāfiʿī jurist al -ʿIzz b. ʿAbd 
al-Salām in his book Qawāʿid al -Aḥkām .  Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām states that  
bidʿah  is performing that, which has not been common during the time of 
the Prophet,  and then he divides it  into the five categories of sharīʿah .  In 
order to determine under which category an invented act is classified he 
states, “one must evaluate it  in accordance to the principles of 
sharīʿah .” 45  
The second definition is that of the Andalusian Mālikī legal theorist al -
Shāṭibī  (1320/1388) in his well -known book al-Iʿt iṣām .  It  reads “A 
[newly] invented way in the religion that resembles [the established 
practice in the] sharīʿah ,  [and] by following i t extreme servitude to  
Allah is sought.” 46 
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The main difference between these two definitions is that the second one 
is more restrictive than the first one. The definition of al -Shāṭibī , which 
is adopted by the Salafīs  is phrased in a way that does not allow any 
room for the concept of a good innovation.  
Consequently,  non-salafī  scholars believe that a newly introduced idea 
that  has not been practiced by the Prophet and his companions is not 
necessari ly a reprehensible bidʿah .  For them it is sufficient for the 
legality of any new act that  it  conforms to the general  principles of 
sharīʿah . 47  Hence, in this sense,  since dhikr  is a praiseworthy act  in 
general terms, such scholars see no harm in inventing any particular type 
of dhikr ,  whether performed alone or in a group, si tting or standing. The 
fact that an action has not been performed by the Prophet  or the salaf  in 
that  particular manner does not make it  impermissible since it has basis 
(aṣl) in Islam. In the salafī  view, however, conformity to the general  
principles of sharīʿah  includes conformity to the form and the manner in 
which an act  is  carried out.  
To conclude, both Salafīs  and non-Salafīs  agree that reprehensible 
bidʿah  is that which has no basis in sharīʿah ,  However, they disagree 
about the definition of “basis” and thus the interpretation of this 
principle.  
Position taken towards the Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence 
The legitimacy of  adhering to one of the four recognised Sunni scho ols 
of law is amongst the central  issues that  divide Salafīs  from non-Salafīs .  
48  The Salafīs  deem the idea that one must adhere to one of the four 
schools of law/jurisprudence (madhhabiyyah ),  to be a new phenomenon 
that  had not existed before the fourth Muslim century. 49 In contrast , the 
opponents of Salafism staunchly contend that the call to abandon the 
established schools of law ( lāmadhhabiyyah ) entails a great danger to 
Islam. These two opposing stances are represented clearly in the tit les of 
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two books that are quoted in most debates between the Salafīs  and their 
opponents on this topic today. Both books were writ ten after a debate 
between al-Albānī and Muhammad Saʿīd Ramadān al -Būṭī,  a prominent 
Syrian scholar and staunch opponent of Salafism. The book supporting 
the Salafī  view is written by al -Albānī’s student Muhammad ʿīd ʿAbbāsī 
and tit led Bidʿah al-Taʿaṣṣub al-Madhhabī  (The Innovation of Partisan 
Adherence to a School of Law ). 50 The opposing view is represented in al -
Būtī’s book Al-Lāmadhhabiyyah: Akhṭar Bidʿah Tuhaddid al -Sharīʿah 
al-Islāmiyyah  (Non-Madhhabism: The Greatest Innovation Threatening 
the Islamic Sharīʿah ). 51 
In the context of this debate,  the point of the view of the  Salafīs  is that  
Muslims should reject what Salafīs  term the blind imitat ion of one 
particular school (al-taqlīd al -aʿmā) without the consideration of the 
opinions presented by the other schools. It  is worth noting that there are 
various views amongst the Salafīs  in terms of how rigid they are in their 
rejection of this kind of  taqlīd .  Some Salafī  scholars (especially those 
from Saudi Arabia) themselves subscribe to a particular school,  while 
others like al-Albānī reject being associated with any madhhab  
affiliation at  all . 52  Overall however,  all  Salafīs  agree that  religious 
verdicts and opinions must always be founded on evidences from the 
source of sharīʿah .  Relying simply on the opinion of a single school is  
not accepted. 53 
This attitude towards the schools of jurisprudence is the  feature of 
Salafism most readily recognised by common Muslims ( ʿawāmm). Unlike 
the disagreements with non-Salafīs  in matters of creed, which often take 
place within religious circles and go largely unnoticed by common 
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Muslims, the taqlīd  issue has a direct impact on the day-to-day life. It 
occurs frequently everyday especially in places where a single school of 
law is predominant.  
In North Africa for instance, where the Mālīkī School is by far the most 
followed school, Salafīs can be simply recognised on account of the way 
they perform the daily prayers . Take for instance these two simple legal 
questions concerning the position of the hands when performing the 
prayer. According to the Mālīkī School,  when a person is in a standing 
position during the prayer, they should lay the arms straight down by 
their side, a practice known as sadl .  This opinion sets this school apart 
from the other three Sunnī schools who view that  the correct posture is 
to place the right hand on the back of the left hand either on the 
abdomen or on the chest.  The Salafīs favour putt ing the hands on the 
chest contending that the practice of sadl  contradicts several  Prophetic  
traditions.   
The second example is related to raising the hands parallel to the 
shoulders, a practice known in Islamic jurisprudence as rafʿ al-yadayn .  
According to the Mālīkī School, this practice is done only at  the start of 
the prayer. The hands are not to be raised at any other time during the 
prayer. Again, the Salafīs  disagree with the Mālīkī opinion insisting that  
the Prophetic traditions indicate that the Prophet  used to repeat the move 
of raising the hands at different positions during the prayer. Although in 
recent years one can also find some non -Salafīs, especially amongst the 
younger generation, who perform prayers in a similar way to the Salafīs, 
these two acts in the daily congregational prayers are sti ll  the most 
distinctive differences between Salafī and  non-Salafī partisans in North 
Africa.  
Thus, although the Salafī  conception of tawḥīd  has greater implications 
for one’s faith in the eyes of the religious scholars, the Salafī  stance 
towards taqlīd  is more l ikely to stir a wider reaction within the society.  
This is because of i ts direct  challenge to the regionally dominant and 
established mode of performing daily religious rituals , which, for  
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common Muslims of the respective regions, is  also the only legally valid 
mode possible.  
In connection with taqlīd ,  Salafīs  argue that  none of the founders of the 
four schools had ever asked his students to follow his opinion 
exclusively and to ignore those of other scholars. In fact, on the 
contrary,  the statements of those scholars urge their followers to follow 
scriptural  texts ,  superseding their own opinions as the source of rulings.  
In the introduction to his famous ly divisive book, al -Albānī cites many 
such statements in order to support  the Salafī  non -madhhab  position on 
acts of prayer . 54 For example, one of the statements ascribed to both Abū 
Ḥanīfah and a l-Shāfiʿī reads,  “If a ḥadīth  is  [proved to be] authentic,  
then it is  my opinion.” Likewise, Ibn Ḥanbal says “Do not imitate me, 
neither imitate Mālik, nor al -Shāfiʿī , nor al-Awzāʿī, nor al-Thawrī, but 
take [rulings] from where they took [their rulings].”  
Based on these statements,  the Salafīs take the position that “The only 
correct way to follow the imāms  would be to apply their methods, not to 
reiterate their substantive rulings.” 55 In their view, their own approach is 
in accordance with that of the prominent students of the imams .  They 
argue that such scholars  understood the statements of the imāms  
correctly,  which led them to produce their own independent reasoning. 
For instance, the two prominent students of Abū Ḥanīfah departed from 
the position of their teacher in about one third of juridical  matters,  as 
Abbāsī argues. 56 
Nevertheless, this approach does not imply that Salafīs recommend a 
free-for-all in the interpretation of Islamic law. The potential  radicalism 
of their idea is  restricted with the argument that,  because people vary in 
their level of understanding and their ability to derive rulings from the 
sources of sharīʿah ,  Muslims can be divided into three categories. 57  
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(i) The first category is the category of common Muslims who have 
neither the capacity to understand the meanings of the sources of 
sharīʿah  nor the necessary tools to deduce legal ru lings from them. A 
Muslim in this condition is required to seek legal opinions from a 
trustworthy scholar.  This form of taql īd  is sanctioned and the person 
performing it (muqallid) cannot be blamed.  
(ii) The second category contains qualified Muslim schola rs who have 
the ability to understand the scriptural texts and have the required tools 
to deduce rulings from them. People in this category are  not permitted to 
limit themselves to following a specific legal school and must  practise 
ijtihād ,  which is defined as “the maximum effort expended by the jurist  
to master and apply the principles and rules of uṣūl  al-fiqh  ( legal theory) 
for the purpose of discovering God’s law.” 58 The practitioner of this is 
called a mujtahid .  
(iii) The third category pertains to Mus lims who fall between the above 
two. A Muslim in this category is she/he who may well  not have the 
same religious knowledge and capacity of understanding the texts and 
the different legal opinions as a mujtahid .  However, at the same time 
she/he is not so completely ignorant that he cannot understand the 
evidences presented by the scholars and their reasoning. This category is  
called ittibāʿ  and a Muslim in this category is called muttabiʿ .  The 
muttabiʿ  must do his/her best to investigate the opinions of the scholars 
and weigh between their evidences. 59 
Although non-Salafī  scholars dismiss this categorisation contending that  
there are only two types of Muslims, either mujtahid  or muqallid , 60 they 
accept the possibility that  a person can be a mujtahid  in one or some 
legal cases and muqallid  in the rest. 61  This is to say, if a person has 
investigated one legal question to the extent of compr ehending all the 
related arguments and reasoning then such a person is a mujtahid  in that 
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question. Such a person according to al -Būṭī must act upon his  own 
ijtihād  in this question  and not just  upon the rulings of his/her 
madhhab . 62  The difference between the two views here may sound 
insignificant and no more than a terminological  issu e since both in 
reality recognise a middle category. However,  as a matter of fact ,  this 
difference is very instrumental  in terms of Salafī vs. non -Salafī  stances 
towards taqlīd .  It  may be argued that by c lassifying this middle category 
(part-mujtahid) under the category of mujtahid ,  non-Salafīs  reveal their 
own restrictive and rigid position towards accepting legal opinions 
outside one’s madhhab .  By including such people with  mujtahids ,  albeit  
partially,  non-Salafīs  indicate that the performance of ijtihād  requires 
certain prohibitively difficult criteria being fulfilled, and consequently  
deny the possibility of independent reasoning or ijtihād  for most people.  
Compared to this, by placing the muttabiʿ  in an independent category to 
mujtahid ,  Salafīs widen the number of those who can exercise such 
independent reasoning, unrestricted by the dictates of their madhhabs ,  
thus showing their  relaxed approach to  taking opinions from outside 
one’s legal school.   
Having said that , it  must be noted that the Salafīs  do not reject taqlīd  in 
an absolute manner (as do liberal reformers for example), but they refuse 
to oblige people to adhere to one single madhhab  with the exclusion of 
the others. 63 The grounds of this attitude can be narrowed down to two 
points. First , the Sa lafī  stance towards taqlīd  conforms to their 
perception that  the first three generations represent the original Islam. 
Hence, it  is  not a surprise to find ʿAbbāsī  portraying the practice of 
following one particular school ( tamadhhub) as a peculiar phenomenon 
that was not known by the salaf ,  which makes it a reprehensible 
innovation in religion. The problem with tamadhhub ,  as the Salafīs see 
it ,  goes even further : they believe that  their opponents do not actually 
adhere to the teachings of the four imāms ,  whose time of course was near 
to that of the Prophet.  Rather,  they allege that  most of their opponents 
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rely on the opinions of later scholars of these schools. Mālikīs rely on 
Mukhtaṣar Khalīl  instead of al-Muwa ṭṭaʾ  or al-Mudawwanah  of Mālik, 
likewise the Shāfiʿīs do not rely on al-Umm  of al-Shāfiʿī ,  rather on 
books written by later scholars such as al -Haythamī and so on.  
Salafīs  also believe that taqlīd  is the source of a great deal of the enmity 
among Muslims, which is caused by the conflicting views betwe en the 
followers of the madhāhib .  Thus, rejecting taqlīd  is the only way to 
purge Muslims of their internal divisions .  ʿAbbāsī one of al-Albānī’s 
earliest  students in Syria cites several  examples to demonstrate that 
taqlīd  has divided Muslims into adversarial  groups,  ranging from 
separate group prayers in the same mosque based on madhhab  affiliation, 
up to the historic battle between the Ḥanafīs  and Shāfiʿīs  over the matter 
of disallowing intermarriage between Ḥanafī  men and Shāfiʿī  women 
amongst lay followers of the schools. 64 
Their inimical atti tude towards adherence to a particular madhhab  has 
led to the opponents of the Salafīs presenting several  charges against  
them. The most common of these is that  the Salafīs are  disrespectful to 
the imāms , 65 an accusation that  the Salafīs themselves  vehemently refuse 
to accept. According to the senior Saudi scholar, al-Albānī, the main 
difference between the Salafīs  and their opponents concerning the imāms  
is that the Salafīs  consider the imāms  to be mere means and 
intermediaries who “convey the knowledge of Allah and His messenger. 
Hence, we do not follow them for the sake of their person and we do not 
make our adherence to them an aim [in itself]; as [our] only aim is to be 
acquainted with what the Prophet  taught.” 66 In his view, such a position  
does not entail any kind of disrespect to the imāms ,  rather it  is only a 
measure that enables Muslims to ben efit from the knowledge of all  
scholars. Although he acknowledges that  non-Salafīs  also respect the 
imāms ,  he insists that  by adhering to the teaching of just  one imām  or 
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school, “they made the imitation of those imāms  the [very] aim.” 67 In this 
view, being content with the opinions of only one imām  or school does 
not just mean ignoring the opinions of the other imams ,  but also entails 
missing out on all the knowledge that one can potentially gain.  
Perhaps the sharpest  attacks on the Salafīs  was made in a book called al-
Lāmadhhabiyyah  Akhṭar Bidʿah Tuhaddid al -Sharīʿah al -Islāmiyyah  by 
the famous Syrian scholar  al-Būṭī, when he alleges that  the Salafī  
approach to ijt ihād  is a pernicious plot  to plant Western culture and 
principles in Muslim societies.  According to al -Būṭī,  Lord Cromer 
(1841-1917) the British Controller -General  of Egypt promoted the idea 
of ijtihād  in order to detach the Egyptian society from Islam. It  is  owing 
to ijt ihād  that  the British messengers were able to replace Islamic family 
code with manmade laws. 68 
Despite all these debates, history remains on the side of the non-Salafīs,  
whose approach towards  the legality of preferring and following only 
one of the established schools rests on the established practice of 
Muslims throughout history.  A long list  of great scholars including those 
highly regarded by the Salafīs  is presented by non-Salafīs to prove that 
they were all  associated with the four schools. Non-Salafīs remain 
concerned that  opening the door for ijtihād  for everyone would lead to 
confusion and chaos in the religious milieu. As Al-Būṭī asserts :  Muslims 
nowadays “have a complete body of jurisprudence for all sorts of 
conditions that people may be faced with ,  whether [as] individuals or [as 
part of] groups,  [which] has been deduced and written by the mujtahid  
imāms .” He continues to argue that if  this body of jurisprudence is 
exposed to “the strong winds of the free -for-all ijtihād” by all Muslims 
then “this treasure of jur isprudence” will  be destroyed. 69 Therefore, it  is 
sufficient for a lay Muslim to read a concise book of fiqh  based on one 
the four schools in order to know the necessary rulings related to their 
personal l ife.  There is no need to know the evidences for thes e rulings 
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because they have not reached the category of ijtihād . 70  After all,  the 
presence or the absence of these evidences in these books is meaningless 
since,  in Al-Būṭī’s opinion, lay Muslims do not understand them. 71  
As for the statements in which the imāms  instructed their followers 
against imitating them uncritically, Al-Būṭī explains that  such statements 
were addressed to the imāms’  great disciples , who had fulfilled the 
necessary conditions to reach the rank of ijtihād.  These statements were 
never intended for those with inadequate scriptural  scholarship :  “Imām  
al-Shafʿī was not addressing a crowd of butchers, night-watchman, and 
donkey-drovers.” 72 
There seems to be an implicit consensus amongst the non -Salafīs that the 
early scholars, by drawing on all methodological approaches and 
developing all possible  answers, have left no room for later scholars to 
practice i jtihād  in the cases that  have been previously solved. It is for 
this reason that  we find al -Būṭī urging the Salafīs to redirect their 
eagerness for ijtihād  towards the endless numbers of new problems that  
keep arising in Muslim societies in the present day, and which are in dire 
need for solutions. Old issues, that have already been settled by the early 
imams ,  should be left alone. 73  
Overall , then, the stance of non-Salafīs towards  ijt ihād  is more 
restrictive than that  of the Salafīs .  By restricting the conditions of 
ijtihād  and emphasising a strict  adherence to the established schools, 
non-Salafī scholars aim to protect the sharīʿah  from the danger of being 
subverted by incompetent scriptural schol arship. The difference may not 
be as wide as it  appears on the surface, since Salafīs  and their foes agree 
that ordinary Muslims are duty bound not to rely on their own reasoning 
and limited knowledge, and should instead follow the opinions of the 
specialists. However, the disagreement is on defining who those 
specialists are,  exactly. For the non-Salafīs, following a specialist is  
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restricted to following one of the four established schools, whereas from 
the Salafī point of view, one may consult  any trustworthy contemporary 
scholar,  chosen at  random. In this sense,  Salafīs reject  taqlīd  and argue 
that  in doing so they are attempting to return  to pristine Islam.  
The Salafism of al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh 
As indicated in the introduction, an important reason for the ambiguity 
surrounding Salafism stems from the fact that the term has also been 
used in association with the trend of reformist  Muslim th ought  of the 
late 19 t h  and the beginning of the 20 t h  centuries. This includes the ideas 
of Jamāl al -Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897),  Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849 -
1905) and Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935) among others.  In this 
section, we shall see why, despite there being some connections and 
parallels,  Islamic reform movements of the 19 t h-20 t h  centuries should not 
be confused with contemporary Salafism. 
According to Lauzière, this confusion about Salafism can be traced to a 
seminal 1919 article by the French Orientalist Louis Massignon, who 
used the term to refer to ʿAbduh’s reformist movement. Lauzière argues 
persuasively that there are two historically distinct  types of Salafism —a 
modernist and a purist Salafism— that should not be conflated. This view 
has been challenged by Griffel, 74  who holds that there are genetic 
linkages between these two trends,  and therefore that Massignon wa s 
correct  in drawing attention to this connection. Griffel’s contention that  
these two forms of Salafism share a common origin is  less than 
convincing, however; while both ʿAbduh and contemporary Salaf īs share 
a concern with tawḥīd ,  they set  out from radically divergent points of 
departure.  They do not obviously share a theological  agenda. L et us 
examine the concept of  tawḥīd  proposed by ʿAbduh in his  book Risālat  
al-Tawḥīd  –  which he explicitly said,  was based on “the path of salaf .”75 
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On close examination, it  is easy to see the great difference between 
ʿAbduh’s  understanding of tawḥīd ,  which, as we know, i s an essential 
element in the teachings of Salafism, but understood very differently by 
and the contemporary Salafī scholars. It  is true that  “for ʿAbduh, tawḥīd  
was seen as liberation from superstition, irrationality,  and myth, and the 
source for endowing man with the powers of free will and independence 
of mind,” 76 such elements are also present in the Salafī  perception of the 
concept . Yet, this alone does not make ʿAbduh and like -minded 
reformists’  understanding of tawḥīd  “not much different from the 
Wahhābī [and Salafī] conception of tawḥīd .” 77  This is  because ʿAbduh 
clearly built his understanding of the concept based almost entirely on 
Ashʿarī  theology.  ʿAbduh not only defines tawḥīd  to mean what the 
Salafīs label as al-rubūbiyyah  (the exclusive Lordship of God),  but also 
advocates the posit ion of the Ashʿarīs  concerning the question of God’s 
attributes , that is,  taking a metaphorical,  interpretive and non -literalist  
view of the potentially anthromorphic description of God in the Quran.  
For this reason, we find his student Rashid Riḍā who became closer to 
the Salafī teachings after the end of the First World War, 78 repeatedly,  
although courteously, disapproving of his teacher’s views. For instance, 
in response to ʿAbduh’s statement  that the most important element in 
tawḥīd  is “the affirmation of God’s oneness in His essence a nd the 
creation of the universes ,” Riḍā remarks that ʿAbduh has failed to 
mention tawḥīd al-ʾulūhiyyah  that  is  “the first thing to which every 
Prophet  called upon his people.” 79 Additionally,  it  is very clear in more 
that  one occasion that  Riḍā is not at  ease with his former teacher’s 
elaborations on how to deal with the question of God’s attributes. 80 
Perhaps the clearest  instance of these disagreements is  evident in a 
passage where ʿAbduh asserts that  Muslims must avoid adopting the 
literal meaning when understanding texts bearing a possible 
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anthropomorphic meaning, and instead interpret them based on taʾwīl  
(al legory) or tafwīḍ  (suspend the meaning) .  In a long editorial  footnote 
to this section of his teacher’s book ,  Riḍā refuted this view ,  reiterating 
the same Salafī  reasoning against  the Ashʿarī  and Māturīdī  schools 
explained earlier  in this chapter. 81 
The other reason why ʿAbduh and similar reformists cannot be mixed up 
with contemporary Salafīs, is the latter’s attitude towards the former 
scholars. Across the spectrum of contemporary Salafīs ,  reformist  
thinkers do not enjoy any significant authority or influence . In fact,  
contemporary Salafīs view all such thinkers,  with the exception of Riḍā, 82 
as no more than an extension of  the Muʿtazilah  who are the his torical  
opponents of the Salafīs .  The label al-madrasah al -ʿaqlāniyyah al -
ḥadīthah  (the modern rational school) given by contemporary Salafīs  to 
this trend does not only signify their eagerness to disprove any link 
between the two trends.  It is  also a clea r indication that  contemporary 
Salafīs perceive the reformist trend as emphasising the primacy of reason 
over the Quran and ḥadīth  texts, as followers of the Muʿtazilah  School  
are believed to have done . One of the famous Salafī websites includes 
the reformist  trend in its  Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Schools of 
Thought and defines it thus:  
Rationalism is a philosophical school of thought, which claims that rational 
reasoning is the only channel through which one can grasp the true essence 
of the existence of the universe without the need for divine revelation or 
human experiments. It also advocates the notion of subjecting everything in 
the universe to reason in order to affirm it, deny it or defining its 
characteristics.83 
Thus, although there are some shared interests between contemporary 
Salafism and the modernists,  the latter trend does not share the key 
denominators and characteristics that distinguish Salafism from other 
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Muslims. As such, the modernists do not even fit into the minimal and 
broad definit ion of Salafism adopted in this study.  
Wahhabism and Salafism 
In many secondary sources, Wahhabism and Salafism often appear in 
conjunction with one another. Many scholars tend to use the two labels 
interchangeably; hence, any study of Salafism cannot be complete and 
adequate without looking at the relationship between the two. 
Wahhabism refers to the followers of the intellectual heritage associated 
with the teachings of Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703 -1792),  the 
co-founder of the first Saudi state  in the eighteenth century. Wahhabism 
or Wahhābī  (one who follows Wahhabism) is not a label  of self-
description;  the adherents of this tradition reject  the term on the basis 
that  they denote following the teachings of ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb rather 
than the teachings of Islam. In their view, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was only 
a reformer,  not an innovator , and so, they prefer to label his teachings 
daʾwah al-tawḥīd  (the call  for monotheism) and refer to themselves as 
al-muwaḥḥidūn  (those who follows the tawḥīd) or Salafīs .  
Broadly speaking, Salafism and Wahhabism share many beliefs,  
doctrines, and sources. 84 The writings of Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb including 
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd that represent the core of his teachings and “the 
foundation of the Wahhabi canon” 85 are widely adopted and taught by the 
Salafīs around the globe. Likewise, one finds the writings of Salafī  
scholars such as al -Albānī widely distributed inside Saudi Arabia ,  the 
birthplace and centre of Wahhabism. Consequently,  many modern Salafī  
movements outside Saudi Arabia have be en charged with propagating 
Wahhabism by their opponents and tagged with the label Wahhabism in 
order to discredit  them. 86 
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However,  despite these similarities,  one can also detect  some aspects 
that distinguish Wahhabism from Salafism, while admittedly not making 
them completely separate traditions.  These distinguishing features 
pertain to geographical and historical  presence, the legal school to which 
their proponents adhere and their core preoccupations.  In terms of the 
geographical  and historical dimension , Wahhabism refers specifically to 
the proponents of what can be called Salafism, but only inside present-
day Saudi Arabia, start ing from the first  Saudi state (1744 -1818) to the 
present  day. Salafism itself transcends these geographical  and historical 
boundaries,  to include the proponents  of the same teachings from around 
the globe, before and after the lifetime of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.  
As for legal schools, we can identify two types of approaches amongst 
the Saudi  scholars who are often referred to as Wahhabīs .  The first  type 
is that of Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb and his early disciples, who adhered very 
closely to the Hanbal ī  school of f iqh .  As we know, this approach is very 
different from that of Salafism, whose proponents are fervent ly reject  
taqlīd  of a particular school.  It  is  worth mentioning, however, that  while 
this type sti ll  exists,  later Wahhābī scholars such as Ibn  Bāz and Ibn al-
ʿUthaymīn ,  moved towards a posit ion which entailed  less exclusive 
reliance on the Hanbalī  school. 87 Thus, Salafism is more general  in this 
respect than Wahhabism, since a salaf ī  can be a follower of any of the 
four Sunni legal schools as wel l as those who do not adhere to any 
particular school. In addit ion, Salafism position against  taqlīd  in fiqh  is  
more drastic and fiercer than that of Wahhabism.  
Finally,  because the main concern for Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb was a stricter 
adherence to the concept of tawḥīd ,  “Wahhābīs across time and space 
have been both famous and infamous for their dedication to this 
principle.” 88 To present-day, the Saudi Salafīs  place greater emphasis on 
the matters of ʿaqīdah  (creed) than the issue of ijtihād  and taqlīd .  This is 
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slightly different in the case of Salafism outside the kingdom. Although, 
ʿaqīdah  also plays a central role in the teaching of non-Wahhābī Salafīs  
such as al-Albānī, “call ing upon the Muslim world to throw off the 
fetters of servile taqlīd  of precedent” 89 is equally an equally important  
concern for them.  
To conclude, Wahhabism is the Saudi version of Salafism and hence i t is 
possible to say in general  terms that  every Wahhābī is a Salafī  but not 
every Salafī  is a Wahhābī.  
Salafism, a 20th Century Phenomenon? 
Tracing the origin of Salafism and whether it  determining whether it  had 
existed in early Islamic history constitute s one of the important 
questions in the study of Salafism. Although, it  is difficult to determine 
precisely the historical emergence of the use of the term Salafīyyah ,  
some scholars such as Haykel have traced the historical emergence of the 
term to Ibn Taymiyyah. 90 Haykal sets up his view based on one of Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s verdicts in which the latter uses the term and defines it .  
Other scholars contend that  this  view is incorrect  and insist  that  Salafism 
did not “blossom as a slogan or as a conceptua l  construct until the early 
20 t h  century.” 91 Only after the establishment of the Salafīyyah Press and 
Bookstore of Cairo—through the efforts  of Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb  (d.  
1969) and ʿAbd al -Fattāḥ  Qaṭlān (d.  1931)—that an unprecedented 
visibil ity was given to the term. 92  This objection is based on the  
distinction between the usage of the term in Islamic texts before the 20 t h  
century and the meaning of the term in modern times. According to this 
view, medieval Muslim scholars  used the term Salafī  to denote a 
theological stance in contradistinction with the Ashʿarī  and Māturīdī  
schools whereas the modern conception of Salafism also encompasses 
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law, morality,  and etiquette. 93  In support  of this distinction, Lauziére 
cites some medieval scholars who, despite being described as Salafīs  and 
having “championed the madhhab al-salaf  in creed,” 94 were at  the same 
time adherents of one of the four legal schools.  For him, this suggests 
that the presence of the term Salafism or its derivat ives in medieval 
Islamic texts should not be taken as a definitive evidence for the 
existence of a usage corresponding to that of the modern period.  
This argument put forward by Lauziére may well make sense with regard 
to the usage of the term. However,  Lauziére , along with other scholars , 
takes this argument further ,  at tempting to entirely detach contemporary 
Salafism from its medieval versions,  on the basis that medieval Salafism 
denotes merely a theological stance whereas contemporary Salafism also 
holds a legal bearing. This study disputes this view and argues that 
contemporary and medieval Salafism are connected through both 
theological  and legal dimensions.  
The main fault in Lauziére’s view  s tems from two presumptions he, and 
a number of other scholars, 95  hold about Salafism: (i) contemporary 
Salafism rejects the tradit ional madhhab-affiliations to the four legal 
schools and instead advocates that Muslims  should deduce legal opinions 
directly from the scripture and (ii) the notion of Salafism in medieval 
Islam refers merely to a theological  rather than a legal dimension. 96 
These presumptions are not entirely adequate,  especially with regards the 
Salafī  position towards the Islamic schools of jurisprudenc e. Indeed, it  is 
true that the Salafī approach to legal matters is very different to that of 
contemporary traditional  scholars , who depend on the emulation of “the 
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rulings of classical  juris consults , whose authority was considered 
unassailable.” 97 However, this does not mean that Salafism advocates that  
Muslims should entirely cease to follow the teachings of the established 
school of jurisprudence. 98 As explained earlier in this chapter,  in the case 
of the Saudi Salaf īs,  association with a particular school  of law does not 
contradict  Salafism. Moreover,  such att itudes are not confined to the 
Ḥanbalī  School which has been historically connected with the Salafī  
creed; many contemporary Salafī  scholars are affiliated with other 
schools as well . 99 Even for a scholar like al-Albānī ,  whose intellectual  
pedigree is considered by some scholars to be rooted in the teaching of 
the 19 t h  century Ahl-e Ḥadīth movement, 100 nowhere in his writ ings does 
he argue that  the four established schools should be entirely rejected. 101 
Thus, Salafism is not an attempt to “cut out the theological  middleman 
who determined the terms on which ordinary believers could relate to the 
divine.” 102  Rather,  i t  is a rejection of the contemporary traditional 
position that perceives the legal schools as ends in themselves instead of 
means to understand the  Islamic script . 103  In other words,  the Salafī  
principle of  giving legal rulings only on the basis of scripture and ijtihād  
(lā madhhabiyyah ,  nonschoolism) is neither intended for lay Muslims nor 
does i t  mean the deduction of legal opinions directl y from the scripture 
without considering the opinions of the legal schools. Instead, this  
notion is directed against the exclusive reliance by scholars on the views 
of their respective madhhabs  at  the expense of the other schools .  It  is a 
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notion that has been championed by a large number of scholars 
throughout the history of Islam and is certainly not just a 20 t h  century 
phenomenon.  
It  is  possible to prove the long-standing existence of cross-  madhhab 
referencing in traditional jurisprudence  by studying the well-known 
phenomenon of multiple  legal verdicts (on certain issues) within the 
same madhhab .  While in some cases,  diversity in legal verdicts within 
the same madhhab  is attributed to the founder of the madhhab ,  in other  
cases,  it  is demonstrably the result  of disagreement of later scholars with 
the opinion of the founder of their own madhhab .  Notably,  such in such 
disagreements , evidence cited consists of the opinions of scholars of 
other madhhabs .  Take, for instance, the example of the great ḥanaf ī  
scholar Abū Yūsuf ,  who held the opinion of his madhhab  concerning the 
amount of zakāt .  However, when he visi ted Mad īnah and was presented 
with the evidence upon which Imām Mālik based his opinion, Abū Yūsuf 
changed his position and adopted the Mālikī view.104 Examples of this nature 
are numerous. What is worth noticing here is that these disagreements with the 
doctrines of one’s  own madhhab  is a practice that has existed  both 
before and after Ibn Taymiyyah’s time ,  let alone the reform movements 
that  arose from the eighteenth century onwards. 105  Cross-madhhab 
referencing was standard Sunnī practice and not one that  can only be 
associated with Salafism. In fact , according to Hallaq, only after the 16 t h  
century,  the blind following of earlier jurists became the norm amongst 
scholars due to the drastic decline in the number of mujtahids .106 Indeed, 
the situation in modern t imes is very different  from the Abū Yūsuf’s 
time; contemporary traditional scholars not only subscribe to only one of 
the established four schools, but it  is also very common for them to  
uncritically and even fanatically adhere to the legal opinions of their 
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respective madhhab  without considering the opinions of the other 
schools.  
Thus, two points can be deduced here. First , the fact that “writ ten 
sources make it clear that medieval scholars used the notion of madhhab 
al-salaf  primarily in theological  contexts” 107  as opposed to in 
jurisprudence is simply because there was no need to address the legal 
dimension. Second, the call to give legal rulings only on the basis of 
scripture and ijtihād  is neither exclusive to Salafism nor a new concept.  
As such, contemporary Salafism is not a new phenomenon but it  has i ts  
roots in the teachings of the medieval notion of madhhab al-salaf .  
Historical Background to the Schism amongst the Salafīs 
Having discussed the relationship of Salafism with other doctrinal 
movements, and having traced the continuities between medieval and 
modern Salafism, it  is now necessary to consider the divisions and 
differences among the Salafīs themselves. Following the invasion of Kuwait 
by Iraqi troops in 1990, Saudi Arabia decided to invite US troops on its 
soil in order to stop what was seen as an immediate danger of Saddam 
Hussein. This decision sparked outrage among the Salafī advocates,  who 
opposed the Saudi regime and its close alliance with the US and saw the 
decision as a clear violation of Islamic teachings. A group of young 
scholars known as the Ṣaḥwah  (awakening) clerics 108 led by Salmān al -
ʿAwdah (b.  1956),  Ṣafar al-Ḥawālī  (b.  1955) and Nāṣir al -ʿUmr (b.  1952) 
openly criticised the decision and “delivered fervent sermons criticising 
the state for allowing an army of infidels on Saudi soil;  consequently 
their popularity skyrocketed and huge numbers of their tapes circulated 
throughout the kingdom.” 109 Yet, “in secular terms, Ā l  Saud could explain 
requesting support from the USA as a necessary expedient to protect the 
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country.” 110 However, in a country where the legitimacy of authority is 
“derived from the claim that  the Saudi state is  a monotheist state that 
upholds sharīʿah  and Islamic values,  in addition to being the protector of 
the most sacred Islamic shrines,” 111  a religious legitimisation was 
necessary in order to justify such decision. For this purpose, the Saudi 
regime turned to the Council of Senior Scholars (CSS), headed at the 
time by the Grand Muftī  Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn  Bāz ,  who issued a 
religious verdict  legitimising the participation of non-Muslim troops in 
the war against  Ṣaddām’s Army.  
This was not the first time when Saudi rulers had sought the help of the 
official  ʿulamāʾ  against their political opponents.  Since the foundation 
of the first Saudi state by the efforts  of King Saʿūd, the official religious 
establishment adopted a doctrine of obedience to the Saudi rul ers. In 
return for this allegiance, the official religious establishment was 
allowed to influence numerous spheres of the Saudi Arabian way of life. 
According to the doctrine these scholars propound , Muslims are 
commanded to obey the orders of those in aut hority regardless of 
whether they are just or unjust, as long as it  is not a sin  to do so.  If the 
ruler commits sins and injustice, the scholars must offer the ruler 
discreet advice, a practice known as naṣīḥah fī  al-sirr .  This doctrine has 
placed official Saudi ʿulamāʾ  in a position where they always had to, at 
least  overtly,  defend the Saudi rulers against  their political  opponents. 112 
This is  one of the main reasons why Salafism, especially in its  
contemporary Saudi version, is seen by some observers as an apolitical  
and quietist school. 113 The Saudi state knows very well how to manoeuvre 
this doctrine in its own favour and has always been able to extract what 
many people in the Arab World describe as polit ical  verdicts. 114  
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For many decades, the ʿulamāʾ  in Saudi Arabia enjoyed a great deal of 
respect and held a very high authoritative status amongst the adherents  
of the Salafī School worldwide.  Nevertheless, the Ṣaḥwah  clerics and 
their followers refused to accept the abovementioned fatwā  by the CSS, 
insisting that it  has  no sound religious basis . The American presence in 
Saudi Arabia became a major issue during this period and it  was 
perceived by many Saudi  youth as a new form of colonialism, the main 
aim of which was to perpetuate  American hegemony, not only in Saudi 
Arabia,  but also in the whole region. 115 The fatwā  of the official  religious 
establishment led Ṣaḥwah  clerics,  as Wiktorowicz observes,  “to question 
whether the senior purists really understood the political  world in which 
they lived.” 116 In a private pamphlet  addressed to the members of CSS , 
al-Ḥawālī  implicitly raised this concern ,  warning that the US-led 
intervention was a deliberate pre-planned US strategy to control the oil  
reserves of the region. 117  Al-Ḥawālī  poli tely urged the members of the 
Council to study the circumstances and realit ies surround ing the whole 
Iraq-Kuwait  crisis in order to understand the real motivations behind the 
presence of these troops . Al-Ḥawālī also warned the CSS against  
confining the whole issue merely to the classical  fiqhī  disagreement over 
the question of  ist iʿānah bi a l -kuffār  (seeking the help of non-Muslims 
troops).  
In Saudi Arabia,  where the traditional poli tical  stand of the senior 
ʿulamāʾ  vis-à-vis political authority has always been obedience to the 
ruler, Ṣaḥwī  unorthodoxy was naturally challenged. Another group of 
Salafī  clerics,  pejoratively referred to as Jāmīs or Madkhalīs, n amed 
after the two Medina-based shaykhs ,  Amān al -Jāmī and Rabīʿ al -
Madkhalī,  began to oppose and condemn Ṣaḥwī  leaders for their open 
cri ticism of the Saudi regime. In their view, this ope n crit icism 
represents a deviation from the correct manhaj  (methodology) of 
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Salafism in dealing with the ruler and consti tutes a violation to the 
concept of obedience to wali  al-amr,  which would only encourage 
rebellion and dissent. They firmly rejected al l forms of activism, 
whether social or political , and took a very loyal ist stance towards 
authority.  Contrary to the Ṣaḥwīs ,  they placed unconditional trust  in the 
Saudi regime and preached total  obedience to existing regimes  elsewhere 
in the Muslim World.  
Both the messages of the Ṣaḥwīs ,  and that  of their critics found their way 
outside Saudi Arabia , resulting in significant splits  amongst the 
adherents of Salafism worldwide. The disagreement over what 
constituted the legitimate stance for Muslims, towards present -day 
regimes,  became a focal point for contention a nd fragmentation amongst 
Salafīs .  
In addit ion to the Gulf war, this period also witnessed two other major 
events in the Muslim World;  (i)  the end of the Afghan War and the 
return of the veteran mujāhidīn  to their homelands, and (ii) the political  
(then violent) confrontations between Islamists and the governments  in 
Algeria and Egypt.  These two events  added greatly to the already 
existing disagreement between Ṣaḥwīs  and their opponents. Saudi 
veterans of the war against  the Soviets in Afghanistan returned from 
what they perceived an individual duty to defend the l and of fellow 
Muslims only to find their own land overf lowing by non-Muslim troops. 
Perhaps what made mattes appear even worse was the fact  that  those 
troops were invited by a regime that for decades, had been portraying 
itself as the only true defender of  the Islamic sharīʿah  in the Islamic 
World.  Those mujāhidīn  who were exposed to the many different ideas of 
other Islamists , such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Jihad  
organisation, along with other takfīrī  groups participating in the Afghan 
War, immediately started questioning the  legitimacy of the Saudi rulers.  
This was step that  even the Ṣaḥwī  scholars had not dared to take against  
the Saudi regime. In addition, the participation of some of the Algerian 
Salafīs in the poli tical party The Islamic Salvation Front ( Front 
Islamique du Salut , FIS) and in its confrontations with the regime before 
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the legislative elections in 1991 , raised many questions within Salaf ī  
circles , inside and outside Algeria ,  about the religious legitimacy of such 
political involvement.  
Thus, as a consequence of these geo -political  events, the seemingly 
homogeneous school of Salafism began to witness intense debates and 
conflicts over a number of questions related to the correct  stand vis -à-vis 
political authority.  These differences took the form of statements and 
counter statements, which were then reproduced in a great  number of 
books, lectures,  and religious verdicts ,  al l  dealing with various questions 
related to the legit imacy of  contemporary rulers in the Muslim world.  
In the aftermath of the 1990/91 Gulf War, Salafī  circles were already 
racked by internal disputes and accusations of deviancy from Salafism. 
Loyalists, in particular, were quick to label their opponents with 
different derogatory names such as surūrīs 118,  ikhwānīs 119,  and quṭbīs 120.  
Initially,  these labels were aimed at revealing the “deviant” attitude of 
the Activists towards the state and not to their creed. At th at point of 
time, the contest was still  between the Loyalists and the Activists,  the 
Jihādīs  still  being considered part  of the latter, and not an entirely 
separate trend.  
The main concern of the Loyalist  scholars was that the Activists’ overt 
cri ticism of “wulāt al-amr” (the rulers) is a foreign innovation that 
contradicts the “manhaj” (method of applying religious views in  
practice) of their forefathers. In their view, the Activists ’ “corrupted” 
manhaj  was a result  of the influence of some Brotherhood figures, such 
as the Egyptian Muhammad Qu ṭb (1919-2014),  the brother of Sayyid 
Quṭb and the Syrian scholar Muhammad Surūr Za yn al-ʿAbidīn (b. 1938). 
Both men had escaped the brutali ty of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes 
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and immigrated to Saudi Arabia where they had found refuge and had 
been integrated to teach in its  educational insti tutions in the 1960s. 121  
Despite these aspersions, the Loyalists  acknowledged the correctness of 
the creed of the Activists,  although they cri ticised the  Activists for their 
interest in politics and for following the political doctrines of Sayyid 
Quṭb and Muslim Brotherhood. The label surūrī ,  was,  at  that  point , 
directed at those whose be lief/creed, as Lacroix put it :  “… might 
conform to what the pious ancestors believed, but the methods they used 
were blameworthy innovations (bidaʿah),  so they were not true 
Salafīs.” 122  Hence, initially,  the creed of those categorised by 
Wiktorowicz as “Politicos” was never challenged by those whom he 
labels “Purists” ,  nor was the creed of the “Loyalists”  questioned in turn.  
However,  this attitude did not survive for very long, as soon afterwards, 
the accusations of dev iation evolved to include also the creed of the 
opponents.  This shift started in the early nineties when the Salafī circles 
began to witness the publication and distribution of many books 
attempting to refute and denounce what was seen as imported deviated 
thoughts of takfīr .  These thoughts in the view of some Loyalists  were 
injected into the religious arenas in countries like Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan by the returnees of the Afghan War who were influenced by the 
various Jihādī  groups operating there,  as well  as by the writ ings of 
people like al-Maqdisī ,  who was one of the first few Salafīs t o declare 
the apostasy of the Saudi rulers.  
At the outset ,  the dispute took place,  between some students of al-Albānī 
in Jordan, supported by the Loyalist trend in Saudi Arabia on the one 
hand, and many Activists and Jihādīs  on the other hand. The focal po int 
of the disagreement was over the correct  Salafī position concerning al-
ḥukm bi ghayr mā anzala Allāh  (ruling by other than that which Allah 
has revealed) and when exactly such action can lead to the 
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“excommunication” or “expulsion” of the Muslim ruler from the realm of 
Islam. 
Later,  the disagreement took on greater creedal ramifications over what 
constitute īmān  and kufr  and whether this or that  action can be a cause 
for kufr .  Eventually,  the disagreements led each side to charge the other 
with deviation from “the correct” ʿaqīdat al -salaf  (the creed of the 
Salaf).   
Ultimately,  the disagreement led each group to accuse the other of 
deviation from the true Salafism. However, it  is vital  to note that these 
accusations were mainly between the Loyalists on one side and the 
Activists and the Jihādīs  on the other. The contribution of senior 
scholars to these debates has been to repeatedly call  for unity and for 
halting mutual  defamation.  
The Main Figureheads of the Debates 
Given the importance of ʿaqīdah  in Salafī thought, it  is not surprising to 
find an abundance of writ ings, lectures, and verdicts relating to these 
debates. Additionally,  because every side in the intra -Salafī  debates is  
trying their utmost to prove that they alone are the representatives of th e 
correct  Salafī position in the  disputed questions, the result is naturally a 
vast  collection of books, sermons, verdicts and other forms of expression 
in the form of polemics.   
This research does not intend to cover all  of the available data related to 
the debates; rather, i t  focuses on the writ ings of certain figureheads who 
played a major role in shaping the intra -Salafī debates over the question 
of ruling by manmade laws and īmān  and kufr .  For the position of the 
Loyalists,  the two main figureheads chosen here are the Jordanian 
scholar ʿAlī al -Ḥalabī and the Egyptian scholar Khālid al -ʿAnbarī . As for 
the posit ion of the Activists, the focus here is on the Saudi scholar Safar 
al-Ḥawālī  and the Jordanian scholar Muhammad Abū Ru ḥayyim. Since 
the posit ion of the Jihādīs on the questions of īmān  and kufr  is very 
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similar to the Activists, the research does not focus on any particular 
Jihādī scholar.  
Safar al-Ḥawālī :  Al-Ḥawālī  was born on 1950 in al -Bāḥah in the south 
west of Saudi Arabia. After completing his first degree at  the University 
of Medina, al -Ḥawālī continued his postgraduate studies at the 
University of Umm al-Qurā where he later became a lecturer in, and then 
head of the faculty of ʿaqīdah .  It  is  almost impossible to study intra -
Salafī  debates on īmān ,  kufr  and takfīr  without looking deeply into al -
Ḥawālī’s book Ẓāhirat al -Irjāʾ fi  al -Fikr al-Islāmī (The Phenomenon of 
Irjāʾ in Islamic Thought ).  The reason for this is that  in the first half of 
the nineties, al -Ḥawālī was one of the most influential a ctivist Salafī 
scholars, whose recorded sermons were widely distributed both inside 
and outside Saudi Arabia. Al -Ḥawālī’s academic specialization is in 
Islamic creed; therefore, unlike his fellow activist leaders, his main 
focus, has always been on matters  of creed. 123 Ẓahirat al -Irjāʾ ,  which was 
first published in 1996, is  believed to be a “major modern work to 
elaborate a systematic critique of purportedly murji’ite  tendencies in 
contemporary Islam” 124 as Lav rightly observes. The opinions expressed 
in this book do not represent only the position of Activist  Salafīs but 
they are also adopted by the Jihādīs as is suggested by its inclusion in 
the largest  online Jihādī library,  called minbar al-tawḥīd wa al-jihād .  
The other factor that adds to the significance o f Ẓāhirat al -Irjāʾ  within 
the topic at hand is the fact that the book contains the first criticism, 
albeit  a lenient one, of the alleged irjāʾ  inclinations of al -Albānī,  by a 
renowned Salafī scholar.  
ʿAlī  al-Ḥalabī :  Al-  Ḥalabī was born on 1960 in the city of al-Zarqa, 
Jordan. A student of al -Albānī, he was a prolific author and a central  
figure in much of the debates over īmān  and kufr  in the second half of 
the 1990s. Al-Ḥalabī was a Loyalist  scholar,  and was directly or 
indirectly involved in the publicati on of many books on the topic of īmān  
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and kufr  that stirred intense controversy within the Salafī community.  
Two of al-Ḥalabī’s books in particular will be scrutinized here,  al-
Taḥthīr min Fitnah al -Takfīr  (Warning against the Mayhem of Takfīr ) 
and Ṣayḥat Nathīr  (a Shout of  a Warner ).  Although al-Ḥalabī produced 
several books on īmān  and kufr ,  most of which are more expansive in 
content than these two books, the two chosen here have a particular 
importance for our purpose. This is firstly because these two books have 
incited very stern responses not only from the Activists and Jihādīs but 
also from some senior official scholars in Saudi Arabia who are 
categorised as “quietists” by many western scholars such as Wiktorowicz 
in his Anatomy of the Salafī Movemen t .  The other significance stems 
from the core of the first  book al-Taḥthīr,  which is a transcript  of an 
answer given by al -Albānī to a question put to him regarding the 
question of applying takfīr  to present-day rulers in the Muslim World.  
Al-Ḥalabī added a very long introduction and some footnotes in which he 
attempted to refute the view of his activist and Jihādī opponents.  Al -
Ḥalabī also attached to the transcribed answer of al -Albānī two 
commentaries ascribed to Ibn Bāz and Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn ,  which he 
considers to be an evidence of their consent and approval of the verdict 
of al-Albānī,  thus taking a position vis -à-vis these two scholars as well.  
Al-Ḥalabī’s book al-Taḥthīr  is also important for the next chapter that  
deals with the accusations against  al -Albānī. This is because according 
to al-Ḥalabī,  al-Albānī read the book and agreed with i ts content.  Now, 
given that senior scholars in Saudi Arabia refuted the book —or at least 
the first  edition of it—it  is  interesting to examine whether al -Albānī held 
different views on such vital issue of creed to that of the Saudi scholars.  
Khālid al-ʿAnbarī :  Al-ʿAnbarī was a university lecturer in Saudi 
Arabia. 125  He represents another central figurehead in the intra -Salafī  
debates over īmān  and kufr  in the second half of the 1990s. Similar to al -
Ḥalabī, his book al-Ḥukm bi ghayr mā anzal Allāh wa Usūl al -Takfīr  
(Ruling by Other than what Allah has Revealed and the Principles of 
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Takfīr) was criticised by the scholars of the PCRV for allegedly 
containing traces of the creed of the Murjiʾah  and was censored in Saudi 
Arabia. Al-ʿAnbarī has a number of recorded meetings with al -Albānī on 
questions related to īmān  and the takfīr  of the rulers who rule according 
to manmade laws. He also claims that al -Albānī approved of his book. In 
the fourth edition of his book, al -ʿAnbarī  provides a preface by al -Albānī 
(though not completed) to prove that al -Albānī shared his views.  
Abū Ruḥayyim :  The study of the intra -Salafī debates over the questions 
of īmān  and kufr  cannot be complete without examining the writ ings of 
the Jordanian professor of theology Abū Ru ḥayyim. Abū Ruḥayyim is a 
very interesting figure in these debates though it is very hard to 
determine whether he belongs among the Jihādīs or the Activists. What 
is certain about him however is  that l ike al -Ḥalabī, he was a prominent 
student of al-Albānī and then turned against his shaykh in a book called 
Ḥaqīqah al-Īmān  ʿInd al-Shaykh al-Albānī (The True Meaning of Faith 
in the view of Shaykh  al-Albānī). After finishing his undergraduate 
studies at  the Jordanian University,  Abū Ru ḥayyim, spent few years 
teaching sharīʿah  in Jordan before he was accepted to continue his 
postgraduate studies at the university of Umm al -Qurā between 1981 and 
1986- thanks to a let ter of recommendation from al-Albānī. This was the 
same period in which al -Ḥawālī was pursuing his studies at the same 
university.  After finishing his doctorate,  Abū Ru ḥayyim worked as a 
university professor of theology in UAE then Jordan.  
There are several reasons that  make Abū Ruḥayyim a significant figure 
in the study of the debates over īmān  and kufr .  First and foremost, there 
is the fact that he was a student of al -Albānī who turned against his 
teacher.  In addition, unlike al -Ḥawālī  in his above-mentioned book, Abū 
Ruḥayyim explicitly and expansively charges al -Albānī with holding 
some views of the Murjiʾah  in relation to the questions of īmān  and kufr .  
Although he stops short  of calling his shaykh murjiʾī  (the one who 
adopts the doctrine of Murjiʾah) he saves his abundant att acks for al -
Ḥalabī and other prominent students of al -Albānī whom he labels adʿiyāʾ 
al-Salafīyyah  (counterfeit Salafīs) and Murjiʾah .  After the publication of 
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al-Ḥalabī’s book al -Taḥthīr ,  Abū Ruḥayyim authored several books in an 
attempt to refute what he believed to be “lies upon the scholars,  
plagiarism, narrow mind, and shallow understanding” 126 of al-Ḥalabī and 
his supporters. These books later became an important source for much 
of the intra-Salafī debates over the position of al -Albānī in regard to the 
questions of īmān ,  kufr  and takfīr .  
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to address  the complexities and ambiguity 
surrounding the concept of Salafism and summarise the widely accepted 
meaning of Salafism by exploring some of its central characteristics. 
These characteristics include a particular  understanding of the concept of 
tawḥīd  based on an expansive definition of shirk ,  one that includes 
denunciation of many popular practices , in addition to a  somewhat li teral  
interpretation of certain  texts that  may imply a possible anthropomorphic  
understanding. The second characteristic of Salafism highlighted in this 
chapter relates to  a restrictive perception of innovation in Islam that 
narrows the scope of acceptable Islamic practice s.  The third 
characteristic pertains to their approach to the traditional four legal 
Sunni schools based on the rejection of blind taqlīd  and the division of 
Muslims into muqallid ,  muttabiʿ  and mujtahid .   
The chapter has also explained that  despite a number of differences 
between Salafism and Wahhabism, they do share a great  number of 
beliefs, doctrines, and sources , which suggests  that Wahhabism is part of 
Salafism. This,  however,  is  not the case with the modernist  movement of 
al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh ,  which does not share the  abovementioned key 
characteristics of contemporary Salafism. 
Finally,  this chapter has briefly presented the his torical context of  the 
genesis of schisms amongst the Salafī  protagonists in the 1990s,  by 
explaining how the presence of non-Muslim troops on the Saudi soil and 
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the polit ical engagement of some Islamic parties have triggered disputes 
amongst Salafī  youth over the legitimacy of the contemporary rulers in 
the Muslim world.  The next chapter ,  on the other hand, examines in 
greater detail the phenomenon of intra-Salafī disputes over the correct 
stance vis-à-vis polit ical authority.  
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Chapter Three: Al-Ḥākimiyyah 
Introduction  
Following the Arab Spring and the emergence of various Salafī  voices on 
the Arab poli tical  scene, a great deal of uncertainty appeared 
surrounding the relationship between the Salafīs and the incumbent 
regimes in their respective countries. The paradox here is  that  Salafism 
has been accused of two contradictory stances vis -à-vis political 
authority.  On the one hand, it  has been charged with an unreserved 
acceptance of, and loyalty towards unsavoury regimes for preaching a 
doctrine of subservience to them, and on the other,  it  has been blamed 
for much of the violence that  took place against these regimes in the 
recent past . Both these charges are based on some measure of truth.  As 
we know, the adherents of Salafism, unlike those of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, have never been unified under a single leadership or one 
organisational structure that  would determine the political stance that  al l 
Salafīs should take. As a result, a number of prominent Salafī scholars 
hold distinct and sometimes contradictory religious v iews, which can 
lead people ,  “to question whether they can even be considered part of the 
same religious tradition” , 1  as Wiktorowicz correctly observed. In this 
chapter,  we shall  discuss the full  range of Salafī  opinion of the matter of 
political legitimacy. It  will be demonstrated the disagreements that exist 
on the topic, far from being incidental, or symptomatic of incoherence, 
are logically related to the patterns of doctrinal  development and 
divergence among the Salafīs ,  which we have discussed in the previous 
chapter.   
As explained in the previous chapter, all  Salafīs broadly share a similar  
approach to religious affairs as well as the same method of reasoning; 
however,  their atti tude towards polit ical  authority in the Muslim World 
is far from uniform. Contemporary proponents of Salafism range from 
extremely loyal clerics who advocate  total subservience to the regimes 
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under which they live,  to the Jihādīs  who overtly seek to overthrow the 
same regimes,  using all forms of violence necessary.   
A good example of the former tendency is the Egyptian Salafī  scholar 
Maḥmūd ʿĀmir who in 2010 issued his famous religious verdict  
legit imising the killing of Muhammad al-Barādʿī  (the former director of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency) due to his calls for pol itical  
reform and his threat  of civil  disobedience. ʿĀmer’s reasoning is very 
simple and straightforward and based on one single Prophetic ḥadīth :  
“Anyone who tries to disrupt the affairs of this ummah  while they are 
united, you should kill him whoever he be.” 2 ʿĀmer deduces from this 
ḥadīth  the following verdict:  
Mubārak is the legitimate ruler of the country,  and challenging 
him is not,  religiously and rationally,  permitted. Therefore, 
whoever comes trying to divide us (Egyptians) in Egypt, the 
Prophetic injunction is clear. 3  
The opposite tendency is exemplified in the armed movements that swept 
various Muslim countries such as Egypt , Saudi Arabia, and Algeria  in 
the mid-nineties . It  was out of these movements that various curren t 
Salafī  Jihādī  groups emerged.  
In secular terms, these contradictory stances amongst the Salafīs can be 
simply explained as a reflection of the various political opinions existing 
amongst the ranks of the advocates of Salafism and can be treated as 
belonging to the distinct and au tonomous area of political thought.  
However, from a Salafī  point of view, positions towards those in power 
should not be justified solely on the basis of political reasoning/ends . 
Rather, Salafī scholars insist  that the relationship between the ruler and 
people is  primarily a religious affair bound by a contract  (‘ aqd) and a 
pledge of allegiance (bayʿah) and therefore,  it  must be regulated in 
accordance with the teaching of sharīʿah  in order to be legit imate. 4 
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In the following sections,  we shall see that  disagreement amongst 
proponents of Salafism towards present-day rulers revolves around 
various aspects of the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah :  the absolute sovereignty 
of God. In this chapter,  we shall examine  the points of agreement and 
disagreement in the Salafī  teachings vis-à-vis contemporary governments 
in the Muslim World, in the l ight of their doctrinal debates over two 
vital  issues  that  derive from the overarching matter of al-ḥākimiyyah :  (i)  
the relationship between al-ḥākimiyyah  and tawḥīd  and (ii) whether  the 
implementation of sharīʿah  law should be a sine qua non condition for 
the legitimacy of any political authority.  The chapter will use the 
specific cases of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in order to 
illustrate the way in which these theoretical  concepts are substantiated in 
the real political world .  
Defining al-Ḥākimiyyah 
Al-ḥākimiyyah,  in the Arabic language, is an invented word derived from 
the word ḥākim  (ruler or governor; pl.  ḥākimūn  or ḥukkām).  The Arabic 
verb of the word is ḥakama ,  which means to rule. The term al-
ḥākimiyyah  does not exist in the texts of the Quran or the Prophetic  
Tradition. However,  derivations from the same root consonants such as 
al-ḥukm  (command, or rule) are used in several scriptural texts to 
express the same concept. One of these derivatives ,  for instance, appears 
in the well -known Quranic verse “The command (al-ḥukm) rests with 
none but God.” 5 The term al-ḥākimiyyah  is mainly used to express the 
idea that absolute authority and command rest  with none but God alone.  
In other words, “[it]  is the Sovereignty in which rests the highest legal 
and governmental authority.” 6  Based on the above premise and the 
definit ion of al-ḥākimiyyah  just presented, the next section will examine 
the salafī perspective on this concept.  
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Al-Ḥākimiyyah from the Salafī perspective  
The literature on the area of what is currently known as “Islamism” or 
“political  Islam” indicates that  the South Asian Muslim scholar Abū al -
Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī 7  (1903-1979) was the first scholar/theoretician to 
introduce the term al-ḥākimiyyah ,  which was subsequently adopted and 
developed by the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qu ṭb. 8 Nowadays, the term is 
widely used by many Islamists including the Salafīs. It  is worth noting 
here that  while some scholars argue that  the salaf ī  Jihādīs  have adopted 
Quṭb’s concept of al-ḥākimiyyah , 9 this is  not actually accurate. This is 
because “the idea that ruler -ship is the exclusive prerogative of Allah, 
and the corresponding tenet that any form of human government that is 
not devoted to implementing Allah’s will  as expressed in the sharīʿah  is 
an illegitimate usurpation of Allah’s prerogative, and thus a form of 
idolatry” is not exclusively promoted by Qu ṭb. Rather,  the conception of 
ruler-ship is  rooted in the Salafī  teachings and  was already widespread in 
the Salafī li terature long before Quṭb started campaigning for it .  Perhaps 
it is  fair to say that  the Salafī l iterature does not use the term al-
ḥākimiyyah  per se as much as Qu ṭb and his followers use i t,  but i t  is 
evident that  the concept has always been present in the Salafī teachings. 10 
From a Salafī perspective ,  al-ḥākimiyyah  is not about the absolute  power 
of the ruler or the head of the Muslim state. Rather,  it  concerns all  
Muslims in all  matters of their lives.  Just  as it  is  not perm issible for the 
ruler to rule according to anything other than God’s decree, Muslims in 
general are commanded to adhere to the commandments of Quran and 
Sunnah (the traditions of the Prophet) in all  aspects of their lives.  The 
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idea of the exclusive ruler -ship of God, thus leads to the tenet that God’s 
will as expressed in the sharīʿah  is the only legit imate source of law. 
Hence, although the conception of the Sayyid Qu ṭb and the politicised 
groups on the notion of al-ḥākimiyya  may broadly “coincide with those 
of Salafism…  [ they] are much more highly politicised.” 11  
The Significance of al-Ḥākimiyyah 
Essentially,  the points of agreement between Salafī  proponents regarding 
al-ḥākimiyyah  and about the implementation of sharīʿah  as a system of 
laws are much more numerous than the issues over which they disagree. 
Nevertheless, the points of disagreement entail  enormous enough 
consequences to make disagreeing Salafīs  appear as opposing polit ical 
trends in relation to their attitude towards contemporary governments. 
Broadly speaking, Salafīs are no different to orthodox Muslims in 
believing and accepting the notion that  God has the ultimate sovereignty 
over the universe and that  authority and command rest with none but 
Him. 12  From the Jihādīs ,  who openly reject  the state and seek to 
overthrow it  by armed means, to those who are ostensibly apolitical and 
consider present-day rulers legitimate (wulāt  amr sharʿiyyūn), all  Salafīs  
lay great emphasis on this notion. There is thus no disagreement amongst 
the Salafīs  that it  is a religious obligation and necessity to apply 
sharīʿah  to govern all spheres of private and public life and that  denying 
such obligation takes one outside the fold of Islam. Take for instance al-
ʿAnbarī , who is an outspoken advocate for subservience to the political 
rulers. In his argument against  the Jihādīs  and Activists ,  al-ʿAnbarī  
makes it clear that his opposit ion to them is not about this point.  
The issue about which there is no disagreement is  the fact  that  
Allāh is the sole judge between people and that  He makes none 
to share in His decision and His rule, no matter ho w noble this 
person is,  or how complete his mind is. He, The Almighty, is 
The Best of Judges and His rule is absolute justice and truth.  
                                                     
11 Meijer ,  “Introduct io n,”  25.  
12 For  a  col lect ion of statements by var ious Sunni  scho lars regarding the  obliga tion 
to  rule  according to  sharīʿah  see:  Ibrāhīm, Muhammad Yusr ī ,  al-Furqān  al -Mubīn f ī  
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All other rules, manmade laws and Jāhilī 13 rules are unjust  and 
deviant. 14  
With respect to the rule of sharīʿah ,  all  Salafīs agree that there are two 
interrelated religious duties incumbent upon both the ruler and the 
people in the Muslim state. First ly,  it  is  compulsory for the Muslim ruler 
to govern according to the principles of sharīʿah .  In other words, a 
Muslim ruler must not follow or judge by any other system of laws that  
contradicts the laws of Islam, such as manmade laws. Secondly,  
Muslims, in turn, are obliged to refer to the rule of God only ,  for 
conduct of their personal affairs and resolution of disputes .  Salafī  
scholars often cite a number of scriptural  texts as evidence for these two 
duties.  For instance, with regard to the duty of the ruler,  they cite the 
Quranic verse:  
Then We have put you [O Muhammad] on a plain way of [Our]  
commandment (i.e.  legal ways and  laws of the Islamic 
monotheism). So follow that [Islamic monotheism and i ts 
laws], and follow not the desires of those who know not. 15  
As for the second obligation that  concerns all Muslims the evidence 
brought forward by the salafī scholars is  the follow ing Quranic verse:  
It  is  not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah 
and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should 
[thereafter] have any choice about their affair s. And whoever 
disobeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly straye d into 
clear error. 16 
According to the Salafī  view, other verses not only command the Muslim 
ruler to rule in accordance with sharīʿah  in all  matters of disputes,  but 
also contain a severe warning (waʿīd shadīd ) for not abiding by these 
commands. This warning implies that  failing to implement o r refer to 
                                                     
13 Jāhil iyyah ,  i s  a  term that  t radi t ional ly re fers  to  the per iod of pagan ignorance 
before I slam. Jāhil ī  is  used to  re fer  to  any soc ia l  pol i t ica l  or  r i tual  behaviour  that  
contrad ic ts  the p r inc iples o f I s lam.  
14 Al-ʿAnbar ī ,  Al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anzala Al lāh wa Usūl a l -Takf īr ,  17.  
15 Quran ,  45:18.  
16 Quran,  33 :36.  
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sharīʿah  in judgements,  legislation, poli tical and legal decisions  could 
lead to falling into unbelief.  The following three verses are quoted 
frequently in most materials dealing with the question of ruling by other 
than sharīʿah .  
And whosoever does not judge according to what Allah has 
sent down, then those are they (who are) the unbelievers ( al-
kafirūn). 17  
And whosoever does not judge according to what Allah has 
sent down, then those are they (who are) the unjust. 18  
And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent 
down, then those are they (who are) the immoral. 19 
The disagreement over the interpretation of these verses, especially the 
first one, forms the core of the contention between contemporary Salafīs 
with regards to the impact of the application of manmade laws on the 
status of the Muslim ruler as a Muslim . This will  be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter.  
Linking al-Ḥākimiyyah to Taqlīd 
The link between the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah  and the question of taqlīd  
in Salafism can be perfectly demonstrated in an incident narrated by al -
Albānī, which took place during a Friday sermon in one of the mosques 
in Damascus before he was forced to live in exile starting from 1980. 20 
The whole sermon, according to al -Albānī, was about how al-ḥākimiyyah  
should belong to no one but God alone. However, al -Albānī noticed 
during this lecture that  the imām  made a mistake with regard to a fiqhī  
(legal) question. After the prayer, al -Albānī approached the imām  to tell  
him that  the legal verdict he gave is in contradiction with an authentic 
Prophetic tradition. The imām justified his view stating that he was a 
follower of the Ḥanafī  School of jurisprudence. The justification of the 
imam  surprised al -Albānī who took i t to mean that  the imām  did not 
                                                     
17 Quran ,  5 :44.  
18 Quran ,  5 :45.   
19 Quran ,  5 :47.  
20 Al-Shaybānī,  Ḥayāt al -Albānī wa Āthāruh ,  77 .  
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consider himself obliged to abandon the view of his legal school in 
favour of following an authentic tradition, when one such existed .  
Al-Albānī responded blaming him  
Subḥān Allāh! You have just given a sermon that al-ḥākimiyyah is just for 
Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, but you only use this word to attack those 
rulers whom you think are unbelievers because they do not rule according to 
the Islamic sharīʿah. Yet you have forgotten about yourself and that Allah’s 
decree and judgement is binding for every single Muslim. So, when I say to 
you that the Prophet did so and so, why do you say, “But my madhhab 
(legal school) is such and such?” Thus, you have contradicted that which 
you are calling the people to.21  
This example is  a very good illustration of how the Salafī  perception of 
the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah  surpasses governorship and authority to 
encompass all  Muslims, and all  religious aspects related to human life.  It  
is this expansive perception of al-ḥākimiyyah  that forms the Salafī basis 
for rejecting blind taqlīd  of the four legal Sunni schools. According to 
Salafī  reasoning, only Prophet  Muhammad was infallible and 
consequently has the right of absolute obedience; no one but him has this 
right regardless of his or her knowledge and status. 22 
In this connection, al-Albānī argues that  any system of laws that  
contradicts sharīʿah  should not be accepted regardless of its  source.  For 
him, as well as many prominent Salafī scholars,  there is no difference 
between a law legislated by non-Muslims, as in the case of  manmade 
laws, and a legal opinion that  results from an erroneous ijt ihād  
(interpretation) by a Muslim scholar if it  contradicts the rule of God. In  
both cases, Muslims must reject  these laws and legal opinions when they 
are clearly in contradiction with the Quran and Sunnah, because absolute 
authority and command belongs solely to God. 23  The only difference 
between the Muslim scholar who has made an error and the legislator of 
                                                     
21 www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEWP0mWQYyI  (accessed 13/05/2013)  
22 ʿAbbāsī ,  Bidʿat  a l -Taʿaṣṣub al-Madhhabī ,  124;  Āl al -Shaykh,  Fatḥ  a l-Majīd ,  362–
363.  
23 Al-Albānī,  al-Taṣ f iyah wa a l -Tarb iyah ,  26.  
77 
 
manmade laws lies in the fact that the former is not as blameworthy as 
the lat ter since he did not intend to contradict the Islamic sharīʿah . 24  
Al-Ḥākimiyyah and Tawḥīd 
Besides these legal implications of al-ḥākimiyyah  for the practice of 
taqlīd ,  Salafīs also l ink al-ḥākimiyyah  to the fundamental  creedal  issue 
of tawḥīd  According to Salafī teachings, all Islamic theories, 
commandments for worship, social relations,  and politics are based on 
the notion of tawḥīd .  Tawḥīd  is the very purpose of the existence of 
humankind. Based on the Quranic verse “I have only created Jinns and 
men, that they may worship Me,” 25  they argue that God has crea ted 
human beings for one reason alone and that is to worship, obey and 
submit to Him solely and to no one else. The revelation of the books and 
the sending of the Prophets were merely to convey this message to the 
people. 26 
Accordingly,  for the Salafīs, the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah  represents an 
integral  part  in  all  three components of tawḥīd  explained in the first 
chapter. It is linked to tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah ,  given that singling out God 
in His lordship implies a firm and definite  belief that  He alone has the 
right to legislate for people  what is permissible,  and what is forbidden 
for them. Hence, whoever decrees a rule that contradicts the rules of 
Islam is deemed to have usurped the legislative sovereignty ( al-
ḥākimiyyah) that  belongs solely,  to God, and thus,  made oneself partner 
with God. 27  Thus we begin to understand the significance attached by 
Salafīs  to tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al-  ṣifāt ,  as  attributes such as al-ḥakam  
(The Judge or The Arbitrator) and al-ḥakīm  (The Wise) are amongst the 
names of God, which, together with the meanings they convey Muslims 
are supposed to unquestioningly believe. Al-ḥakam  means the precise 
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Arbitrator and the absolutely correct Judge whose word is decisive in 
determining what is  right and what is  wrong, in distinguishing between  
righteous and sinful deeds,  and none can overturn or repeal His decree.  
As for al-ḥākim ,  the Arabic word is in a superlative form , and thus 
intended for the glorification of the One who has the wisdom. The 
reference to God’s wisdom is intended to convey that He knows the real  
essence of everything and what is best for His creation. In  the Salafī  
view, therefore, subscription to tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al -  ṣifāt  leads to a 
fuller understanding of al-ḥākimiyyah .  
As for tawḥīd al-ulūhiyyah,  which forbids any form of association with 
God in worshipping Him, Salafīs believe that seeking judgement from 
any entity other than God constitutes a form of shirk  and submitting to 
His judgment is  a form of worship. The resemblance between 
worshipping any thing or being other than God and seeking judgment 
from any other than Him can be illustrated by Muhammad al -Amīn al-
Shanqīṭī’s 28 (1897-1972) interpretation of the following Quranic verse.  
They [Jews and Christians] took their rabbis and their monks to be their 
lords besides Allah, and Messiah -son of Maryam, while they were 
commanded to worship none but One God…29 
According to al-Shanqīṭī ,  there is no difference at all between seeking 
judgment from other anybody than God and worshiping 
someone/something other than Him. “The one who follows a system 
other than that of Allah,  legislations other than that  of Allah, or a law 
that opposes sharīʿah… is similar to the one who worships an idol or 
prostrates to a statue. There is no difference between them at all from 
any point of view. They are the same and they are both mushrikūn  
(polytheists, or guilty of associating idols with Go d).  One has 
association with Allah in worship and the other has associated with 
                                                     
28 Al-Shanqī ṭ ī ,  Muhammad al -Amīn Ibn Muhammad al -Mukhtār  a l -Jakanī.  A wel l -
kno wn and respec ted Salaf ī  scho lar ,  Born and raised in Mauri tania before  he  moved 
to  Saudi Arab ia where he spent  the last  par t  o f his l i fe  teaching Quran ic exegesis 
and  uṣū l  al - f iqh  (pr incip les o f Jur isprudence) .  Best  known for  his fomous work on 
Quranic exegesis Adwāʾ  a l-Bayān f ī  Īdāḥ  a l-Qurʾān bi  al -Qurʾān  
29 Quran ,  9 :31  
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Allah in His judgment.  They are both the same.” 30 The same idea is  also 
found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s interpretation of the above verse in his 
book Kitāb al -tawḥīd .  Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, asserts that  Muslims are 
commanded by God to obey the scholars and the rulers . However, this 
obedience must not be in forbidding what God has made permissible or 
permitting what He has made forbidden  because this type of obedience is 
equal to taking them as lords beside God. 31 Absolute obedience is a form 
worship that is reserved for God alone. To support his view, Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb invokes a famous story of one of the companions of the Prophet 
named ʿAdī b. Abī Ḥatim, who had been a Christian before converting to 
Islam. It  is  reported that  when he heard the above verse, he said :  “We do 
not worship them.” To which  the Prophet replied: “Do not they proscribe 
what Allah (the Exalted) allowed and in turn you proscribe  it;  do not 
they allow what Allah (the Exalted) proscribed and you allow it?  So ʿAdi 
said: “Yes.”  The Prophet  then said:  “That is  worshipping them.”  In his 
commentary on the book , Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn concludes that the Prophet 
explained that the expression “worship” in the verse was not just  
intended to mean sujūd  or rukūʿ  (prostration or bowing) but that i t  
included the acceptance of  legislation that contradicts t he rule of God. 
Thus, obedience to the rabbis and monks or anyone other than God 
constitutes shirk al-ṭāʿah  (association in obedience). 32 
In sum, al-ḥākimiyyah ,  in the view of Salafīs ,  requires Muslims to 
believe and accept that  no one but God has the right to legislate what is 
permissible and what is not in all aspects of life. Muslims must also 
believe that  the rule of God is the best for people, and the y have to refer 
solely to the rule of God in all matters of disagreements. However, 
despite this somewhat unified perception of al-ḥākimiyyah  amongst the 
Salafīs, there exist  many disagreements on how to apply this concept in 
real  life. Some of these disagreements are tolerated and seen as matters 
of ijtihād ,  while others are not accepted and deemed by disagreeing 
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parties to be deviation from Salafī teachings. The coming section deals 
with the latter type.  
Points of Disagreement  
When the disagreements between the Salafīs started in the early 1990s, a 
particular term became frequently mentioned and recurrent especially in 
the Loyalists’ discourse:  manhaj al -salaf fī  al -taghyīr  ( the path of the 
salaf  in order to change status quo).  Using this term, they refer to the 
salafī method or approach in dealing with social and political issues and 
how to rectify them. The Loyalists  started labelling thei r activist  
counterparts using different derogatory terms, such as surūrīs , 33 
ikhwānīs , 34  quṭbīs . 35  These were initially used only to condemn their 
alleged deviant att itude towards the State but not to criticise their creed, 
which was still  broadly considered as within the salafī  ʿaqīdah .  At that  
stage,  the Jihādīs  were still  considered by the Loyalists  merely as 
Activists from among their own group and not as a separate religious 
trend altogether. Nonetheless, these terms already bore the core of the 
Loyalists’ contention ,  that the Activists’ political activism was in fact a 
non-Salafī innovation, in contradiction with the manhaj al -salaf (path of 
the Salaf). In their view, the corruption of the Activists ’ manhaj  was a 
direct result of the influence of a number  of prominent Brotherhood 
figures,  such as the Egyptian Muhammad Qu ṭb (1919-2014), the brother 
of Sayyid Qu ṭb and the Syrian scholar Muhammad Surūr Zayn al -ʿAbidīn 
(b. 1938), both of whom lived and taught in Saudi Arabia universities 
after escaping the crackdown on the organisation in Egypt and Syria. 36 
Thus, although the dispute at this early stage was largely due to 
disagreements over how to deal with current despotic regimes , the 
Loyalists had already begun to argue that Salafism consisted not only of 
upholding the creed of the salaf ,  but also, and most importantly,  required 
                                                     
33 Fol lowers o f  Muhammad Surūr  Ibn Zayn al -ʿĀb idīn,  a  former member o f the 
Muslim Brotherhood  branch in Syria .  
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35 Fol lowers o f Sayyid  Qu ṭb 
36 Al-Rachid,  Contes t ing the Saudi S tate ,  63.  
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acting upon their manhaj  for any societal  or political change and reform 
that  was to be brought about. 37 
Salafīs  are also rent by debates over which regimes are in need of change 
(taghy īr) and when, whatever be the means for bringing about that 
change. Essentially,  there are two main areas of disagreement amongst 
Salafīs in  this matter, both related to the concept of  al-ḥākimiyyah .  One 
pertains to the importance of this concept within Islam overall , and thus, 
the amount of effort and time that Muslims in general and Salafīs in 
particular should devote to it .  The other point of disagreement relates to 
the legitimacy of present -day Muslim rulers who do not implement this 
concept in their rule over the Muslim populations in their countries.  
The Importance of al-Ḥākimiyyah 
According the Loyalists,  the manhaj al -salaf  consists,  first  and foremost,  
in the call to tawḥīd ,  which the Activists and Jihādīs  have neglected by 
according too much attent ion and effort to the establishment of the 
Islamic State. Quite like those we have categorised as senior scholars, 
the Loyalists  argue that  the focus on the establishment of the Islamic 
State would only lead to political  dissent, confrontation with existin g 
governments and bloodshed. 38  According to the Loyalists , by adopting 
the establishment of the Islamic state as their ultimate goal, the Activists  
and Jihādīs  have deviated from the teachings of Salafism in three ways 
(i)  the circumscription of al-ḥākimyyah  within political boundaries only 
(ii) leniency towards non-Salafī movements and their iconic figureheads (iii)  overt 
cri ticism of the rulers.  
The circumscription of al-ḥākimyyah within political boundaries 
The first of these alleged deviations from the Salafī  approach relates to 
the reduction of al-ḥākimyyah  to a mere political notion , at the expense 
of other components of ʿaqīdah . 39  A number of Loyalists,  such as al -
Ḥalabī for example, even question the legitimacy of the term al-
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38 Al-Ḥalabī ,  Ṣayḥat Nath īr b i  Kha ṭar a l -Takfīr ,  43.  
39 Ibid,  87.  
82 
 
ḥākimyyah  itself , insisting that the term is an innovation that needs 
further scrutiny. In al-Ḥalabī's view,  his opponents:  the Jihādīs  and the 
Activists,  whom he labels as tak fīrīs  and ḥizbīs ,  respectively,  have 
distorted i ts expansive meaning by confining it to matters of governance 
and by making it  their sole and primary concern. In order to delegitimise 
his opponents, al -Ḥalabī likens their at titude towards al-ḥākimyyah  to 
the concept of al-imāmah  in the doctrine of the shīʿah . 40 Such a charge 
shows how deep this internal conflict  has reached , since accusing a 
Salafī  of having something in common with shīʿah  can be perceived as a 
more serious insult  than the accusation of bein g ikhwānī  or surūrī.  
However,  al-Ḥalabī was later forced to withdraw these statements in 
later edit ions of his book after having been crit icised by some senior 
scholars for belittling the importance of the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah .  
The origins of the Loyalists’ charges against their opponents in regard to 
the importance of al-ḥākimiyyah  can be traced to the traditional 
ideological tension between the proponents of Salafism and the more 
politicised Islamic movements,  especially the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) .   
The relationship between the proponents of Salafism and MB has been 
tense for years; Salafīs have been deeply crit ical  of both the figures and 
the methods of Islamist poli tical activism. Moreover, differences 
between the two groups have always centred around the debate about 
whether it  is religious-theological purity or political activism that  
deserves primacy .  Traditionally,  Salafīs place more emphasis on matters 
of creed than they do on poli tical  activism. Unlike MB, they take the 
spreading of Islamic education and religious knowledge as their central  
concern and function. For this reason, Salafīs, in general,  have always 
been critical of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political agenda and of their 
lack of religious knowledge. Modern politics is seen by the Sala fīs as a 
path to deviancy, one that  would only force Muslims to make 
compromises in their belief and principles, which they are not supposed 
to make. For the Salafīs, the MB have sacrificed much of their Islamic 
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principles for the sake of their political a genda. As a result, “the 
Brotherhood (and its  offshoots like Hamas) has been looked down upon 
as shallow, misguided, and deviant ( munḥarif) by Salafism for its 
emphasis on politics at the expense of ʿaqīdah  and religious knowledge 
(ʿi lm).” 41 
Based on the verse “know, therefore, that there is  no god but Allah…” 42 
Salafīs argue that tawḥīd  is the foundation of the religion of Islam and 
the first  principle that believers are obliged to know. 43 In their view, the 
obsession of MB with capturing the reins of government has led them to 
overlook the importance of tawḥīd  in order to gather more supporters. In  
the Salafī view, the MB is no more than an association whose main 
concern is mobilising people for its  cause, without paying much 
attention to the most important concept of Islam: tawḥīd .  “Kalimat al-
tawḥīd qabla tawḥīd al-kalimah” 44 (the word of tawḥīd  has priority over 
uniting Muslim on one word) :  this  slogan best  describes the Salafī  vision 
of priorities. Thus, in the Salafī view ,  uniting Muslims is not an aim in 
itself,  unless i t  is  achieved under the banner of the correct ʿaqīdah  and 
manhaj ,  which means the teaching of Salafism. 
Amongst senior Salafī scholars, al -Albānī is arguably amongst the most 
cri tical of the MB approach, which, in his view, is “based on the  
principle: we work together on the matters upon which we all agree and 
we forgive each other in those which we disagree on.” 45 This principle, 
according to al-Albānī, is  the very reason that has kept the MB away 
from the correct  understanding and practice of Islam. 46  
In l ine with the criticism of the MB approach, the Salafīs are also 
cri tical of some of the main icons of the movement. For instance, Ḥasan 
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al-Bannā, the founder of the movement, was crit icised by a great  number 
of Salafīs for adopting a position that contradicts the Sunnah and the 
salafī creed in many ways despite his claims of adhering to Salafī 
principles.  Another MB prominent figure who has been the target of 
severe crit icism from Salafīs is Sayyid Qu ṭb who is probably the most 
important figure in the history of the movement after its founder.  In fact, 
Quṭb is probably the most criticised amongst the MB figureheads due the 
extent of his prolific writings and a number of his ideas were deemed 
deviant by certain Salafīs .  Although, these critici sms vary in terms of 
severity,  it  is clear that  the  Salafīs  do not perceive him as a religious 
scholar.  In fact, even those Salafīs who are somehow apologetic towards 
his stance often avoid referring to him as shaykh ,  a title that connotes 
religious scholarship, but instead, label  him as ustādh  (instructor) or 
adīb  (a man of letters).  According to the Salafīs ,   such unsupportable 
positions and deviations from the Salafī creed are due to the inadequate 
religious scholarship of the two above figures whose interest  was more 
in polit ics than in gaining religious knowledge , and due to their 
influence on unenlightened others . 47  
It  was this historical ly antagonistic  Salafī att itude towards the MB that 
led to the internal Salafī  dispute over al-ḥākimiyyah  in general  and i ts 
importance in particular. As Lacroix has shown, the Loyalists picked up 
on al-Albānī’s criticism of the MB and transformed them “into an 
ideological  paradigm leading to a much more systematic anti -Muslim 
Brotherhood and anti -Ṣaḥwah  argument.” 48 For the Loyalists , the parallel  
between MB and their opponents within the fold of Salafism lies in their  
common mode of distorting the “true” Salafī manhaj ,  that is,  by focusing 
on establishing the Islamic state at  the expense of tawḥīd . 49 The Loyalists  
allege that  their opponents are so overwhelmingly focussed on the 
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political aspects of al-ḥākimiyyah ,  that they end up overlooking other 
important matters of religion and are even will ing to compromise them in 
order to achieve their goals.  
The Leniency towards non-Salafī Movements and their Iconic Figures 
The second deviation from the teaching of Salafism, into which the 
Activists and Jihādīs  have fallen, at least  according to the Loyalists,  
pertains to the  formers’  lenient stance towards other Islamic movements 
and their iconic figures .  The Loyalists  say that giving al-ḥākimiyyah  
more importance than it  merits has led their opponents to strip Salafism 
of one of its  main principles , namely the concept of al-walāʾ wa al -barāʾ  
(loyalty and disavowal).  In a Salafī context, this concept roughly refers 
to the notion that  “all  Muslims should show loyalty to God, Islam and 
Muslims and that everything else should be disavowed.” 50  
It  is necessary to not here that  this  concept is  so loose and flexible that  
it  has been interpreted very differently by different Salafī  protagonists. 
In western academia, the Jihādīs ’  usage of this concept has been 
examined by several  scholars. 51 It  is believed that  the Jihādīs  use it to 
condemn the Muslim governments for their ties with non-Muslim 
countries. According to the Jihādīs ,  loyalty and disavowal is a vital  
pillar of tawḥīd  without which the Islamic profession of faith ( shahādah) 
is void. 52 The Loyalists’ usage of  this concept , on the other hand, has 
still  has not attracted much scholarly attention.  
In fact, the Loyalists  use the concept of al-walāʾ wa al -barāʾ  differently 
from the J ihād īs, and use it to argue that  a true Salafī  should show 
loyalty or allegiance to fellow Salafīs and disavow association with  
people of innovation (ahl al-bidʿah).  They believe that  Islam faces a 
greater threat from the “deviant” manhaj  of Islamic movements such as 
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the MB than from any governments; thus the Loyalists  believe that  
countering the ideas of fellow Islamists is  a priority over the engagement 
in politics.  For the Loyalists, such deviant Islamic movements disguise 
themselves under the flag of defending Islam but, they are in fact more 
dangerous than non-Muslims are.  Muslims cannot be deceived by non-
Muslims but they are deceived by these Islamic movements  who lead 
people astray. 53 Incidentally,  this is a typical  argument ,  one which draws 
on certain classical  texts, which insist  that heterodox sects constitute a 
greater danger to Islam than non -Muslims do.  
The disagreement over the correct Salafī position vis-à-vis fellow 
Islamic movements thus consists of a drastic parting of ways between the 
Activists on one hand and the Loyalists  and Jihādīs  on the other. The 
former trend’s opposition to other groups is distinguished by its soft 
tone whereas the lat ter trends are famous for thei r rigorous attacks on 
other Islamic movements. This is  especially the case with the Loyalists  
as most of the Jihādīs’  attacks are directed mainly towards the MB for 
their participation in the political process in several countries. 54  The 
Loyalists’ position  towards other Islamic movements , on the other hand,  
is dist inguished by its theological  dimension. Their criticism of 
movements such as the MB is not just on grounds of politics and manhaj  
but also based on fundamental issues related to creed. The Loyalists 
point  out that  the MB are guilty of  a number of deviations: their call  for  
pluralism of religions and the brotherhood of Abrahamic religions, their 
ambiguous position towards tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt , 55  as well as 
inherit ing the hatred of the shīʿah  and ṣūfīs  against  Salafism. 56  
On this basis,  the Loyalists  believe that  these Islamic movements and 
their iconic figures should be evaluated through the same prism the salaf 
used with “deviant”  sects such as the Muʿtazilah  and Khawārij .  Quṭb in 
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particular  is  considered to be worse than the heads of Islamic sects such 
Muʿtazilah  and Khawārij . 57  Accusations against Quṭb are very serious; 
they range from his declaring takfīr  on Muslim masses to the adoption of 
the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd  (unity of being) and legitimisation of 
manmade laws. 58 Thus, for the Loyalists , only the Salafīs belong to the 
saved sect in the aforementioned ḥadīth  of the sects.  
However,  the Activists reject this  method of evaluation and instead 
adopt a more accommodating approach. They insist that one must not 
evaluate Islamic movements and figureheads  based on their mistakes 
alone, overlooking the virtues they possess.  Total  truth does not belong 
to one particular group, and every Islamic movement enjoys certain 
virtues that the others do not possess. 59 Unlike the Loyalists , who look 
upon the Islamic movements as antitheses to Salafism, the Activists 
believe that  Islamic movements complete one another and Salafism has a 
complementary role to play in this regard . 60  This relaxed attitude is 
reflected in the Activists’  reluctance to use epithets such as  salafī  and 
atharī  (follower of proof-texts) to refer to the “saved”  sect  and instead 
use ahl al-sunnah wa al- jamāʿah ,  which contains an accommodating 
connotation. Consequently,  they praise iconic figures such as Qu ṭb and 
al-Bannā for their heroic stances in serving the Islamic cause.  
This somewhat tolerant stance towards “the innovators”  is based on the 
principle of muwāzanāt  (balancing between the good and the bad in an 
individual’s thought) .  This principle is , according to the Loyalists, 
fundamentally opposed to the principle of al-walāʾ wa al -barāʾ- since 
this principle requires the uprooting of all  deviations and innovations. 61 
A stance based on muwāzanāt  is unforgivable to the Loyalists, since, in 
their view,  it  turns the Activists  into innovators too. Following this line 
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of reasoning,  the Activists  eventually came to be perceived as the enemy 
within; people who claim to be Salafī  but are reluctant to disavow 
association with  people of innovation, al l  because they were drawn into 
the manhaj  of Sayyid Qu ṭb and the MB, which in turn,  prioritise 
grouping people together for political gain at the expense of the correct  
creed. The Loyalists  do concede that the Activists  are stil l  closer to 
Salafism than all other movements ,  but the extent of their apprehension 
and disapproval is clear from the fact  that they refuse to call such 
Activists Salafīs.  In fact,  given their proximity,  Loyalists view the 
Activists as more dangerous to Salafism than all other movements ,  
including the Jihādīs .  
The Overt Criticism of the Rulers 
The other violation  to the Salafī manhaj ,  committed both by the Activists  
and the Jihādīs ,  pertains to their opposition to the state.  This,  at  least,  is  
the point of view of the Loyalists ,  according to whom Loyalists,  the 
correct manhaj  (way) to rectify any wrongdoing committed by the state 
is to offer the ruler advice  privately.  The duty of a scholar ends there,  
and then it  is  up to the ruler to accept the advice  or reject  it .  Hence, any 
form of khurūj ʿalā al-ḥākim  (rebellion against the state) is seen as a 
reprehensible act  that  will  lead to internal strife within the Muslim 
nation. To support  this position , the Loyalists cite the following passage 
from al-ʿaqīdah al -Ṭaḥāwiyyah ,  a book that is considered one of the core 
sources for matters of creed in Salafism. 
We do not accept rebellion against our imāms or those in charge of our 
affairs even if they are unjust, nor do we wish evil on them, nor do we 
withdraw from following them. We hold that obeying them is part of 
obeying Allah, the Glorified, and therefore obligatory as long as they do not 
order us to commit sins. 62 
 According to the loyalist interpretation,  rebellion against the ruler is  not 
confined to violent conduct against the state but also of all  other pacific 
forms of opposition such as the forming of political parties, sit -ins, and 
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demonstrations. 63  Drawing on heresiographical  li terature,  both violent 
and pacific opposition to the ruler have been identified with  the heretical 
sect called Khawārij ,  a sect vilified by Sunni Islam for justifying 
violence against  the state.  According to the Loyalists ,  the history of 
Islam witnessed two types of Khawārij ;  a mainstream type that  
conducted armed revolts  against  the state using the sword (khurūj bi al-
sayf) and an offshoot type, that  of the tongue, i.e.  those  who use words 
to incite and encourage rebellion against  the state but do not conduct it  
themselves (khurūj bi al-lisān).  The latter is  also known as Khawārij  
qaʿadiyyah  (those who hold and advocate the views of Khawārij  but do 
not rebel themselves) . 64 As such, the Loyalists  argue that  the manhaj  of 
the Jihādīs  represents a revival of the  mainstream Khawārij  and the 
Activists’ overt  cri ticism of the state is  similar to Khawārij  qaʿadiyyah . 
Again, the Loyalists  believe that the intellectual roots of both trends go 
back to the revolutionary ideas of Qu ṭb that  are based on his “deviant” 
interpretation of al-ḥākimiyyah . 65 
The Loyalists’ stance towards the rulers can be described as a mixture of 
al-Albānī’s rejection of political activism and the doctrine of obedience 
adopted by the Saudi scholars towards the Saudi regime. The Loyalists  
built  on this mixture and made it  applicable to all Muslim countries. On 
the one hand they insist  that  Salafism is not a poli tical  movement  and 
that  political  activism itself is  prohibited as it  contradicts the basis of 
ʿaqīda  based on al -Albānī’s principle “The good policy is to stay away 
from politics .”  However, their obsession with  denying any link between 
Salafism and all forms of opposition to the state has led them to move 
away from being apolitical and quietist to become active Loyalists , 
whom main concern is to preach subservience to the rulers and denounce 
all those denounced by their governments.  Thus, although in theory the 
Loyalists claim to be concerned primarily with creed rather than politics ,  
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in practice, it  has been hard for them to completely ignore politics and 
stay apolitical. Partly,  this stems from the fact that the Activists and the 
Jihādīs  are highly active and as such they represent a competitor for 
people and influence; the Loyalists  are drawn into the debate as it  
touches upon core creedal and theological matters.   
The position taken by the Loyalists  is of course vehemently rejected by 
both the Jihādīs  and Activists.  In the lat ter’s’ view, the correct manhaj  
of the salaf  is to confront what is  an eminent threat to Islam and not to 
stop at  the same creedal arguments that the salaf  have preferred in the 
past  when dealing with new deviations. Throughout history, they argue, 
scholars have engaged in different combats against  new deviations that 
were taking place in their times. In other words,  the Jihādīs  and Activists  
believe that  the nature of challenges facing Muslims change over  time 
and thus, Muslims ’ priorities should change too accordingly.  
It  would be a fallacy to take  the contentions of the Activists and the 
Jihādīs  to mean that  they are opposed to tawḥīd ,  which, as we know,  is  
the first  principle that  Muslim believers are obliged to know and 
practise. To the contrary,  the notion of tawḥīd  is actually the main 
driving force in their opposition to the state; since they believe that  
giving the right of legislation to anybody other than God represents the 
greatest form of shirk  in present t imes.  As such, in condemning such 
shirk ,  Muslims should give i t  priori ty over the less prevalent and less 
important forms of shirk .  In their view, the Loyalists’ posit ion on al-
ḥākimiyya  is  inconsistent wi th the teachings and principles of the Salafī 
manhaj ,  which require Muslims to fight all forms of shirk .  The fault of 
the Loyalists’ manhaj ,  they say,  lies in its emphasis  on shirk al-qubūr  
(polytheism of graves) at  the expense of shirk al-quṣūr  (polytheism of 
palaces) . 66 
These,  in short ,  are the main points of the  disagreement amongst the 
Salafīs over the importance of al-ḥākimiyyah  and about how much effort 
Muslims should give to this concept . As is evident, these disagreements 
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reflect the various priorities adopted by various groups within Salafism. 
The cause of this divergence in  priorities can be traced to an even deeper 
disagreement about  the legitimacy of present -day rulers,  to which we 
shall turn our attention in the next section.  
The Relationship between the Legitimacy of the Ruler and the Application of 
Sharīʿah 
Salafism adopts and advocates a doctrine of obedience to the legitimate 
Muslim ruler. This doctrine is based on the classical Sunni 
understanding of the relationship between the Muslim ruler and people 
within his jurisdiction. Thereby, Salafī scho lars insist that once a 
Muslim ruler has established himself at  the helm of the Muslim state and 
is given bayʿah  (pledge of allegiance to the ruler),  he becomes a 
legit imate ruler; henceforth, obeying him becomes a religious obligation 
incumbent upon all  Muslims, and any form of rebellion against him is 
forbidden. Any group of Muslims who secede from the authority of the 
legit imate ruler and resort to violence in order to overthrow him are seen 
as condemnable bughāt  (rebels or secessionists). 67 In theory, proponents 
of Salafism from across the Salafī spectrum share this view. 
Having said that, the question that arises here is:  if it  is true that  
Salafism and Salafī scholars teach and advocate such doctrine of 
political pacifism that prioritises order and stab ility over social justice, 
then what makes the Activists  and the Jihādīs  oppose and sometimes 
rebel against the state in many Muslim countries? Moreover,  how do they 
justify their overt opposition to the state?  
The answer to these questions lies in the fact that apart from the case of 
Saudi Arabia where the ruling family has always “ tried hard to broaden 
its legitimacy and image as the only truly Islamic State committed to the 
comprehensive implementation of the sharīʿah ,” 68  constitutions in the 
rest of the Muslim World are derived mainly from secular laws. The 
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implementation of these laws instead of the sharīʿah  has been the main 
underlying cause for much of the opposition against  authorities , and 
consequently,  the divisions amongst the Salafism. 
Two main points  regarding the application of manmade laws have been 
subject to dispute and division amongst contemporar y Salafīs. The first  
relates to the impact of these manmade laws on the ruler’s  faith, that is,  
whether implementing these laws  is an act of apostasy or not.  Secondly,  
if the application of such laws does not quite constitute apostasy, then 
what is the effect of ruling by manmade laws on the legitimacy of the 
ruler? The question therefore: is he qualified to be obeyed?  
It  is worth noting here that  the focus of most intra-Salafī  polemics  is  on 
the first question, while the second question has always been treated as 
secondary to the first one. This is because the first question is related 
directly to a crucial  matter in  ʿaqīdah ,  namely the concept of takfīr , 
while the second one belongs to the realm of  fiqh. For the Salafīs ,  as 
Wagemakers observes , “defining exactly what their creed entails  is v ery 
important” due to their “desire to purify Islam of religious innovations 
and other “un-Islamic” influences .” 69 With that clarificat ion in mind, we 
shall deal here with  the second question only.  The first ,  and more 
important question is examined separately and in greater detail  in the 
next chapter.  
The Main Views 
Within Salafism, there are two opinions about the legitimacy of the ruler  
who rules according to manmade laws; some Salafīs argue that  such 
rulers are not legitimate because the main purpose of government in 
Islam is to apply the rule of God which such rulers are clearly not 
fulfilling. Other Salafīs contend that the only case in which a Muslim 
ruler is considered il legit imate is when he becomes non -Muslim. Without 
this condition, the ruler maintains and continues to have his rights as a 
legit imate ruler even if  he does not fulfil  his duties. The first  opinion is 
held by the Jihādīs ,  Activists  and most of those we have classified as 
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senior scholars ,  while the latter is  predictably advocated mainly by the 
loyalist groups.  
The key factor for this disagreement stems from the fact that the 
implementation of manmade laws in many parts of the Muslim world is a 
new phenomenon in the course of Islamic history.  As such, i t  has proved 
to be problematic in determining the “correct” stance that  Muslims 
should take apropos the Muslim ruler who adopts such systems of laws 
instead of sharīʿah ,  since there is  no clear precedent in Islamic history 
on which one can draw. The second factor pertains to the paradox in 
which the Salafīs found themselves after the elimination of sharīʿah .  On 
the one hand, Salafism teaches a doctrine of nearly total  political  
obedience to the ruler , even an unjust one, but at the same time it asserts 
that  any legal system in contradiction with sharīʿah  must be rejected and 
resisted. The Loyalists  hang on to the first  principle over the second, 
while the Jihādīs  and the Activists take the opposite view: they reject the 
legit imacy of present-day rulers on the basis that the application of 
sharīʿah  is  a necessary condition for the doctrine of obedience.  
According to David Commins , the most distinctive facet of  the thought 
and writings of  Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ,  which, as we have seen, forms part 
of the Salafī  canon,  is “the insistence that  proclaiming, understanding 
and affirming that God is one do not suffice to make one a Muslim, but 
that one must also explicitly deny any other object of worship.” 70 Indeed, 
Salafīs believe that mere verbal pronouncement of shahādah  (testimony 
of Islam) is not sufficient for the correctness of one’s faith unless it  is 
accompanied with the disbelief in all types of false deit ies . 71 Based on 
the Quranic verse: “whoever disbelieves in the ṭāghūt and believes in 
Allah, he has grasped the firm handhold… ,” 72  Salafism teaches that 
tawḥīd comprises two pillars  neither of which is sufficient without the 
other;  the belief in God and disbelief in tāghū t  (pl.  ṭawāghit ).  
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Linguistically,  ṭāghūt derives from the Arabic verb ṭaghā ,  which means 
to exceed the limit . 73  In their usage ,  Salafī scholars often quote the 
definit ion provided by Ibn al -Qayyim that  ṭāghūt is  
All things that go beyond their boundaries in respect of being worshipped 
followed or obeyed.74 Thus, ṭāghūt of every group of people includes all 
those whom people refer to in arbitration instead of God or His Prophet, or 
whom they worship besides God or whom they follow blindly without sight 
from God.75 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb lists five main types of ṭāghūt ,  one of which is the 
one who rules in accordance to other than the rule of God. 76 The logic for 
including such type of rulers is because they go beyond their designated  
boundary that is by decreeing their own rules they infringe upon the rule 
of God. 
Following this logic ,  Salafīs affirm that  any legal system that is not 
based on sharīʿah  is considered to be a jāhil ī  system that  Muslims 
should not accept because God has divided al-ḥukm (judgment) into two 
types in the Quranic verse: “Do they then seek after a judgment of [ the 
Days of] Ignorance? But who, for a people whose faith is assured, can 
give better judgment than Allah?” 77  Thus, there is no middle way in 
governing the state according to the Salafī  d octrine;  it  is either the rule 
of God or the rule of jāhiliyyah  and ṭaghū t .  
According to senior scholars in Saudi Arabia such as Ibn Ibr āhīm and 
Ibn Bāz, who enjoy a great  authoritative posit ion amongst the Salafīs, 
any state that  does not apply sharīʿah  and does not adhere to the rule of 
God is a state of jāhiliyyah and kufr ,  towards which showing enmity is a 
duty upon all Muslims. 78 
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Saudi Arabia and the Doctrine of Obedience 
The above view of senior scholars may well seem in contradiction with 
their lenient position towards the regime in Saudi Arabia. However,  the ir 
position towards their regime should be set against the background of 
their perception of the Saudi state a s a state that  is founded upon  tawḥīd  
and promotes it  (dawlat al-tawḥīd). Even though i ts  rulers can be seen as 
impious or unjust in the eyes of many people, they remain legitimate, in 
their view, because they have not committed any sin, which would 
nullify their legitimacy according to Salafī teachings,  and certainly have 
not replaced sharīʿah  with secular laws. Let us consider,  by way of 
example,  this statement of Ibn Bāz in which he affirms this view by 
describing Saudi Arabia as:  
dawlah mubārakah (blessed state) that is keen to establish truth and justice, 
support the oppressed, deter oppressors, establish and spread peace and 
security and preserve people’s money and honour.79 
Although he admits that the state of Saudi Arabia  is not perfect, he 
maintains that  it  is  the only country that  defends and calls for true 
monotheism and applies shar īʿah .  He further, questions its opponents  
Which of the countries around us now guard tawḥīd? Egypt? [Is it] the 
Levant? Iraq? Who calls to tawḥīd now, rule according to sharīʿah, and 
destroy tombs which are worshipped instead of God...apart from this 
country.80 
This perception of Saudi Arabia as the only modern state where sharīʿah  
is applied and the Salafī  interpretation of tawḥīd is  defended is not 
confined to senior scholars in Saudi Arabia but is also shared by some 
Activists inside and outside the kingdom. It is certainly the view of the 
adherents of the loyalist trend , both inside and outside the kingdom. 81 For 
this reason, one finds most of the Salafī  writings about the question of 
                                                     
79 Ibn Bāz,  Bayān Ḥuqūq Wulā t  al -Umūr ʿalā a l -Ummah .  Avai lab le a t :  
www.binbaz.org (accessed 20/04/2013)  
80 Bāzmūl ,  Marāqī Al -Saʿūd f ī  Thanāʾ  a l - ʿulamāʾ ʿalā Ḥukkām āl  Suʿūd ,  13.  
81 See ib id  for  more Salaf īs ’  s ta tements on Saudi  Arabia  
96 
 
the application of manmade laws focusing on the issue outside Saudi 
Arabia. 82 
Of course ,  it  does not mean that all Salafīs perceive Saudi Arabia as a 
model for applying sharīʿah .  The Saudi royal family has received its 
share of crit icism from many Salafīs. The point being made here is  
simply that  much of the Salafī  disagreement  over the legitimacy of 
contemporary rulers is linked to the application of manmade laws instead 
of sharīʿah  in one way or another.  
This point  is  best il lustrated by looking at the severe criticism of the 
Saudi monarchy that  comes from the Jihādīs .  Al-Maqd isī ,  for instance,  
showed himself as one of its arch-enemies 83 after the emergence of his 
Book al-Kawāshif al-Jaliyyah fī kufr al -dawlah al-Suʿūdiyyah  (Clear 
Evidences of the Blasphemy of  the Saudi Regime) in late 1980s. 84 In his 
book, which “relies heavily on citations from the intellectual  heritage of 
Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and aʾimmat al-daʿwah al-najdiyyah” ,85 
al-Maqdis ī  does not only refute the notion that  Saudi Arabia applies the 
rule of sharīʿah ,  but also accuses the royal family of lying and decei ving 
people about their application of sharīʿah .  As the title of the book 
suggests,  al-Maqdis ī  charges the Saudi government of apostasy and 
deems some of the actions of the Saudi rulers—especially the country’s 
alleged reliance on manmade laws instead of  the sharīʿah—as acts of 
kufr .  He presses the same charge against the Saudi State on grounds of 
its “participating in local  and global organizations that are governed by 
rules and regulations not rooted in the sharīʿah .” 86 
Egypt as Example of a Constitution Based on Manmade Laws 
Unlike the model of Saudi Arabia, the regime in Egypt has always 
admitted to its application of secular laws. Thus, the Egyptian case 
                                                     
82 The except ion here are the J ihādīs  
83 Hegghammer,  Jihad in  Saudi Arabia ,  47  
84 Availab le at :  www.tawhed .ws  (accessed 12 /03/2012)  
85 Al-Rachīd,  Contes t ing the Saudi S tate ,  122.  
86 Wagemakers ,  “The Endur ing Legacy of the Second Saudi Sta te ,”  108.  For  more on 
al -Maqdisī ’s  views on Saudi Arabia see :  Wagemakers,  A Quiet is t  J ihādī  
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probably serves as a better example of how the legitimacy of the ruler 
depends on the application of sharīʿah  in the Salafī  view, and also how 
Salafīs  disagree in their evaluations.  
Prior to the 25 t h  January Egyptian revolution, there had been suggestions 
that Mubarak’s regime was trying to exploit the Salafī doctrine of 
obedience to the ruler to  garner support  in its own favour. After the 2005 
Parliamentary elections ,  in which the more politicised Muslim 
Brotherhood group captured a fifth of the seats, the former Egyptian 
regime l icensed several  Salafī  satellite television stations. According to 
Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam, some commentators considered th is 
action by the old regime as “part of a strategy to cultivate Salafism as a 
counterwe ight to the Brotherhood.” 87 
One of the proponents of this argument is the Egyptian novelist  ʿalāʾ  
Aswānī 88 who emphasises that “the political quietism of the Salafīs and 
their injunctions to always obey the ruler are too good an opportunity for 
established Arab rulers to pass up.” 89  Although Nathan and Hamam 
disagree with Aswānī’s  “dramatic claims ,” there is  no other explanation 
for the real reasons behind this unusual ly soft stance of the old regime 
towards an Islamist  group. The fact that this relatively passive approach 
was not practiced towards all Salafī scholars makes it even more likely 
regime was trying to make the most of such a doctrine.  Only a few Salafī 
clerics enjoyed this special treatment.  In  fact, many clerics such as the 
head scholars of al-Daʿwah al -Salafīyyah  in Alexandria (DSA) for 
example,  were not even allowed to preach outside certain areas in 
Alexandria. 90  This indicates that the regime was well aware of the 
existence of more than one trend within Salafism and its soft approach 
towards one particular trend, namely the Loyalists, is a clear attempt to 
employ their doctrine of obedience to counter other political groups.  
                                                     
87 Field and Hamam,  “Salaf ī  Satel l i te  TV in Egypt”  
88 An Egyptian novel i st ,  the author  o f the famo us novel  ʿ imārat  Yaʿqūbiyān  
89 Field and Hamam,  “Salaf ī  Sa tel l i te  TV in Egypt ”   
90 ʿAl ī ,  al-Daʿwah a l-Sala fiyyah bi  a l - I skandariyyah ,  47.  
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Nevertheless, it  is clear that the attempt by the former Egyptian regime 
to explo it  the Salafīs’ doctrine of obedience did not succeed, as its soft 
approach did not last for long. Starting from 2008, two planned new 
Salafī  satellite channels were not giv en broadcasting permit s and some 
others were shut down by the security services. It  is believed that the 
regime was uneasy with the rising resonance of the Salafīs’ hard-core 
religious message with the general population. 91 
The failure of the Egyptian ruling elite to exploit the Salafī doctrine can 
be attributed primarily to the fact  that  unlike Saudi Arabia, the regime in 
Egypt openly adopts  secular laws and does not claim to be applying the 
sharīʿah,  which makes i t more vulnerable to opposition and rejection by 
the Salafīs.  The vast majority of Egyptian Salafīs refuse to accept the 
legit imacy of the rulers who apply manmade laws , as is well 
demonstrated in the writ ings and religious verdicts  of the scholars of the 
DSA ,  the group with the largest Salafī grassroots membership in Egypt. 92 
According to Yāsir Burhāmī, one of the leading Salafī scholars in 
Alexandria, ruling in accordance with sharīʿah  is a vital condition for 
the acceptance of the legitimacy of any ruler, even in the case of the 
ruler who has established himself at  the helm of a Muslim country and 
claims to be a Muslim. 93 
Another factor that  explains the remarkable failure of the Egyptian 
regime to exploit Salaf ī  doctrines in i ts favour  is the fact that the 
loyalist  trend does not enjoy widespread popularity amongst Salafīs in 
Egypt. As we have seen,  the proponents of this trend share the same 
broad understanding of the meaning of tāghūt and the division of  
governance into Islamic and jāhilī ,  they disagree with other Salafīs over 
                                                     
91 In one of his  speeches  in 2010,  the  previous Egypt ian president  Muhammad Husni  
Mubarak at tacked Salafi sm branding i t s  p roponents as “r igid  and narro w -minded”  
cal l ing upon “the true scholars o f I slam” to  step up agains t  “the anarchy of rel igious 
TV channels” ,  see his speech a t :  ht tp: / /www.youtube.com/watch?v=wm_cYsWjS -I  
(accssed  
92 ʿAbd a l -Hādī,  Mawqif  a l -Sala fiyyīn min  al -Ḥukkām wa Wulā t  al -Umūr .  Avai lab le 
at :  www.sa lafvo ice .com (accessed 22 /03/2013)  
93 Burhāmī,  Al-Sa laf iyyah  wa Manāhij  a l -Taghyy īr .  Avai lab le at :  
www.salafvoice.co m (accessed 17/03 /2013)  
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whether or not the application of sharīʿah  is a necessary condition for 
the ruler’s legitimacy. The scholars of this trend accept the legitimacy of 
any established Muslim ruler even if he does not apply sharīʿah  as long 
as he has not committed what justifies his takfīr .  The basis for their view 
lies in the same classical Sunni traditions, referred to before to 
emphasise obedience, patience, and not to rebel  against  authority.  In 
these traditions,  the Loyalists  argue, Muslims are urged by the Prophet  
to obey the rulers in all conditions except when they witness a clear and 
obvious kufr  that  can be authenticated with a proof “illā an taraw kufran 
bawāḥan ʿindakum min Allah fīh burhān.” 94  Hence, for them, since 
rebellion is allowed only in the case of kufr  then the rulers are legitimate 
in all other cases such as when he is unjust, fāsiq  (sinful) or mubtadiʿ  
(innovator). 95 
For those who argue that the application of sharīʿah  is a necessary 
condition for the legitimacy of the ruler,  these traditions of obedience 
are bear an unqualified and unlimited meaning (mu ṭlaq), which has to be 
understood as limited and explained by other traditions. 96 In this vein,  
they refer to the tradition that specifies that ruling by the Quran is a 
condition for obedience: “mā aqāma fīkum kitāb Allah .” 97 They also, cite 
the practice of some of the Prophet’s companions and of some early 
recognised scholars who either took part  in rebellions against a Muslim 
ruler themselves, or sympathised with other such rebels. However,  this 
does not mean that they believe that  Muslims are unconditionally 
permitted to revolt agains t present-day rulers, but it  does emphasize 
their view that  the application of sharīʿah  is a necessary condition for 
the legitimacy of the ruler. They do limit the implications of their 
opinions by pointing out that  r ebell ion against  the ruler—even in the 
case of kufr—depends on isti ṭāʿah  (abil ity, capability)  of the people .  
                                                     
94 Ruslān,  Shurūṭ  a l-Khurūj ʿalā  a l -Hākim a l -Kāfir .  A video recording ava ilab le at :  
ht tps: / /www.youtube.com/watch?v=nwMnhJ6bsFQ  
95 Ibid .  
96 Al-Dumayj ī ,  al- Imāmah al - ʿuẓmā ʿ inda Ahl al -Sunnah wa a l -Jamāʿah ,  472–473.  
97 Ibid ,  473  
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When the potential  result of the rebellion is disorder then Muslims must 
be patient. 98 
Thus, all  Salafīs recognise the importance of applying sharīʿah  and 
believe they have a duty to replace jāhil ī  political systems with Islamic 
ones, since al-ḥākimiyyah  should be solely that of God. However, they 
differ in their understanding of this  concept, and how it  should be 
applied and manifested. All Salafīs  agree that adhering to tawḥīd  and 
disavowing ṭāghūt are equally important, and take rejecting ṭāghūt to 
mean that Muslims should reject and disassociate themselves from any 
legal systems that  contradict  the law of God such as manmade laws. 
Here, however,  the path of the Loyalists diverges from that  of the 
Activists and the J ihād īs. The Loyalists  agree with all the above but 
maintain that  application of, or association with legal systems other than 
those of Islam is not sinful enough to expel rulers from the fold of Islam. 
Since such expulsion alone can form sufficient reason for deposing 
rulers,  in the Loyalists’ view ,  Muslim rulers applying un-Islamic laws 
remain legitimate rulers , to whom obedience is due according to Islamic 
law. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen  how the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah ,  which 
stresses that absolute sovereignty rests with none but God, constitutes a 
fundamental component of tawḥīd  according to the teaching of Salafism. 
Although the precise term “al-ḥākimiyyah”  was first introduced after the 
mid-twentieth century in the writings of al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb, i t  is a 
concept that can be found in the writings of many authoritative Salafī 
scholars long before them. In those Salafīs  works, the concept merely 
holds a more expansive meaning Salafism in comparison to its usage in 
al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb, whose focus was mainly on its  poli tical  
dimensions.  
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Among contemporary Salafīs ,  competing groups  share many concepts and 
interpretations regarding al-ḥākimiyyah .  Yet,  they differ on the 
importance of its political dimension in the lives of present-day 
Muslims. This divergence has led to intense debates amongst them and 
mutual accusations of  deviation from the teachings of Salafism. Such 
accusations have included the Loyalists  accusing the Activists and the 
Jihādīs  of adopting the teachings and concepts of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, especially the revolutionary ideas of Sayyid Qu ṭb and his 
interpretation of the concept of al-ḥākimiyyah .  On their part , the 
Activists and the Jihādīs  accuse the Loyalists of only combatting 
sporadic and scarce forms of shirk  while neglecting the greatest  form of 
polytheism in present day, that is, shirk  al-ḥākimiyyah .  
As we have seen, this divergence in the implications of al-ḥākimiyyah  
has led different Salafī  groups to form not only different, but oppos ing 
opinions in the matter of political activism and its legitimacy. At the 
heart of the Salafī  emphasis on subscription to the oneness of God 
(tawḥīd) and to his absolute command, is a paradox, with opposing 
groups choosing to focus on different parts of it .  With their focus on the 
sovereignty of God’s law, the J ihād īs and Activists  feel justified,  even 
obliged to oppose rulers who may be Muslim, but do not rule by 
sharīʿah .  The Loyalists,  on the other hand, while recognising the 
importance of sharīʿah ,  and agreeing that  ruling by non-sharīʿah  laws 
constitutes shirk  and a sinful deviation from tawḥīd ,  remain attached to a 
classical Sunni interpretation of certain Prophetic  traditions,  which 
require Muslims to obey their rulers in all  cases. The Loyalists argue 
that   this is the requirement of God’s law for all  Muslims, that  it  remains 
incumbent upon them even when the rulers are tainted by the sin of shirk   
of ruling by un-Islamic laws, and that i t  ceases to apply under the sole 
condition of the ruler ceasing to be Muslim. 
Now we can begin to understand how t he intra-Salafī  disagreement over 
the implication of manmade laws moved from debating the legitimacy of 
present-day rulers  to disputing their status as Muslims; this is the only,  
and the essential  condition under which even Loyalists  might endorse 
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political activism and opposition to current rulers. Predictably,  of 
course, Salafīs  have found it difficult to agree when a ruler ceases to be 
Muslim. The next chapter examines these disputes in detail.
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Chapter Four: The Question of Manmade Laws 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we mentioned that  despite their differences on 
various points regarding al-ḥākimiyyah ,  Salafīs unanimously emphasise 
the necessity of implementing the sharīʿah  as a system of laws. The 
Salafī  belief that Islam is both a state and a religion, and that  politic s 
and religion are inseparable, means that for them, the application of 
sharīʿah  in governmental affairs is unquestionable. In the Salafī view, 
both, Muslim rulers and courts are obliged to operate according to 
sharīʿah .  Likewise,  they insist  that Muslims are prohibited from seeking 
judgements derived from any other system of laws , including those 
legislated in a democratic system. 1 Overall, then, all Salafīs agree that 
the application of any system of laws apart from sharīʿah  to be a sin.  
However,  they disagree on whether doing so is sinful  enough to take the 
culprit  outside the realm of Islam.  
There are serious divisions among Salafīs nowadays as to whether 
exchanging the whole body of Islamic laws for a manmade system can 
form the basis for takfīr  of Musl im rulers.  Many Salafīs do argue that 
this is the case, but it  is a highly disputed issue, and one that  forms the 
core of the dispute over al-ḥākimiyyah .  
Having discussed the intra -Salafī disputes over al-ḥākimiyyah  broadly in 
the previous chapter,  we shal l now examine the specific issue of whether 
or not the implementation of manmade laws instead of sharīʿah  
constitutes kufr ,  and map the various strands of Sal afī  argumentation on 
the topic.  
                                                     
1 This covers  engaging or  par t icipat ing in  the  democrat ic  process.  The most  hardl ine 
view of democracy i s  he ld by the J ih ād ī s .  For  an analys is  o f how the J ihādīs app ly 
takfīr  to  democracy and  democra ts ,  and ho w such applica t ion of  takf īr  d i ffers from 
one  context  to  ano ther  see:  Wagemakers,  Joas,  “’The Kafir  Rel igion of  the West ’ :  
Takfir  o f  Democracy and Democrats by Radical  Islamis ts ,”  in  Camil la  Adang,  
Hassan Ansari ,  Mar ibe l  Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.) ,  Accusa tions  of Unbelie f 
in  I slam:  A Diachron ic  Perspective on Takfīr ,  Bri l l ,  2015.  
104 
 
The Importance of this Question 
It  is important to note here why this part icular issue is extraordinarily 
significant, and deserving of our particular attention. Salafī proponents, 
similar to classical  Sunni jurists, unanimously st ipulate that  a legitimate 
ruler, in Islamic terms, must be a Muslim. 2  Thus, in order to be 
recognised as a legitimate Imām or Caliph, 3  rulers must fulfil this  
fundamental requirement before assuming power (i.e. be Muslim) and 
they must also remain Muslims if they wish to stay in power. Now, in 
view of the fact that  most present -day rulers in Muslim countries do not 
apply the sharīʿah ,  i t  is important to look at the implications that such 
failure can have on the status of the ruler as a Muslim. In fact , the 
legit imacy of these ruling regimes can depend, to a certain extent,  on 
whether or not one considers this failure to implement sharīʿah  to be an 
act of kufr .  Predictably, intra-Salafī debates on the topic are even more 
complex. As we shall see, both positive and negative answers to this 
question entail  clashing implications in relation to the att itude of 
contemporary Salafīs towards political  authorities.  
Moreover,  apart  from stripping the ruler of his legitimacy,  the salient 
point  about takfīr ,  as some scholars observe, is also that “it  legitimises 
the use of violence against  the person or entit y that is  deemed to be non-
Muslim.” In our case here,  the “one consequence of this is  that  armed 
rebellion—often termed jihād—against  a nominally Muslim-led state 
(e.g. , Saudi Arabia,  Egypt) is  considered not only legitimate,  but a 
religious duty incumbent  upon the individual believer.”  
Such a view can be clearly detected in Ibn Bāz’s opinion with respect to 
rebelling against the rulers in the Muslim world because of their major 
sins and in order to change the status quo:  
Rebelling against  those in authorit y leads to great  corruption and 
evil .  The exception to this is when Muslims see a clear kufr (kufr 
                                                     
2 For the c lass ical  op inion,  see:  Ibn Ḥazm, Marāt ib  al - I jmāʿ ,  145;  Crone,  Patr ic ia ,  
God’s  rule :  government and  Is lam,  229  
3 Imām  and Cal iph are two terms used interchangeably to  denote the po li t ica l  head  of 
the Muslim s ta te  
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bawāḥ) ,  for which there is proof from Allah. In this case, there is 
nothing wrong in rebell ing against  these rulers to depose them, if 
Muslims have the power  to do so. 4 
Such statements illuminate the doctrinal roots of conflict ing stances  
toward the state. In many cases, such stances are derived from the 
specific answer that a part icular Salafī group chooses to embrace 
regarding this crucial question: whether or not applying man-made laws 
consists of kufr .  
The Main Views 
The various answers offered by contemporary Salafīs can be divided into 
two main sets of opinions. The first  concludes that implementing 
manmade laws is a major sin but short of kufr .  The second believes that 
it  is  indeed kufr .  Here,  we have to remain aware of the difference 
between evaluations of the action of ruling by other than sharīʿah ,  as 
opposed to evaluations of an individual. The difference is worth making 
because the Salafīs themselves  distinguish between labelling an action to 
be kufr  and declaring an individual perpetrator to be kāfir (al-farq bayna 
kufr al-nawʿ wa kufr al -ʿayn). 5  We shall discuss this dist inction in 
further detail in the chapter of īmān  and kufr .  
Position One: Applying Manmade laws is not Kufr 
The advocates of this view uphold that  applying any system other than 
sharīʿah  constitutes one of the major/grave sins ( kabīra ,  pl.  kabāʾir) but  
it  is short of kufr .  The main holders of this opinion are the Loyalists as 
well as some senior clerics such as al -Albānī and Ibn Bāz. 6 The book of 
al-ʿAnbarī al-Ḥukm bi Ghayr mā Anzala Allāh wa Usūl al -Takfīr  (Ruling 
by Other than what Allah has Revealed  and the  Principles of  Takfīr) 7 is 
believed to be one of the most important and influ ential books in support 
                                                     
4 Fatāwā Ibn Bāz ,  8 /202  
5 Ibn Qāsim, Al-Durar Al -Saniyya f ī  a l -Ajwibah a l-Najdiyyah ,  10 /432 ,  8 /244  
6 More on the views of  al -Albānī and  Ibn Bāz  wi l l  fol low l a ter  on in this chapter  
7 Fir s t  publ ished in 1994 but  I  found only the fi f th edit ion published in 2001 which 
is  no w avai lab le online  and  in bookshops in  Jordan and E gypt  
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of this opinion from the Loyalists’ perspective. As a result of this view, 
the Loyalists consider present -day rulers in the Muslim World to be 
religiously legit imate rulers,  despite conceding that  they are sinful 
Muslims and guilty of not fulfilling a very important religious duty. 
Therefore, they stop short of declaring kufr  on them. 
As for the doctrinal definition of kabāʾir  (major sins),  according to 
Salafī  scholars these are those sins that  are tied in Quran with hell -fire, 
the divine anger, malediction, or punishment 8 such as drinking alcohol, 
fornication and indulging in usury. In general , scholars from across the 
Salafī  spectrum accept that committing a major sin does not, in itself, 
cause the exclusion of the Muslim sinner from the realm of Islam. This 
conclusion, however,  depends on the actor’s own beliefs regarding 
her/his actions. If  the perpetrator acknowledges the unlawfulness of 
her/his actions, then they commit a kabīra  but not kufr .  If , on the other 
hand, he/she considers something which is prohibited ( ḥarām) to be 
permissible (ḥalāl) or rejects a religious obligation (wājib), then they 
stray into kufr .  To give concrete examples,  if  a Muslim drinks alcohol 
while admitting that what he or she is  doing is ḥarām ,  then this person is 
a sinful  Muslim and not a kāfir .  However, if a person drinks alcohol out 
of the belief that i t  is ḥalāl  to do so, then he or she i s  considered to be 
outside of the realm of Islam. As we can see, the cause of kufr  here is 
not the action of the person i tself but the belief which he or she holds 
while undertaking that action. For this reason, a person who holds such a 
belief can also be  considered non-Muslim,  even without their committing 
such actions, such as drinking alcohol. In Salafī literature, such 
improper belief is known as istiḥlāl  (rendering something that is ḥarām  
to be ḥalāl).   
There is  a complementary type of transgression that consists of the 
denial of a religious obligation. Such denial is known as juḥūd .  An 
example of this is when a Muslim denies the religious obligation to fast 
                                                     
8 Majjal lat  a l -Buḥūth al - Islāmiyyah ,  40 /220,  avai lable a t :  www.ali f ta .net  (accessed 
03/05/2016)  
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during Ramaḍān. Such a person is considered to be a non -Muslim 
regardless whether they perform the fasting or not, beca use the denial of 
the duty in itself is kufr .  Conversely,  if one does not fast during 
Ramaḍān, out of laziness for instance, provided they recognise that  it  is 
a religious obligation, then such a person is only a sinful Muslim who 
should not be considered outside the realm of Islam.  
Based on this doctrine,  the proponents of this first view insist that  the 
ruler who applies manmade laws should not be charged with kufr  merely 
on account of his action without further investigation of the intention 
behind it.  This is because, as al -ʿAnbarī argues, there is a consensus 
amongst early and present Salafī scholars that the one who rules by other 
than sharīʿah  is not kāfir  unless the action is accompanied with the 
conditions of juḥūd ,  or istiḥlāl . 9  
As is to be expected, the imposition of such a condition, related to the 
nature of a ruler’s inner beliefs, makes it almost impossible to declare 
the apostasy of any present -day ruler in the Muslim World. However, i t  
can turn into kufr  i f one of the following conditions is present:  
1- If the ruler considers such action permissible, fulfilling the 
condition of istiḥlāl  explained above.  
2- If the ruler considers other laws equivalent to the rule of God. 
Possible reason for the fulfilment of this condition, and that of the next 
one is that such rulers deny the basic doctrine that  the rule of God is 
superior to all  rules.   
3- If the ruler considers other laws superior to the rule of sharīʿah  
and more complete and comprehensive for the needs of people.  
4- If the ruler denies or does not acknowledge the obligation to rule 
according to sharīʿah ,  this being the condition of juḥūd .   
Although the presence of any of these conditions would render the 
application of manmade laws to be kufr ,  members of this Salafī group 
maintain that  it  is  almost impossible to know the intention of these rulers 
                                                     
9 Al-ʿAnbarī ,  al-Ḥukm bi  Ghayr mā Anzala Al lāh wa Usūl a l -Takf īr ,  112.  
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or the reasons for their willingness to rule by manmade laws instead of 
sharīʿah .  As another Loyalist scholar asserts, the only way to know the 
intention behind people’s deeds is when they inform us either by saying 
or writing. 10 Thus, if the person ruling by manmade laws does not plainly  
declare what would indicate the presence of any of the mentioned 
conditions in his heart , this person stays Muslim. This is because 
according to legal maxim man thabata islāmuhu bi yaqīn falā yazūlu bi 
mujarrad al-shakk  (certainty [of him being Muslim] cannot be repealed 
or dispelled by doubt) ;  the norm is that persons who are definitely 
known to be Muslims cannot be removed from status quo (that is , being 
Muslim) for mere doubt unless it  is  proven to have changed. 11 
Position Two: Applying Manmade Laws is Kufr 
At the other end of the disagreement,  there is another opinion that  
considers the application of manmade laws as practised in its modern 
form to be kufr  thus nullifying the perpetrator’s status as a Muslim 
completely.  The advocates of this view do not entirely reject the 
arguments of the first group, that ruling by laws other than sharīʿah  can 
be considered kufr  but also just a major sin, depending on the proven 
beliefs of the perpetrators. In fact,  this group even accepts that  such is 
the true opinion of the salaf .  However, they argue that such distinctions 
apply solely to those who perpetrate such acts occasionally,  or even 
frequently,  so long as sharīʿah  remains the main source for legislation 
and adjudication. This  infractions can happen when a judge  or a ruler 
who fails  to judge or rule in a particular case according to sharīʿah ,  in 
order to favour a friend or for some financial gain. This is indeed a 
major sin without being kufr .  But such benefit  of doubt cannot be 
extended to a ruler who replaces sharīʿah  entirely or part ly, with other 
laws, as is  the case with manmade laws in present -day Muslim World.  In 
such case, this group of scholars assert , there is no need for further 
                                                     
10 Al-ʿUtaybī,  al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anza l  A llāh ,  Munāqashah Taʾ ṣ ī l iyyah  ʿI lmiyyah  
Hādiʾah ,  40 .  
11 Al-ʿAnbarī ,  al-Ḥukm bi  Ghayr mā Anzala Al lāh wa Usūl a l -Takf īr ,  317;  al -Ḥalabī ,  
al-Taḥthīr min Fi tnat  a l -Takfīr ,  35.  
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investigation into the motives behind the ruler’s action because such act 
“does not come out from a person whose heart has disbelieved in ṭāghūt .  
Rather it  arises from one who has held that manmade law is good and has 
held judging by it also to be good.” 12 In other words, such scholars and 
Activists believe that the act of abolish ing sharīʿah  and applying 
manmade laws in its  place constitutes in itself a clear manifestation of 
the intention of the ruler. As such, there is  no need for further 
investigation. In this sense, the distinction offered by the holders of the 
first opinion i s confined to the ruler who only violates the rule of 
sharīʿah  occasionally,  because such isolated acts do not suggest  the 
existence of istiḥlāl ,  juḥūd ,  or that the ruler prefers other laws to 
sharīʿah .   
Thus, the main point  of divergence in debates over t he issue of whether 
or not ruling by manmade laws constitutes kufr ,  is centred around the 
identification of certain facts, specifically whether the whole body of 
sharīʿah  has been rescinded in favour of manmade laws that is, whether 
what is known in intra -Salafī  debates as the tabdīl/istibdāl  (replacement) 
or tashriʿ ʿāmm  (general  legislation) has taken place. Of the two 
positions that we have discussed, the second proposes that when 
tabdīl/ istibdāl  (replacement) or tashriʿ ʿāmm  (general legislation) 
happens,  the ruler’s kufr  is indisputable.  
The proponents of this second view are further divided into two sub -
groups:  
The first group consists mainly of the theologians of the so -called 
Jihādī-Salafī current, such as al -Maqdisī  who as mentioned before, was 
one of the first Salafī clerics to pronounce takfīr  on the Saudi rulers.  The 
Jihādī-Salafīs consider all  present day rulers in the Muslim World to be 
apostates and hence do not hesitate to pronounce apostasy on a specific 
individual ruler.  Another example of the holders of this opinion is the 
Syrian Jihādī Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī , whose statement summarises  the view 
of the Jihādīs  in this matter.  
                                                     
12 Āl a l -Shaikh,  Al-Tamhīd l i  Sharḥ  Kitāb a l -Tawḥīd ,  430.  
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Most of the rulers in the Muslim countries …are kuffār  murtaddūn  
(apostates) bi  aʿyānihim  (each individual of  them).  This means you 
can name them and label them as apostates. 13 
The second sub-group hold the opinion that replacing sharīʿah  by any 
other system is an act  that  null ifies Islam but they stop short of 
pronouncing apostasy on every individual ruler until further 
investigation for the particular individual has been conducted. This 
opinion is held by most senior Saudi scholars,  as well as most activist 
scholars, who underline the importance of the Salafī distinction between 
labelling an action to be kufr  and declaring an individual perpetrator to 
be kāfir .  Hence, in principle, they agree with the Jihādīs that replacing 
the rules of sharīʿah  with other systems as it  is practiced in present days 
constitutes an act of kufr  but only as a general rule (ḥukm ʿāmm).  Yet, 
they disagree with them on applying this injunction to a specific 
individual ruler without the consideration of the Salafī  criteria for 
determining takfīr.  We will discuss these criteria in more detail  in the 
chapter of īmān  and kufr ,  but it  is  worth noting here that these criteria 
stipulate the establishment of several conditions before one can 
pronounce takfīr  on someone who has committed kufr .  
Causes of the Disagreement 
The Quranic Verse (5:44) 
Although, generally speaking, they share a similar approach and  method 
of reasoning in order to form religious legal rulings,  and accept and refer 
to the works of the same classical scholars (such as al -Ṭabarī,  Ibn 
Taymiyyah, and Ibn Kathīr),  contemporary Salafīs differ at  times over 
the interpretation and application  of these sources to current affairs.  The 
crux of the contention over the question of ruling by manmade laws has 
always revolved around how to understand and apply the Quranic verse 
“And whoever does not judge/rule by that which Allāh has revealed (the 
                                                     
13 See verdict  number 58,  avai lable a t :  www.abubaseer .biz land.com/verdicts.htm  
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law of God),  such are al-kāfirūn  (unbelievers)” 14  to the present-day 
replacement of sharīʿah  with manmade laws. The disagreement between 
the Salafīs regarding the exact meaning of the word “ al-kāfirūn” in this 
verse led them to take different stances vis -à-vis present-day rulers in  
the Muslim World.  
Broadly speaking, all Salafīs deal with this and other similar Quranic 
verses by relying explicitly on the classical scholars. Their works 
include copious quotations from the same classical books of Quran 
exegesis and statements of the same classical scholars.  The main purpose 
for such quotations is to claim the lineage of the salaf for themselves. 
But the classical scholars were themselves divided; there are several  
opinions among them about whether the ruling of t hese verses applies to 
Muslims, Jews and Christians or it  applies exclusively to ahl al-kitāb  
(people of the book, i .e.  Jews and Christians),  Muslims being exempt 
from it. 15 The cause for this disagreement goes back to the context for the 
revelation (sabab al-nuzūl) of these verses,  which, according to the 
classical  sources,  was concerning the Jews for changing the rule on 
married adulterer. 16  
As for the Salafīs, they agree and accept the opinion of the vast majority 
of classical  scholars, that  the former opinion (that people of all  three 
religions are included) is the correct one, due t o the well accepted 
principle of Quran exegesis amongst most Sunni scholars, al-‘ibrah bi 
‘umūm al-lafz la bi khuṣūṣ  al-sabab (texts have general  application even 
though they were revealed concerning a specific occasion). For instance, 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maḥmūd, who holds position two regarding manmade 
laws (that  applying such laws consists of kufr by the ruler) discusses 
several different opinions from classical  scholars,  including the view of 
the Khawārij  (which he disregards as incorrect of course). He th en 
argues in favour of general applicability, stating: “We should note that 
stating that i t  (the verse) is more likely to be general  in application does 
                                                     
14 Quran ,  5 :44 .  
15 For  these classical  views see :  a l -Ṭabarī ,  Jāmiʿ  Al -Bayān ,  8 /456–468.  
16 Ibid .  
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not contradict the fact that it  was revealed concerning the People of the 
Book, because the point here is  the general  applicability of the wording, 
not the specific reason for revelation.” 17  Such conclusions, about the 
general applicability of this verse,  are also shared by people who are 
otherwise opponents, such as al -ʿAnbarī in his book supporting the 
Loyalists’ view. 18 
It  is because of this similarity in the method of reasoning that one finds 
Salafī  proponents from all  tendencies following their classical  
counterparts and agreeing in principle that at times ruling by other than 
sharīʿah  takes one outside the fold of Islam, and at  other times it is  a 
grave sin short  of kufr . 19 Both the authors mentioned above (al-Maḥmūd 
and al-ʿAnbarī) quote numerous statements from classical scholars in 
support  of this principle. However,  due to the fact that  manmade laws is 
a new phenomenon which has naturally not been directly addressed in 
the classical sources,  disagreements on when exactly such action 
constitutes kufr  and when it is just a major sin have emerged “as a result 
of the inherently subjective nature of applying religion to new issues and 
problems.” 20 
The Two Meanings of Kufr 
Despite the disagreement among classical scholars on the matter of 
applicability of the Quranic verse 5:44, this has not caused disputes  
among the Salafīs. The main reason for intra -Salafī disagreement over 
this verse has in fact been over the word kufr  itself,  and its  meaning. In 
the texts of Quran  and Prophetic Ḥadīth ,  the word kufr  is  used to signify 
two different meanings.  One of which is kufr  as opposed to Islam, and 
thus kāfir  in this terminological  use refers to the person who is outside 
the fold of Islam. This type of kufr  is known as al-kufr al-akbar  (major 
or greater kufr).  The second usage of the term is to characterise what is 
known as al-kufr al-asghar  (minor or lesser kufr) that  indicates an action 
                                                     
17 Al-Maḥmūd,  al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anza la Allāh,  A ḥkāmuh wa Aḥwālu ,  141.  
18 Al-ʿAnbarī ,  al-Ḥukm bi  Ghayr mā Anzala Al lāh wa Usūl a l -Takf īr ,  116.  
19 Al-Maḥmūd,  al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anza la Allāh,  A ḥkāmuh wa Aḥwāluh ,  153.  
20 Wiktorowicz,  “Anatomy of the Sa laf ī  Movement ,”  208.  
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to be a grave sin but it  does not expel the perpetrator from Islam. 
Consequently,  a person branded kāfir  in the sense of al-kufr al-asghar  is 
only subjected to a metaphorical  label implying a sinful Muslim, but not 
one who is outside the fold of Islam.  
Moreover,  in order to determine the meaning of any verse or ḥadīth ,  
Salafīs insist on two points: firs t ,  that  one must consider all  texts related 
to the matter and understand them in such a way that they do not 
contradict each other. Second, that understanding those texts should be 
based on the interpretations of early scholars.  
A good example for the approach adopted by Salafīs to determine the 
meanings and objectives of the Quran and Prophetic texts,  can be found 
in their interpretation of the word kufr  in the Prophetic ḥadīth :  “cursing 
a Muslim is fusūq  (an evil -doing), and killing him is kufr .”21 Salafīs ,  like 
the vast majority of Muslims, unanimously agree that the usage of the 
word kufr  here signifies the gravity and the magnitude of such action 
(the killing) but also that such action alone does not take the perpetrator 
outside the fold of Is lam. In sho rt, a Muslim who kills another Muslim is 
a sinful Muslim and not a non -Muslim. This understanding and 
interpretation of this text is  not based merely on reason or logic.  Salafīs 
cite several verses from the Quran in support of this view, on the basis 
of which they argue that  there is  a clear indication that  killing a Muslim 
is a great  sin and not an act  of kufr .  One such verse is:  “O you who have 
believed,  prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered –  the free 
for the free,  the slave for the slave,  and the female for  the female.  But 
whoever overlooks from his brother anything,  then there should be a suitable 
follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. . .” 22  
Salafīs  argue that this verse is clear evidence that the Muslim killer of 
another Muslim is not kāfir  since he or she was described to be a brother 
of the al-walī  (the relative) of the victim, in a reference to their 
brotherhood in faith. Based on this rea soning, they conclude that the 
                                                     
21 Transla t ion o f  Ṣaḥhīḥ  Bukhārī :   Vol .  1 ,  Chapter  2 ,  Number 48  
22 Quran ,  2 :178 .  
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meaning of the word kufr  in the mentioned Ḥadīth is  the minor kufr  not 
the great one.  
Though it might seem facile and straightforward, such Salafī  reasoning, 
when applied to current affairs that  do not have a clear precedent ,  can 
sometimes lead to very different opinions.  Ruling by modern manmade 
systems of law is a new phenomenon in Islamic history.  Its novelty,  
combined with the scale of the consequences of any doctrinal position, 
magnifies the significance of classical deb ates regarding the exegesis of 
Quranic verses, which are the staple of the Salafī  doctrine.  
The Impact of the Historical Debate over the Quranic Verse 5:44 
The historical  dispute over this verse –  especially the debates that took 
place between some Sunni scholars and the Khawārij  - has played a 
major role in shaping opinions in subsequent Islamic history.  The 
paradox is that all  groups accept the facts about the historical  contexts in 
which these verses were revealed but then use these differently to 
support their own views over each other. According to classical Sunni 
sources, the Khawārij  were the first “deviant” sect in Islamic history and 
are always identified by two main traits, (i) rebellion against the ruler 
and (ii) extremism in declaring takfīr  on fellow Muslims. Both traits  are 
said to be based on their misinterpretations of several verses in the 
Quran. One of these is the aforementioned verse 5: 44 which the 
Khawārij  utilised at  face value to declare the apostasy of the rulers of 
their times in an absolute manner,  without any further elaboration or 
clarification. The Khawārij ,  in the view of classical scholars, made 
assumptions based on the apparent meaning ( zāhir) of the verse - that 
kufr  here is the opposite of Islam without any restrict ions or co nditions -  
and then applied i t to anyone who commits a sin. This is because the 
word “man” encompasses every single person and the word “ mā” 
includes every single rule in Islam. Thus, whoever commits a sin has 
ruled or made decisions based on something oth er than the command of 
God, and therefore is  a kāfir .   
On the contrary,  classical  Sunni scholars contend that the verse should 
not understood in the same manner as the Khawārij  do because there are 
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other texts that  restrict the ʿumūm  of this verse. We have seen what these 
are.   
More relevant to the current study, classical scholars assert that ruling, 
or making decisions in accordance with rules other than sharīʿah ,  
constitutes kufr  at  certain times and other times it is only a major sin. In 
this connection, they unanimously agree that  the Quranic verse 5:44 does 
not serve the view of the Khawārij .  Classical  jurists frequently quote 
some statements ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās and some other famous 
companions and their students regarding the interpretation of the verse,  
in order to support their opinion. The most famous of such statements is  
that  of Ibn ʿAbbās when was asked by some Khawārij  about the 
transgressions amongst the rulers of the Omayyad Dynasty.  Ibn ʿAbbās 
said: “It  is  not the kufr  you are going to (in  your minds),  i t  is  not the 
kufr  that  expels one from Islam, and i t is  kufr duna kufr  (kufr  lesser than 
kufr).” 23 In a nutshell ,  the stand of classical scholars in relation to this 
key Quranic verse, 5: 44 is that the meaning of kufr  here depends on the 
state and condition of the ruler committing this act . If  the perpetrator 
does it out of istiḥlāl  or juḥūd  then it is kufr akbar  otherwise it is only a 
grave sin.  
Based on these classical texts, those Salafī scholars who take position 
one, argue that  the established interpretation of the verse is  very clear 
and that  it  requires the dist inction  related to the motivation and intention 
of the ruler.  Ruling by manmade laws is the same as ruling by something 
other than what God has revealed, which, given Ibn Abbas’ explanation, 
constitutes a grave sin unless accompanied with the necessary conditions  
of istiḥlāl  and juḥūd .  In this matter, they see the ruler as just like all  
other Muslims, and so the necessary conditions are also the same: those 
who commit sins but without declaring them to be permissible or reject 
what is  known in Islam as necessary, commit a grave sin, not kufr .   
                                                     
23 Al-Ṭabarī ,  Jāmiʿ  a l -Bayān ,  8 /465–466;  Ibn Kathīr ,  Tafsīr  a l -Qurʾan a l - ʿAẓīm ,  
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The statement of Ibn ʿAbbās: “kufr duna kufr” is perceived as clear and 
decisive evidence that  the correct  Salafī interpretation of kufr  in the 
verse 5: 44 is the minor kufr  and not the major one. Hence, utilising the 
authority of this verse to declare takfīr  of the ruler is neither a Salafī  
understanding nor a new phenomenon, rather it  equals the position of the 
Khawārij , whom Ibn ʿAbbas and early scholars denounced and refuted. 
In support  of this argument,  Al -ʿAnbarī  does concede that  the apparent 
(ẓāhir) meaning of the verse is  major kufr ,  but  he provides several 
statements of classical scholars, by which he attempts to prove that  only 
the Khawārij  and their likes hold the literal  meaning of the verse ( ʿalā 
ẓāhirihā).  One such classical  scholar who is frequently cited in this 
connection is the great Mālikī Ibn ʿAbd al -Barr, who states:  
A group of innovators from the Khawārij  and Muʿtazilah  were 
misguided in regard to this issue (major sins) and uti l ised these 
narrations and their  l ikes  in order  to justify takfīr  of sinners.  They 
also uti l ised verses  from Allāh’s Book which are not meant  be taken 
on their  ẓāhir  such as (5:44). 24  
It  has to be kept in mind that  for the Salafīs, the value of these 
statements by classical scholars derives not only from their actual words,  
but also from the status of the scholars themselves. For example, the 
importance of the statement of Ibn ʿAbbās is based not only on its  
content but also on the prestige that  Ibn ʿAbbās enjoys in regard to 
Quran exegesis in Salafī  literature and in classical  Sunni Islam in 
general. He is considered to be one of most knowledgeable amongst 
ṣaḥābah  (the companions of the Prophet) and one of the greatest  
interpreters of Quran. His statements on Quranic exegesis, when 
considered authentic, are very weighty and authoritative in classical  
Sunni sources. This may explain why the Loyalists firmly reject the call  
of their opponents, the Jihādī -Salafīs, or that of the activist -Salafīs and 
instead label them neo-Khawārij .  The Loyalists charge the Jihādīs and 
Activists of deviation from the teaching of Salafism, by demonstrating 
                                                     
24 Al-ʿAnbarī ,  al-Ḥukm bi  Ghayr mā Anzala Al lāh wa U ṣūl a l -Takf īr ,  130.  
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how they match the creed and the interpretation of the Khawārij  with 
respect to this verse.  
Naturally,  the Activists and the Jihādīs fervently refuse such  charges, 
emphasising and stressing the differences between their own 
understanding and what is  conceived to be Khawārij  misuse of the verse.  
They insist  that  unlike the Khawārij  who use the verse in order to 
declare apostasy on anyone guilty of committing  a grave sin,  not only 
the rulers while they themselves do not hold such extreme beliefs 
regarding grave sins.  
The Jihādīs and Activists further assert that the Loyalists are 
misinterpreting Ibn ʿAbbās’ statement. They argue that there is no reason 
to think that Ibn ʿAbbās’ statement precludes the understanding of verse 
5:44 as talking about major kufr .  To clarify this point,  al -Maḥmūd 
retraces the debates that took place between Ibn ʿAbbās and the 
Khawārij .  He recalls the beginning of the statement of Ibn ʿAbbās “It is 
not the kufr  you are going to” to conclude that it  is  a clear indication 
that  Ibn ʿAbbās was merely correcting “the false usage of the verse” 
made by the Khawārij  against the unjust  rulers of his time. Al -Maḥmūd 
argues:  “Since the statement o f Ibn ʿAbbās is  directed to the Khawārij  
who perform takfīr  based (merely) on every sin, then his comment “ kufr 
dūna kufr” (certainly) refers to the one who judges unjustly,  according to 
something other than that which Allāh revealed, in a specific case.” 25 
Thus, it  is incorrect  to deduce from it that Ibn ʿAbbās meant that the 
word “kāfirūn” in the verse denotes always, minor kufr .  This is he 
insists, the understanding of the great scholars such as the late Grand 
Muftī  of Saudi Arabia Muhammad Ibn Ibrāhīm. 26 
Al-Maḥmūd continues his arguments insisting that the reason that  
classical scholars pointed to verse 5:44 and Khawārij  is because the 
verse was one of the basic grounds on which the Khawārij  denounced 
those who committed grave sins,  including unjust rulers ,  as kāfir .  Ibn 
                                                     
25 Al-Maḥmūd,  al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anza la Allāh,  A ḥkāmuh wa Aḥwāluh ,  233.  
26 The views of Ibn Ibrāhīm wi ll  be discussed  s t  length l ster  in  this  chap ter .  
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ʿAbbās and other scholars issued their verdicts “ kufr  lesser than kufr” on 
the Omayyad and Abbāsī  rulers who did not abolish the rule of God. 
These great scholars also wanted to prevent unnecessarily widespread 
denunciations of takfīr ,  hence their condemnation of the Khawārij  and 
the evidences they used.  
The Question of Tabdīl 
It  is clear, then, that  the Activists and the Jihādīs do not reject  or ignore 
the statements of early scholars, such as Ibn ʿAbbās, regarding the verse 
5:44, but they insist that these classical interpretations should be 
understood within their historical  and political  contexts.  And for that 
reason, such interpretations must be addressed to the form of ruling by 
other laws that  is  similar to the one that existed in the times of these 
scholars and not to the implementation of manmade laws in its modern 
form. For this reason, Activists and Jihādīs accept the detailed 
conditions, given by the holders of position one, of when ruling by 
something other than sharīʿah  constitutes major kufr .  But they apply 
those restrictive conditions exclusively to isolated policy decisions or 
judgments made by the rulers or judges,  and not to the application of 
manmade laws in general . Ironically,  al -Maḥmūd supports this 
distinction using the same passage from the great 14 t h  century Ḥanafī 
text al-ʿAqīdah al -Ṭaḥāwiyyah used by the Loyalists to foster their view. 
After explaining that ruling by something other than sharīʿah  can be 
evaluated differently depending on the status of the perpetrator,  Ibn Abī 
al-ʿIzz, a major 14th -century commentator on al-Ṭaḥāwiyyah  concludes:  
If  the judge believes that  ruling according to what  Allāh has 
revealed is not obligatory and is optional,  or he thinks l i t t le of i t 
even though he is certain that  this is the ru l ing of Allāh, then this is 
a major kufr .  If  he bel ieves that  ruling according to what Allāh has 
revealed is obligatory, and he knows the correct  ruling in this 
part icular case, but  he does not judge or rule by i t ,  whi lst 
acknowledging that  he deserves to be punished, then he is a sinner 
and he is described as  a kāfir  in a metaphorical  sense, in the sense 
of lesser kufr .  If  he is  unaware of the ruling of Allāh in a case, but 
he does his best  to  reach the right  conclusion, and suffers error,  
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then he has made a mistake. He will  be rewarded for his efforts and 
his mistake will  be forgiven. 27  
While the Loyalists deduce from this statement the different categories 
of kufr  mentioned earl ier and see it as the only legitimate elaboration 
(tafṣīl) of the salaf  on this issue, Activists like al -Maḥmūd, along with 
the Jihādīs interpret it  differently. They point at the expression “and he 
knows the correct  ruling in this particular case ( waʿalimahu fī hāthihi al -
wāqiʿah)” to argue that  the commentator is talking about jud ging in 
particular cases and not about the replacement of sharīʿah  (qaḍāyā 
muʿayyanah lā al-tashrīʿ al -ʿāmm.) In other words,  this particular 
elaboration ( tafṣīl) does not deal with one who eliminates sharīʿah  and 
systematically institutes non-Islamic laws. Thus they view the case of 
manmade laws as a completely new form of ruling by something other 
than sharīʿah ,  that is, a phenomenon that did not occur during the early 
history of Islam, and as such it would be inaccurate to apply these 
verdicts by the ear ly Salafī  scholars to this form of ruling.  
Further, in support of their understanding, those that  take position two 
underline the distinction between merely not fulfilling a religious 
obligation out of desire or laziness and the legislation of new laws. Th e 
former action does not necessarily express any rejection or denial of the 
religious obligation while the latter, in addition to not fulfill ing an 
obligation, implies that  the perpetrators of such an act have put 
themselves at  a level equal to that  of God , since in legislating for people 
they are doing something that  which God has not given permission for.  
Even by itself,  doing so constitutes a violation of the concept of tawḥīd  
which, as explained before, demands a firm and definite belief that  the 
command is for none but God alone. As such, whoever decrees a rule 
that contradicts that  of God has usurped the legislative sovereignty ( al-
ḥākimiyyah) that should be God’s alone, and thus, he or she has made 
themselves partners with God. 28 
                                                     
27 Ibn Abī al -ʿ Izz,  Sharḥ  a l- ʿAqīdah  al -Ṭaḥāwiyyah ,  323–324.  
28 Al-Maḥmūd,  al-Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā Anza la Allāh,  A ḥkāmuhu wa Aḥwāluhu ,  57–65.  
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In addition, the supporters of this view do not regard this question of 
tabdīl  (replacing sharīʿah with manmade laws) to be open to ijtihād ,  
since they claim that it  is  a settled matter, based on consensus amongst 
the early scholars. In support of this historical argument they cite the 
statement of Ibn Taymiyyah:  
When a person makes permissible (ḥallala)  something which is 
agreed by consensus to be forbidden, or  he regards forbidden 
(ḥarrama)  something which is agreed by consensus to be permitted, 
or he alters (baddala)  the ruling of  sharīʿah  which is  agreed upon 
by consensus, then he is a kāfir  according to the consensus of the 
jurists.29 
However, the use of such distinctions by the activist and Jihādīs - 
between ruling by something other than sharīʿah  in isolated cases, and 
the replacement of sharīʿah ,  drew the J ihādīs enormous crit icism from 
the Loyalists. Both Al-Ḥalabī and al-ʿAnbarī  challenge their opponents, 
questioning the validity of their  distinction. In principle, the Loyalists 
agree that manmade laws violate the concept of tawḥīd  but they assert  
that the sin of legislating a new law can be exacerbated into major kufr  
only when the perpetrator claims it  to be the law of God.  
According to the Loyalists, the word tabdīl  in the usage of Ibn 
Taymiyyah does not mean the mere replacement or alteration of 
sharīʿah ,  as their opponents understand from it.  It  is  only when such 
legislation is undertaken out of “lying against Allāh and His Messenger” 
that  tabdīl  is  committed, as Ibn Taymiyyah himself illustrates in another 
statement:  
Al-sharʿ al -munazzal  ( the revealed legislation):  And this is 
whatever the Messenger came with. It  is  obligatory to follow this ,  
and i t  is  obligatory to punish anyone who o pposes i t .  
Al-Sharʿ al -muʾawwal  ( the interpolated legislation):  This is the 
opinions of  the scholars,  who perform i j t ihād  in  these matters,  such 
as the madhhab of Mālik  and what is l ike that .  It  is  permissible to 
follow this ( i t t ibāʿ) ,  but i t  is  not obliga tory and i t  is  not ḥarām .  
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And it  is  not for anyone to make this binding upon the general  
people, and nor should they be prevented from it .  
And the third:  al-sharʿ al-mubaddal :  this is lying against  Allāh and 
against  His Messenger or upon the people with a false testimony 
and i ts l ikes, and clear oppression. So whoever says:  “Indeed, this 
is  from the sharʿ  of Allāh, then he has disbel ieved… 30 
Based on this, the Loyalists outline their view on tabdīl ,  contending that 
there are two separate ways of replacing sharīʿah .  The first type is tabdīl  
in which the perpetrator makes partial changes to sharīʿah .  Such case is 
kufr  only if the perpetrator claims that  these foreign laws are in fact  part  
of sharīʿah .  The second type is the case of a total  replacement of the 
whole sharīʿah  in every single aspect ( ist ibdāl tām).  This case is kufr  in 
all  case regardless whether or not the perpetrator claims them to be part  
of sharīʿah .  Thus, in itself,  part ial  replacement of the sharīʿah  is  not 
regarded as major kufr  i f the perpetrator does not claim it to be part of 
sharīʿah  and hence, further investigation into the motives for such act is 
required, just as it  is needed in the case of ruling by something other 
than sharīʿah  occasionally.  As such, such reasoning implies the 
exclusion of nearly all present -day rulers from the ruling of Ibn 
Taymiyyah on tabdīl ,  s ince family laws in most Muslim-majority 
countries are still  based on sharīʿah .  
Thus, we see how, start ing from the same Quranic verse (5:44) and based 
on the same comments on  the topic by classical scholars such as Ibn 
ʿAbbas, Activists and Jihādīs  come to a very different conclusion from 
the Loyalists regarding the role of manmade laws in determining the 
status of present-day rulers in Muslim countries.  While all  groups agre e 
that  ruling/judging by anything other than sharīʿah can cause kufr ,  and 
hence a sufficient factor in itself to depose a ruler, they disagree on the 
distinctions between different kinds of ruling/judging activities –  and the 
centrali ty of understanding motives when making these distinctions. For 
Activists and Jihādīs ,  while occasional policy decisions or judgments 
may not be evidence of a ruler’s belief that she/he is equal to God, 
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tabdīl ,  the replacement of sharīʿah with new, manmade laws offers 
sufficient proof, and is therefore sufficient for declaring takfīr .   The 
Loyalists, on the other hand, make further distinctions –  even within the 
act of legislating –  contending that  these are of two kinds: tabdīl  (partial 
change of sharīʿah) and istibdāl (change of the whole body of sharīʿah). 
While tabdīl  can be kufr (but impossible to prove, since no ruler makes 
the necessary declarations about their own beliefs), istibdāl  can be 
judged to be kufr only when all the laws are changed in their totali ty –  
which rarely happens, since family laws, if nothing else are preserved 
for sharīʿah in most countries that  the Salafīs are concerned with.  
Which Precedent is Equal to Modern Manmade Laws? 
Applying precedent scholastic opinions issued by authoritative figures,  
to new cases is a common method in Salafism. However, the struggle to 
agree upon a previously decided case,  where the facts are of satisfactory 
resemblance to the case of manmade laws, has proved to be another main 
reason for the dispute.  
One of the most important precedents is  the case of the Yāsa, the Mongol 
system of laws. From a Salafī perspective, the Yāsa code is a legal 
system created by the founder of the Mongol Empire Genghis Khan 
(1162-1227). It is  believed to be a combination of laws borrowed from 
the legal traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; in addition to 
many other laws based on Genghis Khan’s own “thoughts and whim.” 31 
The analogy between the Yāsa and manmade laws is probably the most -
known invoked precedent for determining the takfīr  of present-day 
rulers. On several occasions, Jihādīs have used this analogy as the basis 
of their justification for revolt ing against their rulers. Perhaps for this 
reason, one finds most academic works focussing on the Jihādīs’ 
interpretation of this precedent, while largely overlooking the 
challenging interpretation offered by the Loyalists.  
After seizing power in several  areas in the Muslim World, it  is reported 
that the Mongols embraced Islam. This conversion raised many questions 
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about the legitimacy of waging j ihād  against them. These questions were 
particularly critical  during the lifetime of Ibn Taymiyyah, that is, 
towards the end of the thirteenth century, when the Mongols made 
various attempts to control the Levant region. “The Mongol conversion 
had produced such an impact upon Ibn Taymiyyah’s surroundings that  
many of his contemporaries appeared to have considered the conflict  as a 
modern replica of the battle of the camel and the Battle of Ṣiffīn.” 32 In 
response to the question of whether or not it  wa s legitimate to wage 
jihād against  the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyyah issued several verdicts in 
which he concluded that the Mongols were in fact non -Muslims, despite 
professing Islam outwardly.  Ibn Taymiyyah listed several reasons for his 
conclusion, the most important of which, for our purpose here,  is  their 
continuance to rule by the Yāsa. The great fourteenth -century Levantine 
scholar of ḥadīth ,  tafsīr  and history,  Ibn Kathīr,  repeated a similar 
argument, stating:  
He who abandons ( taraka)  the clear laws revealed to Muhammad 
Ibn ʿAbd -Allāh, the seal  of the Prophets,  and refers judgment 
( taḥākama)  to other among abrogated laws,  then he is a kāfir .  Let 
alone the one who refers judgment to the Yāsa  and gives precedence 
to i t  over them (wa qaddamahā ʿalayh ) .  Whoever  does such is a 
kāfir  according to the consensus of Muslims. 33 
These kinds of statements by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathīr on the 
Mongol rulers are given great prominence in the writ ings of Jihādīs and 
Activists.  And although these two scholars did not direct  their verdicts 
against the poli tical  authorities of their own time, the holders of the pro -
takfīr  opinion here consider them perfectly applicable to the case of 
present-day rulers. According to al -Maḥmūd, throughout the history of 
Islam up to the time of Ibn Taymiyyah, Muslims had never witnessed or 
ruled by any rule other than sharīʿah . 34 The case of ruling by the Yāsa  is  
the first incident in which sharīʿah  was replaced by manmade laws and 
thus, is a perfect match for the modern case of manmade laws. This  
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analogy means that the Activists and Jihādīs do not just deem ruling by 
manmade laws to be a major kufr ,  but also classify this injunction within 
the category upon which there is  consensus among the scholars. This is  
particularly important because where t here is such consensus, i t  is  not 
permissible for any scholar, regardless of their status, to take a different 
position. For this reason, when the senior Saudi scholar al -Ḥawālī  was 
asked about his opinion about the view of al -Albānī and Ibn Bāz who 
allegedly stipulate the necessity of istiḥlāl  for declaring kufr in the case 
of tabdīl ,  he described their stance as a stumble ( zallat ʿālim). 35 This is  
an expression that  is  commonly used to convey total rejection of a stance 
taken by another highly respected scholar. Al-Ḥawālī then, proceeded to 
explain that the views of these scholars should be rejected as i t  goes 
against the consensus of early scholars on the matter.  
The Rejection of the Yāsa Analogy 
However,  the Loyalists fervently refuse the analogy between manmade 
laws and the Yāsa. Instead, they offer a very different and a rather 
interesting reading of the case of the Yāsa and consequently, of the 
statements of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathīr. To refute the analogy 
proposed by their opponents,  the Loyalists t urn to several accounts 
provided by these two classical scholars, which, in their opinion, 
collectively offer a clearer understanding of the case of the Mongol 
rulers in regard to ruling by the Yāsa .  Based on these accounts,  they 
reject  the proposition tha t  Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Kathīr and other scholars 
declared  takfīr  on the Mongols rulers simply due to their ruling by the 
Yāsa .  An example of these accounts is the statement of Ibn Taymiyyah in 
one of his fatāwās :  
And that  is because the belief of these Tatar s in Genghis Khan is 
immense; as they believe that  he is the son of God, similar to what 
the Christ ians believe in Jesus, and they state that  the sun got his 
mother pregnant while she was in a  tent.  And that  the sun then 
descended through a hole in the ten t  to  impregnate her…despi te 
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this,  they deem him to be the greatest  messenger in the eyes of God 
in the way they venerate what he insti tuted and legislated for them 
based on his conjecture and whim… 36 
For the Loyalists,  such statements shed l ight on how scho lars who lived 
through the Mongol invasions conceived the religious status of the 
Mongols.  They contend that  such scholars declared the Mongols to be 
non-Muslims based on their  prior knowledge of the Mongols’  religious 
beliefs.  In other words, the cause of  kufr  was the belief they held 
regarding this code, and not the mere act .  Al-Ḥalabī concludes:  
This is Genghis Khan and his status. This is his kufr  and shirk ,  this 
is  his Yāsa, his book and his sharīʿah ,  this is the belief of his 
followers (the Mongols) in him and their  claim that  he was a  
Prophet ,  and this is the injunction on  the one who does not accept 
the testimony of faith or other  components of Islam. Therefore, 
whoever was l ike him has the same ruling. 37 
Al-ʿAnbarī made similar arguments, insisting that  the consensus 
mentioned by Ibn Kathīr is a specific case for the kings  of the Mongols, 
“for their ruling by the Yāsa  involved giving it  precedence over the 
legislation of Allāh and because they preferred it over the legislation of 
Allāh.” 38 Thus, these verdicts against the Mongols can be extended only 
to those who share similar beliefs.  
The history of the Mongols, medieval Central  Asian rulers who 
eventually embraced Islam, and the opinions of classical scholars 
regarding their religious status,  centres on the Yāsa, or the Mongol tribal 
code. Jihādīs and Activists among the Sa lafīs see this code, and 
decisions of legal scholars about it ,  as the earliest examples of the 
promulgation of non-  sharīʿah  laws by Muslim kings.  All Salafīs refer 
respectfully to the decisions of the fourteenth -century scholar,  Ibn 
Taymiyyah and his students, who declared kufr on the Mongols, but they 
remain divided over the applicability of this historical  decision as a 
precedent to evaluate the status of rulers in the present -day world. This 
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is because the Loyalists do not believe that  Mongols had been accused of 
kufr by classical scholars merely for ruling according to Yāsa  code, but 
really for the belief behind the imposition of that code — that Genghis 
Khan was a Prophet.  
The Loyalists’ alternative Precedents  
The basis for the Loyalists’ rejection of the analogy between the Yāsa 
and manmade laws can also be attributed to  another factor: their 
rejection of their opponents’ assumption that the case of Yāsa was the 
first precedent for manmade laws in Islamic history.  The Loyalists 
highlight certain precedents that  they deem to form a better equivalent to 
the case of manmade laws than the Yāsa.  
The first  precedent is the example of the innovator ( mubtadiʿ), that is, 
people who invented or added new aspects to religious practice. 
According to the Loyalist scholar al -ʿAnbarī there is no difference at all  
between the one who legislates manmade laws and the mubtadiʿ  because 
both have invented what God has not given permission for,  and hence, 
both have transgressed the right of God to legislate. 39  To prove this  
similarity between manmade laws and bidʿah ,  al-ʿAnbarī  cites several 
statements by the 14 t h  century Mālikī scholar al -Shāṭibī ,  in which the 
Andalusian scholar argues that innovating new matters in religion entails  
rivalry with God. For if  the innovator believed that  the religion (Islam) 
is complete and comprehensive, he/she wou ld not try to modify it. 40 
Based on this comparison, al -ʿAnbarī argues that since al -Shāṭibī and 
others did not apply takfīr  to the mubtadiʿ ,  and mubtadiʿ  is no different 
from making new laws to replace the sharīʿah ,  this means that the 
classical scholars did not judge the mere act of transgressing the right of 
God to legislate to be kufr .  As such, he declares that his opponents have 
fallen in contradictory stances by applying takfīr  to the ruler who rules 
by manmade laws but not to the innovator.  
                                                     
39 Ibid ,  123.  
40 Ibid,  125.  
127 
 
It  has to be noted here, his comparison of manmade laws to bidʿah  does 
not mean that  al -ʿAnbarī  believes that  bidʿah  can never amount to kufr .  
He accepts that  classical scholars categorised innovations into two types, 
one which constitutes kufr  and another one that does not.  However, he 
maintains that the criteria set  by the classical  scholars for distinguishing 
between the two types are based on whether the innovation involves a 
rejection of one of the followings: (i) a matter upon which there is a 
consensus amongst  the scholars, (ii)  a matter of mutawātir , 41 (i ii)  what is  
known in religion (Islam) to be a necessity.” 42  Only when a religious 
innovation involves such rejection, is it  considered to be kufr .  
Al-ʿAnbarī’s opinions add an interesting twist  to the comparison between 
manmade laws and the innovator. Studying such opinions allow us to 
understand why the Loyalists among the Salafīs priorit ise combatting 
those they consider innovators over the rulers.  This prioritisation cannot 
be explained merely with reference to political conservatism; it has  a 
clear doctrinal basis.  
The other precedent which al -ʿAnbarī  regards as clear support  for his 
view is the story of al -Najāshī, the king of al-Ḥabashah  (nowadays 
Eritrea and northern Ethiopia).  Islamic sources reveal that  in the early 
days of Islam, before the famous immigration of Muslims from Makkah 
to al-Madīnah, Muslims fled the persecution they faced in Makkah at  the 
hands of Quraysh and sought refuge in al-Ḥabashah .  This encounter led 
al-Najāshī to secretly convert to Islam but despite his conversion  he was 
unable to apply the rule of Islam upon his people. It is also reported that 
when al-Najāshī  died the Prophet said to his companions: “A brother of 
yours has died; get  up and offer the funeral  prayer for him.” 43 Based on 
these reports,  al -ʿAnbarī bui lds his argument as follows; since al -Najāshī 
was a king who did not apply sharīʿah  upon his subjects, and yet the 
Prophet  and the Ṣaḥābah  prayed the funeral  prayer upon him, then it is 
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necessary to conclude that  ruling by something other than sharīʿah  is  not 
a major kufr .  Muslims are not permitted to offer such prayers to non -
Muslims, therefore al -Najāshī was clearly not considered to be outside 
the realm of Islam, as he would have been if the Prophet and 
Companions had judged him to have committed a major  kufr . 44 
Debating the Opinion of Senior Scholars 
In the intra-Salafī debates on manmade laws, some of the senior scholars 
who enjoy great respect and acknowledgment amongst all Salafī factions 
are quoted frequently as a support for or against takfīr .  It  is safe to say 
that the authority of some of these scholars is very high in the eyes of al l 
Salafīs, to the point  that their verdicts are taken face value to support 
one’s position even when no scriptural  evidence is given along with the 
verdict. However, the lack of explicit  and detailed studies on this 
question by those highly-quoted scholars has left  the doors wide open for 
different interpretations and speculations over their actual positions 
concerning manmade laws. In the following section, we will look at the 
intra-Salafī debates over the views of some of these scholars on that 
matter of manmade laws, and how each faction tries to consolidate its 
view by ascribing it  to these scholars.  
These authoritative scholars can be divided into two categories. The first  
category includes those scholars who witnessed the phenomenon of the 
application of manmade laws in the Muslim world but passed away 
before the start of these debates in the 1990’s. As examples for this 
category, I have chosen two scholars, the forme r Grand Muftī of Saudi 
Arabia Muhammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Āl  al-Shaykh (1893-1969), and the 
Egyptian scholar Aḥmad  Shākir (1892 -1958).  The significance of Ibn 
Ibrāhīm stems from the fact  that  he is,  to my knowledge, the only scholar 
in this category who has produced a writ ten work, fully dedicated to the 
question of manmade laws. His work is widely quoted in the debates and 
the disagreement over his actual position on the matter takes up a great 
                                                     
44 Al-ʿAnbarī ,  al-Ḥukm bi  Ghayr mā Anzala Allāh wa Usūl a l -Takf īr ,  89–90.  
129 
 
part  of every book dealing with manmade laws. Additionally,  Ibn 
Ibrāhīm’s authority is recognised not only by the young Salafī generation 
but also by the senior scholars, since most of them have studied directly 
under him or at least , attended some of his lectures.  
As for the Egyptian scholar Shākir, although he did not wri te a specific 
work elaborating on manmade laws, his significance stems from his very 
important statement regarding the similarities between manmade laws 
and the Yāsa, the Mongol code of law in his book ʿUmdat al -Tafsīr .  As 
we know the disputed parallel bet ween the Yāsa and modern manmade 
laws has been the cause of persistent disagreements between the 
Activists and Jihādīs on the one hand, and Loyalists on the other; a 
significant part of these arguments rely on Ahmad Shākir’s crucial 
statement.  
The second category of scholars whom we are going to discuss in this 
section are those who were alive when the debates were taking place, the 
most important of whom are al -Albānī, Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn, and Ibn Bāz. 
The views of these scholars on the matter is scattered in  a number of 
their lectures. They generally deal with the question in lesser depth than 
in the polemical writ ings of the younger generation.  
Ibn Ibrāhīm 
The position of Ibn Ibrāhīm  (1893-1969), the former grand muftī  of 
Saudi Arabia is  probably the cleares t amongst modern senior scholars. 
To my knowledge, his booklet Taḥkīm al-Qawānīn 45 is the most detailed 
work written by a senior scholar on this matter, albeit consist ing of only 
several pages. The booklet  is frequently quoted by the Jihādīs and 
Activists in order to promote the pro- takfīr  view. 
From the outset , Ibn Ibrāhīm’s takes a trenchant tone against manmade 
laws, affirming that the replacement of the Quran as source of legislation 
by “the cursed manmade laws” 46 constitutes a great  and clear kufr .  Based  
on several verses from Quran, Ibn Ibrāhīm builds his argument that 
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referring back in disputes to anything other than sharīʿah  constitutes an 
absolute contradiction to one’s īmān  (faith) and hence, it  is  impossible to 
have both in one heart , since: “one of  them will totally dispel the 
other.” 47  
It  does not take one very long to read the whole booklet but it  takes even 
less to understand why the Activists and Jihādīs quote Ibn Ibrāhīm more 
frequently than the Loyalists do. Explaining the meaning of jāhiliyyah  in 
the Quranic verse (5:50), Ibn Ibrāhīm echoes the understanding of 
Sayyid Qu ṭb for whom jāhiliyyah  is  “a condition of any time and place 
where Allāh is not held to be the highest governmental  and legal 
authority.” 48 Ibn Ibrāhīm similarly insists that  th ere are only two types of  
rule,  the rule of God and everything besides that is, the rule of 
jāhiliyyah .  
Ibn Ibrāhīm approaches the verse (5:44) stating that it  is impossible for 
God to “call he who judges by [anything] other than that which Allāh has 
revealed a kāfir  and for such a person not to be a kāfir .”49 However,  he 
also refers to the statement of Ibn ʿAbbās explaining, in the manner of 
all Salafīs,  that  the kufr  mentioned in the verse can sometimes be major 
and at other t imes only minor, depending on the state of mind of the 
perpetrator.  
Up until this part  of the booklet,  although Ibn Ibrāhīm’s tone sounds 
similar to that of the Jihādīs in deprecating manmade laws, it  is still  
general and indistinct in terms of determining when exactly he considers 
ruling by anything other than sharīʿah  to be a major kufr .  The latter part 
of the booklet however, is more precise and detailed. It is this latter part 
that  the Jihādīs  and Activists quote regularly to support  their view. Ibn 
Ibrāhīm provides six cases in whi ch ruling by anything other than 
sharīʿah  constitutes major kufr .  The most important of these is the fifth 
case, which he describes thus:  
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This is the greater,  more comprehensive and obvious form of 
stubborn rejection of the sharīʿah  and haughty rejection of i ts 
rulings and showing dissent towards Allāh and His Messenger, and 
challenging the courts of Islamic Law, in i ts sett ing -up, 
maintenance,  provisions, foundations and i ts branches,  forms, 
types,  i ts  judgement  and compulsion,  references and sources.  So, 
just  as the sharīʿah  courts have references upon which they depend, 
all  depending upon Allāh’s Book and the Sunnah  of His Messenger, 
in the same way the law-courts of  the manmade laws have their  
sources:  laws patched together from many different law -systems, 
l ike French laws, American laws, Brit ish laws, etc.  and from the 
systems of  innovators  who claim allegiance to the sharīʿah ,  etc.  So 
these law-courts are now present  in many Muslim lands, complete 
and established, with open doors and the people flock th ereto in 
throngs; their  judges give judgements going against  the judgements 
of the Book and sunnah ,  according to their  own laws and making 
these pronouncements  binding and agreeing thereto and making 
them unalterable, so what Kufr  is  greater than this,  and  what can be 
a greater contradiction to the testimony that  Muhammad is the 
Messenger of Allāh. 50 
The Objection of the Loyalists 
Although, this statement appears in support  of the holders of the pro -
takfīr  view in this case,  the Loyalists are reluctant to ac cept this 
perception and instead, offer a different reading to it .  They contend that 
their opponents misunderstood Ibn Ibrāhīm’s position because of 
overlooking his other statements on the matter. For instance, al -Ḥalabī 
cites other statements by Ibn Ibrāhīm ,  which he asserts, are proof that 
the shaykh “unlike what was understood from his booklet” 51  holds the 
same posit ion as the Loyalists.  The main statement used to foster this 
contention is found in the first  volume of the fatāwā (verdicts) of Ibn 
Ibrāhīm in answer to some questions sent to the shaykh from India. 
Although the questions are about various fiqhī  issues, the shaykh 
however,  seems to have found in them an opportunity to begin his 
answer with an overview statement on the meaning of the declaratio n of 
faith,  a topic that  is  central  in the teachings of the vast majority of Salafī 
scholars especially in Saudi Arabia.  Ibn Ibrāhīm states that the 
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actualisation of the meaning of the second part  of the shahādah  
(Muhammad is the Messenger of God) implies not only to judge in 
accordance with his sharīʿah ,  but also, to confine oneself to that  while 
rejecting whatever oppose it .  Amongst what Muslims have to reject are 
the laws (qawānīn) that  he concludes  
He who judges according to them or  refers to them for j udgment  
believing (muʿtaqidan)  in the correctness (ṣ iḥḥah)  or the 
permissibil i ty ( jawāz)  of such judgment is  kāfir  the [type of] kufr  
that  takes one out of  the religion. However, if  he performs that  
[ judgment] without  believing in their  correctness or the 
permissibil i ty to judge by them, then he is a kāfir  with the kufr  of 
action, which does not  take out of religion. 52 
For the loyalist scholar al -Ḥalabī, statements such as these are more 
precise and offer a better clarification of the position of Ibn Ibrāhīm  on 
the question of manmade laws than his booklet  Taḥkīm al-Qawānīn .  On 
this basis, al-Ḥalabī builds his argument against his opponents, 
highlighting that the shaykh here stipulates the necessity of iʿtiqād  
(inner belief) in the correctness or in the permissibility for the act to be 
major kufr .  As such, in order to determine the position of Ibn Ibrāhīm on 
this matter one must choose one of three options.  (i) The possibility that 
the shaykh contradicts himself (ii) that this statement is not as specific 
as the booklet,  (iii)  or that  the booklet  has to be understood in l ight of 
the elaboration given in statements of this kind. From al -Ḥalabī’s 
perspective,  only the last option is conceivable, since the first  possibility 
entails  a great  vilification of a schola r of the standing of Ibn Ibrāhīm, 
which no Salafī would dare to undertake. As for the second option, it  is  
not plausible because in the view of al -Ḥalabī, it  goes against the Salafī  
method of determining the opinion of a scholar.  That is to say, in order 
to determine the position of a scholar regarding an issue, one must 
investigate all  of his statements on the matter then interpret  them 
compatibly.  In the case of the existence of conflicting statements by the 
same scholar,  one must determine which statemen t bears more than one 
meaning (mujmal) and which one carries only one meaning ( mufaṣṣal). 
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Then, the former should be interpreted in light of the latter. In our case 
here, al -Ḥalabī considers the statement of Ibn Ibrāhīm he provides to be 
mufaṣṣal  and the booklet to be mujmal .  Hence, the categorisation of the 
fifth case as major kufr  in the booklet must be interpreted to mean that  
this is true only when i t [ruling by manmade laws] is done out of  
“istiḥlāl ,  juḥūd ,  or iʿtiqād ,  and not the mere action.” 53 Based on this,  al -
Ḥalabī concludes that Ibn Ibrāhīm supports the view of the Loyalists, 
that the mere act of applying manmade laws is not major kufr  unless the 
aforementioned conditions are present.  
This approach in dealing with Ibn Ibrāhīm’s booklet  is  very com mon 
amongst the Loyalists. The Loyalists seem to be interested more in citing 
any other statement by the shaykh where there is mention of words like 
juḥūd  and iʿt iqād  rather than explaining how the booklet  is less specific,  
especially given the fact  that juḥūd  and iʿtiqād  were already included in 
the first four cases of major kufr .  The first  four cases include the one 
who (i) “denies the precedence of the judgement of Allah and His 
Messenger.” (ii) “Believes that the judgement of someone other than the 
Messenger is  better than His judgement and more complete and 
comprehensive for the needs of the people.” (i ii)  “Does not regard it  as 
being better… but believes it to be equivalent,” and “believes that it  is 
permissible.” 54 The Loyalists tend to ignore complete ly the details given 
in these cases and seem rather anxious to switch the re asoning behind 
Ibn Ibrāhīm’s ruling in the fifth case to juḥūd ,  iʿtiqād  or istiḥlāl  by 
referring to his other statements 55  rather than simply concede that the 
view of Ibn Ibrāhīm in this matter is wrong.  
However,  despite the persistence of the Loyalists tha t the booklet  does 
not support the pro-takfīr  view, one can also sense from the tone of the 
Loyalists,  that  they are uncomfortable with i t,  which raises the question 
about the genuineness of their contention. For instance, Al -ʿAnbarī 
shows this discomfort indirectly when he narrates his story with ʿAbd -
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Allāh Ibn Jibrīn  (1933-2009), one of the prominent students of Ibn 
Ibrāhīm and one of the senior scholars that  time. 56 The story is about a 
discussion over the question of manmade laws that  al -ʿAnbarī held with 
Ibn Jibrīn.  When the shaykh apparently agreed with his view, al -ʿAnbarī  
asked him about the dubious position of Ibn Ibrāhīm in his booklet 
“istashkaltuhu fatwā skeikh…in taḥkīm al-Qawānīn .” 57  Ibn Jibrīn then, 
told him that Ibn Ibrāhīm has also other statements, in which he 
stipulates istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  for major kufr .  The use of the word 
istashkaltuhu  (which in the Arabic language means to ask about 
something that  is troublesome) is  an explicit indication of the Loyalists’ 
discomfort with the booklet .  
 Additionally, the Loyalists use another approach to contend that the 
booklet  does not champion the pro -takfīr  view. This approach consists of 
stressing that the statements in which Ibn Ibrāhīm stipulates istiḥlāl  and 
juḥūd  for major kufr  are issued some years  after his booklet . Although, 
the Loyalists do not explicitly declare that  the shaykh had changed his 
opinion, their constant interest  in highlighting this fact  entails an 
inclination towards this declaration, which constitutes an implicit 
recognition that  the booklet  does in fact support  the pro -takfīr  view.  
Responses to the Loyalists 
The contention by the Loyalists that Ibn Ibrāhīm did not consider the 
application of manmade laws to be major kufr  unless accompanied by 
istiḥlāl  or juḥūd  drew a lot of criticism from the Jihādīs and the 
Activists. However, it  is the criticism levelled by the senior scholars in 
Saudi Arabia against  the Loyalists’  interpretation of the position of Ibn 
Ibrāhīm that is more significant in order to determine his actual  position 
on this matter, given that  most of these scholars were his students. In 
their verdicts against  the books of al -ʿAnbarī and al -Ḥalabī,  the members 
of the Permanent Committee for Research and Verdicts (PCRV) 58 make 
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their rejection of the authors’ interpretation to the posit ion of Ibn 
Ibrāhīm obvious. The senior scholars charge both authors with 
dishonesty and the distortion of the words of Ibn Ibrāhīm, especially 
because of their claim that the shaykh had stipulated istiḥlāl  in the heart 
as a condition for major kufr .  For the PCRV the booklet of the sh aykh is 
not only “as clear as the sun” in terms of considering the act of applying 
manmade laws to be major kufr  but it  is  also “upon the path of ahl al-
sunnah wa al-jamāʿah .”59 
The rejection of the Loyalists’ interpretation of the words of Ibn Ibrāhīm 
is not confined to the members of the PCRV but it  also includes other 
former students of the shaykh such as Ḥmmūd Ibn ʿUglaʾ al-Shuʿaybī 
(1928-2001) 60 and Ibn Jibrīn to whom al -ʿAnbarī and al -Ḥalabī refer in  
their books as support for their interpretation. Acco rding to Ibn Jibrīn,  
the words of Ibn Ibrāhīm in his booklet are amongst his “mildest” 61 
statements against  the application of manmade laws. Indeed, i t  seems to 
be a well -known fact amongst all  those scholars who have close links to 
him, that Ibn Ibrāhīm considered the replacement of sharīʿah  with 
manmade laws to be major kufr ,  without the need for further 
investigation into the person’s iʿtiqād .  This is also confirmed by Ibn 
Ibrāhīm’s grandson, Ṣāliḥ  Āl Shaykh, the former Saudi minister of 
religious affairs . 62 
The Loyalists’ reluctance to accept that  the booklet  supports the pro -
takfīr  view shows the struggle in the Loyalists’ ideas and thoughts about 
how to reconcile the words of a great scholar for whom they have a great  
respect and the question of manmade laws about which they have very 
strong views. In addition, the determination to deny that  Ibn Ibrāhīm 
held the view that  applying manmade laws constituted major kufr  also 
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highlights the high status enjoyed by Ibn Ibrāhīm amongst the salafī  
proponents; it  also brings to lights how the Loyalists perceive the matter.  
For the Loyalists, the opinion that ruling by anything other than sharīʿah  
constitutes major kufr  only when accompanied by the mentioned 
conditions is beyond the domain of ijtihad .  It  is one of those questions,  
upon which all the scholars in the past have agreed and thus,  no one has 
the right to adopt a different position. 63  Consequently,  conceding that  
someone of the calibre of Ibn Ibrāhīm held opinions similar to those they 
accuse of deviancy in this crucial matter would not only damage their 
claim about the consensus on this subject  but it  would also force them to 
drop the charges of deviancy against their opponents. This is because 
matters of ij tihād  cannot be grounds for deviancy. In addition, p ardoning 
Ibn Ibrāhīm without pardoning their opponents would be a clear double 
standard in their judgement.  
Nowadays it  is  not possible to know exactly the extent of the damage 
caused by the verdicts of PCRV and other senior scholars to the 
credibility of the Loyalists.  However, one can sense a great  confusion in 
their responses to the PCRV that only adds to the uncertainty concerning 
the aforementioned question about whether they really believe that  Ibn 
Ibrāhīm held views similar to theirs.  
Aḥmad Shākir 
Aḥmad Shākir (1892/1958) is one of the most prominent Salafī scholars 
in the first half of the 20 t h  century Egypt.  Shākir first received his 
religious education under his father, a well -known Azharī scholar,  and 
later obtained his doctorate from al -Azhar in 1917. Nowadays, Shākir 
enjoys a high status amongst the Salafī proponents and he is seen as the 
leading scholar of ḥadīth  science in his era,  and is even designated imām 
al-Ḥadīth fī  ʿaṣrih . 64  
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Shākir lived in Egypt where manmade laws were openly adopted by  the 
state in the legal system. More importantly,  Shākir worked as a judge for 
more than thirty years in sharīʿah  courts operating at that t ime, which 
put him in a direct confrontation with many of those who favoured the 
application of manmade laws in Egyp t. 65 This confrontation resulted in 
numerous statements against the legitimacy of such application, which 
the Activists and Jihādīs quote frequently in support of their views 
regarding present day rulers. However, unlike Ibn Ibrāhīm, Shākir does 
not have a particular book art iculating his religious opinion on the 
matter but instead his statements and verdicts are spread out in his 
various works on tafsīr ,  ḥadīth  as well as a number of articles. In 1992, 
his son Usāmah compiled these statements and published them in one 
book under the ti tle Ḥukm al-Jāhiliyyah .  Nevertheless ,  the main 
statements that  reveal the stance of Shākir towards the application of 
manmade laws are found in the footnotes of his famous book ʿUmdat al-
Tafsīr ,  an abridged version of the well -known Quranic exegesis Tafsīr 
Ibn Kathīr .  
One of these statements comes after Ibn Kathīr’s aforementioned ruling 
on the Mongols and their code of law called Yāsa .  In a manner very 
similar to the Activists and the Jihādīs,  Shākir draws an analogy between 
the Yāsa  and manmade laws, assert ing that the modern case of manmade 
laws in the Muslim world does not only fit the description given by Ibn 
Kathīr to the Yāsa ,  but that it  is  worse. The only difference according to 
Shākir is  that  only the ruling elite of the Mongols adopted the Yāsa  
during the time of Ibn Kathīr, whereas in present -day most Muslim 
nations have virtually been affected by manmade laws. Shākir does not 
actually elaborate on when exactly ruling by anything other than 
sharīʿah  is major kufr  or touch upon the conditions of istiḥlāl  or juḥūd .  
In fact, the style of Shākir’s writing is very different to the tradit ional 
approach employed by Ibn Ibrāhīm in his booklet and by contemporary 
Salafīs in their debates.  However, it  is evident that he views a 
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resemblance between the Yāsa  and manmade laws. For him, manmade 
laws represent Yāsa  ʿaṣrī  (contemporary Yāsa), on which, the ruling “is 
clear as the clari ty of the sun, they constitute blatant unbelief  (kufr 
bawāḥ). . .” 66  
In addit ion to his different style o f writing, most of Shākir’s discontent  
and arguments are directed towards Muslims studying these laws and 
accepting them rather than the rulers themselves.  
These laws are legislated by people who endorse Islam. They teach 
them to the children of the Muslims, and fathers and children feel 
proud of that .  They entrust  their  affairs to the followers of this 
modern Yāsir ,  and they ridicule those who oppose them. They 
describe those call ing them to adhere to their  rel igion and sharīʿah  
as backward and rigid… 67  
The reason for this stems from Shākir’s concern about what he sees as an 
inherent threat posed by manmade laws to the religion of Muslims. For 
Shākir,  the case of manmade laws is not simply replacing a system by 
another, rather,  it  is a conversion to a new r eligion. 68 For that reason, he 
contends, “there is no excuse for anyone who considers himself Muslim, 
regardless of who he is, to apply i t,  submit to i t ,  or consent to it .” 69  
The other important statement for our purpose is Shākir’s footnote on 
Ibn Kathīr’s  commentary on the Quranic verse (5:44). The lengthy 
footnote is approximately three times of Ibn Kathīr’s concise 
commentary in which the latter refers to the abovementioned statement 
of Ibn ʿAbbās “kufr  lesser than kufr” to assert that ruling by anything  
other than sharīʿah  is sometimes major kufr  and other times minor kufr .  
Shākir attacks those he labels “the misleading people of the era who 
ascribe themselves to knowledge” 70  for invoking the statement of Ibn 
ʿAbbās in order to provide excuses for the app lication of the “idolatrous” 
manmade laws. Shākir quotes his younger brother Ma ḥmūd (1909-1997),  
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another scholar recognised by all  Salafīs,  who seems to condemn the 
same people for invoking a similar statement by a renown tābiʿī  named 
Abū Mijlaz. According  to Maḥmūd, these statements of “kufr  lesser than 
kufr” are never intended to  be used for justifying “the passing/issuing of 
judgements in money, personal affairs,  and blood by laws incompatible 
with the sharīʿah  of Muslims, or the production of laws that  oblige the 
people of Islam to seek judgment from other than the judgment of 
Allah.” 71 He argues that  such acts are is  a major kufr  because they clearly 
signify giving preference to manmade laws over sharīʿah .  Similar to the 
Activists and the Jihādīs, Maḥmūd  distinguishes between ruling in one 
particular incident by something other than sharīʿah  and the broader 
application of manmade laws. He argues that the latter case simply did 
not exist at the t imes when the statements of “ kufr  lesser than kufr” were 
issued, therefore it is not acceptable to invoke such statements in this 
case. 72 
When reading the statements of the Shākir brothers,  one can easily 
understand why the Jihādīs and Activists quote them frequently as 
support  for their own position. Firstly,  the Sh ākir brothers’ framing of 
manmade laws as modern-day Yāsa  serves as a precedent for the Jihādīs 
and Activists to stand on in order to apply the verdicts issued by Ibn 
Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathīr on the Mongols to present -day rulers.  
Secondly, the Shākir brothers clearly do not consider the statements of 
“kufr  lesser than kufr” to be applicable to the case of modern day 
implementation of manmade laws. In fact,  they label the use of these 
statements as misguidance and innovation. For the Jihādīs and Activists, 
this presents the basis for both countering the Loyalists’ strongest  proof -
text for their position on the matter, and for charging them of 
misguidance.  
The Loyalists do not dispute what the Shākir brothers have said, but they 
tend to discuss their views mainly to refute the argument of their 
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opponents,  rather than support  their own stance. In the loyalist 
interpretation, the charges of deviancy levelled by the Shākirs are not 
against the use the statements of “kufr  lesser than kufr” in order to 
understand the Quranic verse (5:44) as such, but only against those that  
use these statements as an excuse for ruling by manmade laws. Since the 
Loyalists do not really make such use themselves,  they do not see 
themselves as indicted by the Shākirs. 73 Again, similar to the manner in 
which they deal with the statements of Ibn Ibrāhīm, the Loyal ists do not 
address the distinction made by Shākir between the incidental ruling by 
something other than sharīʿah  and the replacement of sharīʿah  by 
another system of law. Nor do they respond to Shākir’s argument that the 
act of replacing sharīʿah  by another system is major kufr  because it 
constitutes  “a break away from the rule of God, aversion to His religion, 
and giving preference to the rule kufr  over the rule of God.” 74 Instead, 
they shift the focus to the last  part  of Maḥmūd Shākir’s comment where 
he asserts that  the opinion of the classical scholar al -Ṭabarī  represents 
the “decisive words” 75  in this matter. Al -Ṭabarī, the 9 t h-century tafsīr 
scholar from present -day Iran, stated that “everyone who does not rule 
according to what God has revealed out of juḥūd  (jāḥidan bih) is kāfir .”76 
Here it is interesting to see how Loyalists re -frame Shākir’s argument:  
although Shākir uses al - Ṭabarī  to dispute the applicability of the “ kufr  
lesser than kufr” classification to the act  of replacing the sharīʿah  with 
manmade laws, the Loyalists interpret  the same statement differently.  
For them, it  is  important that  Shākir himself pronounces such acts as 
unprecedented in Islamic history,  and also th at Shākir’s source,  al -Ṭabarī 
appears to stipulate the necessity of juḥūd  for the verdict of kufr  in such 
cases. Such a mode of argumentation shows the Loyalists’ unwillingness 
to accept that an authoritative scholar,  such as Shākir,  would consider 
the act  of replacing the sharīʿah  with manmade laws to be major kufr  
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without the need for further investigation into the perpetrator’s iʿtiqād .  
The Loyalists appear to be capable of retaining this belief despite the 
existence of many examples proving the contrary .  In my opinion, the 
main reason for this reluctance to accept the facts is that most of these 
Loyalists belong to the circle of the great  ḥadīth  scholar Muhammad 
Nāsir al-Dīn al-Albānī, formed in Jordan in the 1980s and 1990s. Al -
Albānī, as we will see in  the next section, held a different position 
regarding manmade laws from that of the category of scholars just  
discussed.  
Al-Albānī 
Al-Albānī is one of three most authoritative scholars who were alive 
during the intra-Salafī disputes of the nineties. He is  also the only one 
whose position on manmade laws has not been disputed in intra -Salafī  
polemics. There is a consensus amongst all the Salafīs that al -Albānī saw 
no difference between the incidental  ruling by manmade laws and the 
wholesale or partial implementation of manmade laws instead of 
sharīʿah .  Both actions are minor kufr  unless accompanied by one of the 
necessary conditions related to the mental state of the perpetrator. The 
reason behind this consensus lies mainly in the consistency of his 
statements. In all occasions where he discusses the question of manmade 
laws, al-Albānī’s approach is very meticulous and detailed. The other 
two authoritative scholars, on the other hand, despite producing some 
detailed statements on this question, also made othe r statements, which 
are either very general , not addressing the issue in detail or even 
contrary to their own statements.  
The other reason that has also helped in making the position of al -Albānī 
unequivocal amongst all  Salafīs owes to the fact that  al -Albānī spent the 
last  part of his life in Jordan. Unlike the case of Saudi Arabia,  Salafism 
in Jordan shared the religious sphere with other more politicised 
movements.  According to Lacroix,  at the time when al -Albānī settled in 
Jordan and established himself  as one of the most senior Salafī scholar 
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worldwide, the Muslim Brotherhood was at the height of its  power. 77 In 
this mixed religious arena, it  was natural  for questions related to politics 
and manmade laws to become salient topics of discussion amongst all  
different types of Islamists. These face -to-face discussions and 
confrontations with other Salafīs and Islamists who differ with him on a 
number of topics related to current affairs,  allowed al -Albānī to clarify 
his opinions on these topics. These discuss ions were usually recorded 
and then distributed worldwide. In addition, l iving in Jordan made al -
Albānī relatively easy to reach, which turned him into an attraction for 
many young Salafīs seeking religious clarifications about current affairs.  
One of the most famous discussions in which al -Albānī expressed his 
view on mad-made laws very clearly was with a young Salafī named 
Sāmī, who held that  the application of manmade laws constituted major 
kufr .  The discussion is reported as part of a famous lecture by al-Albānī 
on the issue of takfīr  known as al-Kufr Kufrān  (Kufr  is  of Two Types). 78 
In the lecture, al -Albānī divides kufr  into two different types: kufr  
ʿamalī  (kufr  relating to actions) and iʿtiqādī  (kufr  relating to belief). 
Only the latter, he says, takes one out of Islam. He then clarifies that the 
kufr  of actions refers to a situation where a Muslim commits actions of 
kufr  that  the texts of Quran and Sunnah commonly relate to non -
Muslims. This type of kufr  does not deprive the culprit of his or her 
status as a Muslim unless there is a clear indication that he or she has 
carried it out of conviction in the heart . From al-Albānī’s perspective,  
major kufr  must relate to one’s heart and since the kufr  of actions 
pertains to the mere action and not the heart then it  is  only minor kufr .  
Hence, a Muslim committing kufr ʿamalī  may well  resemble to non-
Muslims in terms of his or her action but differs from them in terms of 
conviction.  
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Based on this typology, al -Albānī builds his opposition to the idea that 
the Qur’anic verse (5:44) applies to Muslim rulers. His argument invokes 
the reason behind the revelation ( sabab al-nuzūl) of the Quranic verse 
5:44, which, he explains, was about the Jews who rejected the rulings of 
the Prophet  Muhammad when these were not in their favour. Then, al -
Albānī proceeds to explain that  the verse declares the Jews kāfirūn  not 
merely due to their action but because their action is based on rejecting 
the rule of God in their hearts “hum yarfuḍūnahu qalban wa qāliban  
(they reject  it  from the inside and outside)” As such, he concludes that  
applying this verse to the rulers of Muslim countries mere ly because of 
their failure to rule by sharīʿah  is  erroneous. In other words, al -Albānī 
concedes that  there is a resemblance between those rulers and the Jews, 
but he argued that  this resemblance is only in terms of actions. Thus, for 
al-Albānī, the verse applies to Muslim rulers only when the act of ruling 
by manmade laws is accompanied with a rejection of the rule of God in 
their heart as it  is the case for those Jews about whom the verse was 
revealed.  
Further, on several occasions when dealing with the q uestion of ruling 
by manmade laws, al -Albānī makes it evident that he does not consider 
incidental judgement by non-Islamic laws to be different to the exchange 
of the whole body of sharīʿah  for manmade laws. 79 Both cases are major 
sins similar to usury, adultery,  and drinking alcohol and as such, a 
person guilty of them is not kāfir  unless there is an indication that the 
motive behind the act is  iʿt iqād .  Unlike the view of Ibn Ibrāhīm and most 
of the Saudi scholars, for al -Albānī,  the application of manmade  laws 
does not automatically reveal any considered preference for these laws 
over sharīʿah .   
However,  there is  one particular point that  distinguishes al -Albānī from 
the Loyalists in this matter.  This pertains to al -Albānī’s implicit 
recognition of the subjective nature surrounding the assessment of 
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Fatāwā al -Shaykh  a l-Albānī wa Muqāranatuhā bi  Fatāwā a l - ʿUlamāʾ ,  580–581.  
144 
 
whether the act of replacing sharīʿah  with manmade system of laws can 
be an indicative for kufr  of the heart. For al -Albānī, kufr  of the heart can 
be identified in two ways: (i) explicitly by one’s utterance: lisān al-
maqāl ,  or (ii) implicitly by his or her action lisān  al-ḥāl .  Unlike the first  
way, the latter is  open to dispute.  Based on this,  al -Albānī holds that the 
one who deduces takfīr  in this case based on the reasoning that the act of 
replacing sharīʿah  implicitly indicates kufr  in the heart , is not 
blameworthy. Hence, while al -Albānī was concerned about those 
advocating takfīr  based on mere actions, without any consideration to 
what is  in the perpetrator’s heart,  he did not foreclose the possibility of 
making such judgments and was prepared to accept the promulgation of 
manmade laws as sufficient evidence of the state of heart  requisite for 
declaring takfīr .  This is not the case for the Loyalists, who insist that the 
case is closed on the basis that the ag reement of al -Albānī,  al -ʿUthaymīn 
and Ibn Bāz on such vital  case is binding. 80 For example, al -Ḥalabī says:  
It  would not  be far  from the truth if  one claims a  consensus 
[amongst the scholars] regarding a  ruling, upon which the l ike of 
these great  scholars agree…this is because they are the scholars of 
the t ime ʾaʾimmat al -zamān wa ʿulamāʾ al -ʿaṣr wa al-awān . 81 
Despite the lack of perfect concordance between their own views and 
that of al -Albānī’s,  the clarity of the latter’s posit ion concerning the 
stipulation of iʿtiqād  in the case of manmade laws has prompted the 
Loyalists to not only adopt his view but also,  assume that all  other senior 
scholars shared it. 82 In their polemics against the Loyalists, the Activists 
and the Jihādīs admit that al -Albānī considers the application of 
manmade laws to be minor kufr .  And while they, too, hold al -Albānī in 
great respect,  some Jihādīs and Activists were not deterred by his status 
as a great Salafī  scholar from directly targeting him with their criticism 
and even accusat ions of deviancy, as we shall  see in the last  chapter.  
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Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn 
In the nineties, the Saudi scholar Muhammad b. Ṣāliḥ  al-ʿUthaymīn was 
considered the second most senior scholar in the Saudi religious 
establishment after Ibn Bāz 83  and the third major Salafī scholar 
worldwide. Unlike al -Albānī, al -ʿUthaymīn was not a prolific writer;  
rather, his entire life was dedicated to religious education. During his 
lifetime, al -ʿUthaymīn taught an ample number of fundamental books in 
the study of religion from a Salafī point of view. This, along with his 
unique style of teaching, earned him an elevated status amongst the 
Salafī youth, not only within the Kingdom, but also outside. 
Additionally,  the wide distribution at no cost –thanks to the generous 
donations of his wealthy followers–of the transcription of his lectures,  
has not only helped his views to reach a wider audience, but also created 
a sense of student -teacher relationship between him and his audience. 
This type of relationship has enhanced al -ʿUthaymīn’s  authority amongst 
the Salafī youth worldwide; hence, it  is no surprise that his view on the 
application of manmade laws would be very significant amongst Salafī 
youth.  
Similar to the majority of Saudi senior scholars, al -ʿUthaymīn’s position 
is in harmony with that  of Ibn Ibrāhīm’s. In many occasions,  al -
ʿUthaymīn has opined that the replacement of the Islamic system of laws 
constitutes major kufr . 84 Such an act,  in his view, reveals hatred of and 
sneering at  the rule of God as well  as a preference for manm ade laws 
over the sharīʿah .  To prove this point , al -ʿUthaymīn applies a rational 
argument that  rests on the contention that common sense dictates that  
one does not depart from one system to another unless he or she believes 
in the superiority of the latter  over the former. 85 Similar to Ibn Ibrāhīm, 
the Activists and the Jihādīs, al -ʿUthaymīn makes a clear distinction 
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between the one who incidentally fails  to rule by the sharīʿah  and the 
systematic application of non-sharīʿah  laws. He asserts that the latter 
case constitutes kufr  “even if they (the rulers) perform the prayer,  fast 
Ramadan, give charity,  and accomplish the pilgrimage.” 86  
Further,  the disagreement of al -ʿUthaymīn with the position of al -Albānī 
on this matter is  best highlighted in a commentary b y the former on a 
famous lecture by the latter under the title al-Taḥthīr min Fitnat al-
Takfīr  (Warning against the Mayhem of Takfīr ).  The comment is  related 
to al-Albānī’s argument against the Jihādīs that the rulers should not be 
fought and should be considered Muslims except when they believe that 
ruling by manmade laws is permissible. Al -ʿUthaymīn tactfully starts his 
disagreement by praising al -Albānī’s argument that  declaring kufr  on 
present-day rulers can only lead to f itnah .  He then, expresses his 
disagreement with making istiḥlāl  a condition for takfīr  in this case.  
These words of  shaykh al -Albānī are  very good. However, we might 
disagree with him regarding the issue of not declaring them kāfir  
unless they consider i t  to be permissible.  This is beca use, we say 
that  whoever rules  by the rule  of  God while believing that  the rule 
of other than God is more suited,  is kāfir  even if  he rules by the 
rule of God, and his  kufr  is  kufr  of ʿaqīdah  ( i .e.  major kufr) .  
However , our question [here] relates to actio ns. In my opinion,  i t  is  
not possible for anyone to apply laws that  oppose the sharīʿah ,  and 
rule the people by them, unless he considers them permissible,  and 
believes that  they are better than the sharīʿah .  Therefore, he is 
kāfir.  This is what i t  i s  apparent,  otherwise what has  driven him to 
do so? 87  
This passage identifies the point  of divergence between the two main 
opinions on the question of manmade laws. That is  whether or not the 
implementation of manmade laws as a system of laws can be considered 
sufficient proof of what is in the heart of the perpetrator.  
However, despite his agreement with the Jihādīs that the implementation 
of manmade laws is major kufr ,  it  is  evident that al -ʿUthaymīn is not 
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comfortable with their idea that  this alone is sufficient to pronounce 
takfīr  on individual rulers. 88 Al-ʿUthaymīn’s statemen ts on takfīr  in this 
matter in particular,  are often accompanied by words of caution against  
hastening in pronouncing takfīr  on a specific ruler. 89  This is a clear 
indication of al-ʿUthaymīn’s cautionary approach in matters of takfīr .  He 
often insists on the seriousness and the graveness of the application of 
takfīr  on individuals who might be unaware, misinformed, or simply 
ignorant in matters of religion. 90  In fact, despite acknowledging the 
magnitude of the matter in present times, al -ʿUthaymīn is not interested 
at all  in the practical application of this injunction to individual rulers. 91 
This is because, similar to al-Albānī, al-ʿUthaymīn believed that 
preoccupying oneself with the topic of the rulers is fruitless, given that 
there is nothing that can be done about it .  Even if the rulers were 
apostates, he argues,  Muslims still  should not fight them because, quite 
simply, this would certainly lead to fitnah  and bloodshed. 92 
However,  while most Activists adopt al -ʿUthaymīn’s view on manmade 
laws and accept hi s differentiation between labelling the act  to be kufr  
and the judgment that a particular ruler is kāfir , 93 the Jihādīs cling only 
to the first  part  of al -ʿUthaymīn’s argument, namely that the application 
of manmade laws expels the perpetrator from Islam. A t the same time, 
they firmly reject  his justifications for not declaring takfīr  on present-
day rulers. The reason for this lies in the fact that  the Jihādīs do not 
consider ignorance to be a valid excuse in the case of the implementation 
of manmade laws. The Syrian scholar Al -Ṭar ṭūsī  for instance, argues that  
there is  a difference between those whose ignorance is caused by an 
unavoidable inability to seek knowledge and those who will ingly chose 
not to inquire about what is permissible and what is  not in the ir religion.  
Only the former’s ignorance of an act  of kufr  is  a valid excuse ( ʿudhr) 
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for committing it  and, subsequently,  is  an objection ( māniʿ) to others 
applying takfīr  to that  particular sinner. 94  The Jihādīs believe that the 
rulers cannot claim to be ignorant about the impermissibility of ruling 
according to something other than the sharīʿah .  This is because if they 
are not aware of the message of Islam, it is because they chose to ignore 
it . 95 
On their part,  the Loyalists have various ways of dealing wi th the 
apparent contradiction between the statements of al -ʿUthaymīn and their 
own view on this issue. Essentially,  they have two main approaches.  The 
first approach tends to evade this apparent contradiction insisting that 
the shaykh has agreed with Al-Albānī’s lecture and the comment of Ibn 
Bāz on it  when it  was read to him. 96  As a support ,  they focus on 
highlighting the difference between the shaykh’s cautiousness and 
warning against applying takfīr  to individual rulers and the rashness of 
those using his  verdicts. 97 The Loyalists also underline the conditions al -
ʿUthaymīn provides in another statement, for applying takfīr  on 
individual rulers,  in order to claim that this explains his abovementioned 
commentary. In other words, the Loyalists overlook the dif ference 
between their view and al -ʿUthaymīn’s and focus instead on latter’s 
arguments against applying takfīr  to individual rulers.  
Later, Loyalists changed their strategy for dealing with Ibn Ibrāhīm’s 
opinions on the matter. Now, the Loyalists refer to a nother statement by 
al-ʿUthaymīn from 1999, that is , from two years before his death,  to 
argue that the shaykh had changed his view towards the end of his life. 98 
The origin of the statement is a recorded answer to a question sent to 
him by a young loyalist  scholar asking for his view on the question of 
manmade laws. Al-ʿUthaymīn’s answer states that the ruler who 
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legislates by manmade laws and turns them into a constitution is Muslim 
as long as he acknowledges that it  is  an offence and admits that  what is  
in “Quran and Sunnah is the truth.” 99 For the Loyalists, this answer is  
seen as a clear indication that al -ʿUthaymīn abandoned his earlier 
position on the matter in favour of a view that conforms to their 
position. For that reason, it  is deemed to be his mos t valid opinion, 
especially given that  it  is his last  statement on the matter and that  it  is  in 
harmony with the views of Al -Albānī and Ibn Bāz. 100  Of course, this 
assumption is rejected by the Activists and Jihādīs on the basis that the 
shaykh’s many pro -takfīr  statements in various lectures cannot be 
overlooked simply because of one answer over the phone. 101 
In sum, if one is to ignore his last  statement, al -ʿUthaymīn’s position on 
the question of manmade laws is as well -defined as al -Albānī’s and also 
that  the two are mutually contradictory.  Barring the last “phone -call” 
statement that the Loyalists choose to focus on, the clarity of al -
ʿUthaymīn’s position provides the Activists and Jihādīs with a great  deal 
of support, while challenging the view of the Loya lists.  
 Ibn Bāz 
Unlike al-Albānī, whose cri ticism of Islamic political activity gained 
him many enemies,  Ibn Bāz was known to have good relations with all  
Islamic movements in the field. 102 In the nineties, “all participants in the 
Saudi religious field called [him] al -Wālid (our father).” 103 This “papal 
position” as Lacroix calls it ,  was not limited to the Kingdom but it  
transcended it  to most of the Islamic World. 104 Consequently,  it  is not a  
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surprise that  his position and statements on manmade laws would be us ed 
as a support to settle the dispute. However, similar to what we have seen 
in the case of al -ʿUthaymīn, Salafīs engaging in these debates have also 
disagreed on their interpretation of the position of Ibn Bāz, although to a 
lesser extent than [al -Albānī and al-ʿUthaymīn]. The reason for this owes 
to the existence of two conflict ing opinions in his statements. On the one 
hand, there are those statements that he issued earlier in his life, in 
which he not only states, “he who does not rule according to the Islamic 
sharīʿah  is kāfir” but on the other, he also contends that  the rulers have 
applied manmade laws under duress and therefore can not be declared 
kāfir .  
As an example of the first type of statements, he said:  
As for those who have power over people in  most Muslim countries 
nowadays, could i t  be said about them that  they are unable to rule 
by sharīʿah? Or that  they know that  sharīʿah  is  the rule [they 
should apply]  and that  they have erred and sinned by applying the 
laws [made by man]? And they admit th at  they are wrong and 
sinful,  but they have deliberately done so due to certain reasons and 
desires? So we can say regarding them in this scenario that  they 
have committed minor kufr…this [view] is  questionable. What  is 
apparent from their  conduct,  state,  their  predilection for the laws 
[made by man]  and their  contentment with them, what is apparent 
from [all  of]  these conditions when one carefully studies  them, is: 
that  they are pleased and satisfied with them and they consider them 
superior to sharīʿah . 105 
Such statements,  issued before the nineties,  indicate that  Ibn Bāz held 
the same view as his teacher Ibn Ibrāhīm. However, there is  enough 
                                                                                                                                                           
evidence of Saudi backwardness.  Essential ly,  Ibn Bāz argued aga inst  the bel ie f tha t  
the ear th ro ta tes and  tha t  the  sun i s  stat i c  and  does no t  move.  Holding such bel ie f he 
argued takes one outside  the fo ld o f I s lam because i t  i s  a  clear  denia l  o f what  i s  in  
the Quran.  His argument  was interpreted by the magazine as a  declarat ion of tak f ī r  
against  whoever  be lieves that  the ear th i s  spher ical  or  tha t  the ear th o rbi ts  the sun.  
However ,  a  careful  examinat ion of Ibn Bāz’s statements on this issue  sho ws tha t  the 
controversy around his views was in fac t  par t  o f the ongoing co ld war  a t  the  t ime for  
Muslim and Arab minds between Saudi Arabia  and Egypt.  See:  Ibn Bāz,  al-Adi l lah 
al-Naqliyyah wa a l -Ḥissiyah alā  Imkān al -Ṣuʿūd  i lā  a l -Kawākib ,  www.is lamweb.ne t  
(accessed 30 /01/2017);  Lauzière,  The Making o f  Salaf ism: I s lamic Reform in  the 
Twent ie th  Century ,  207-208.  
105 Ibn Bāz,  Wujūb al - ʿAmal bi  a l -Sunnah ,  www.is lamweb.ne t  (accessed 13 /11/2015) .  
151 
 
evidence to believe that  his view has changed towards the end of his life 
as one finds other statements in  which he clearly stipulates istiḥlāl  as a 
condition for takfīr .  For instance, in a discussion he held in the nineties 
with some pro-takfīr  scholars, 106 Ibn Bāz declares that he disagrees with 
the view of Ibn Ibrāhīm that the implementation of manmade laws s tands 
as a sufficient indication that  the perpetrator  considers it  permissible to 
rule by them. Unlike the Loyalists, Ibn Bāz admits that his teacher held 
the position of pro-takfīr  in this matter 107 but he opposes it on the basis 
that “in my opinion” 108  the mere application of manmade laws do not 
offer enough evidence that the rulers are pleased and satisfied with these 
laws. In other words,  Ibn Bāz employs the same argument that he himself 
rejected in his earl ier statement, excerpted above.  
According to Lacro ix, Ibn Bāz’s opposit ion to his teacher on manmade 
laws is an emblematic of the radical change that happened in the senior 
scholars’ stance towards the state after the death of Ibn Ibrāhīm. Such 
change, he asserts is the direct result  of the “reorganisatio n of the 
religious field, coupled with the sudden influx of resources.” 109 However,  
Lacroix fails  to provide any adequate evidence for his assumption. Here,  
we contend that since, as sources indicate, Ibn Bāz’ changed his position 
in this matter, ,  in the nineties,  one must not ignore the bloody context, 
which many Arab countries,  including Saudi Arabia witnessed in this 
period. In light of this,  coupled with the fact  that  those armed revolts 
were based on declaring takfīr  on those applying manmade laws, Ibn 
Bāz’s change of position could be understood as an attempt to deter and 
prevent these revolts. This argument is especially supported by the 
interesting twist  Ibn Bāz adds to the stance towards the question of 
manmade laws, which distinguishes him from the Loyalists. This pertains 
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to his assertion that  in the case of the existence of a powerful Muslim 
state with sufficient means to deter those rulers from applying those 
laws; it  becomes incumbent on this state to fight them. If those rulers 
resist  and fight back then they are kāfir  because the fighting in support 
of the laws constitutes a clear indication that  their application is based 
on istiḥlāl . 110  
Ironically,  Ibn Bāz invokes the same ruling by Ibn Taymiyyah against 
the Mongols,  which the Jihādīs use as a precedent for takfīr  of the rulers. 
However,  Ibn Bāz reading of Ibn Taymiyyah’s ruling differs from the 
Jihādīs’ in two points. Firstly,  his contention is that only an Islamic state 
is to fight the ruler who does not rule by sharīʿah  so if  there was no such 
state then those rulers should not be fought,  rather they “should be left 
to God [to decide their fate].” Secondly,  for Ibn Bāz, the basis of kufr  
here is the ruler’s fighting against and resistance to the application of 
sharīʿah ,  whereas the Jihādīs and the pro -takfīr  holders in general, view 
the mere application of manmade laws to be sufficient cause for 
declaring kufr .  Hence, for them, the ruler is  kāfir  even without being 
fought and without his fighting back.  
Further, the other parting of ways between Ibn Bāz and both t he 
Loyalists and the Jihādīs is the idea of whether or not the question in 
hand should be considered amongst matters of ijtihād .  From a Salafī 
perspective,  considering any religious question to be a matter of ijtihād  
entails  that  the opposing parties can d iscuss and dispute the question but 
no side has the right to accuse the other of deviancy. Seeing that  al l 
factions are engaged in war of accusations and counter accusations of 
deviancy, it  is evident that  each faction claims to hold the only “correct 
Salafī” view that represents the consensus of the Salafī scholars. The 
case of Ibn Bāz seems to be different as in both types of statements he 
choses a very soft manner to dispute the view that  he does not agree 
with. The use of expressions such as “this needs  further investigation,” 111 
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“in my opinion” 112  is  a clear indication that  Ibn Bāz considers the 
question of manmade laws to be a matter of ijtihād .  His position is 
perhaps clearer when he states,  “everyone needs to make effort and 
endeavour in order to achieve presumption regarding this question so he 
or she finds contentment in his or her heart , because these are dangerous 
questions and they are not easy.” 113 It  is perhaps the view that the matter 
is open to ijtihād  that facilitated his change of mind in this qu estion.  
Nevertheless, despite his conflicting statements on manmade laws, there 
is an agreement amongst the Salafīs that Ibn Bāz did not hold his 
teacher’s view. Apart from few exceptions, 114 Activists and Jihādīs also 
concede that he came to agree with al -Albānī on this question before his 
demise. From the Loyalists’ perspective, this agreement represents a 
confirmation that the senior scholars unanimously held their view. 
Whereas for the pro- takfīr  proponents, it  is considered as zallat ʿālim  (a 
blunder of a scholar) that not only contradicts the consensus of the early 
Salafī scholars including his own earlier view but also his earlier 
position. 115 
In l ight of this section, we can say that the pro -takfīr  view was the 
predominant position amongst the early Sala fī  scholars especially in 
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the bloody events of the nineties in Algeria, 
Egypt,  and Saudi Arabia led some senior scholars to soften their tone 
against the application of manmade laws, which in return caused a great  
confusion amongst the younger generation.  
  
                                                     
112 Ibn Bāz,  al-Dmʿah a l -Bāziyyah .  
113 Ibid .  
114 The except ions are found mainly on discuss ions onl ine by unknown Salaf ī s  
115 See for  example:a l -Ḥawālī ,  Ḥaqīqat a l -Khi lāf  f ī  Masʾala t  al -Ḥukm b i  Ghayr mā 
Anza la Al lāh,  avai lab le at :  www.alhawali .com (accessed 15 /11/2015)  
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Summary  
This chapter has discussed in the detail the role of one specific line of 
doctrinal disputes among the Salafīs –  the implications of applying 
manmade laws on the legitimacy of Muslim rulers. We have seen how, 
since a ruler’s apostasy from Islam is universally accepted as a sufficient 
condition for deposing him, the evaluation of whether or not the 
application of manmade laws denotes such apostasy has been of crucial 
importance in the political  thought of the Salafīs.  I n a typical Salafī 
mode, the intense and deeply divided debates have centred around the 
interpretation of a common corpus of texts –  starting from verse 5:44 of 
the Quran, to exegetical statements by classical scholars such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathīr,  to the lectures and responses of the most 
highly respected present -day Salafī scholars, such as Ibn Ibrāhīm, the 
Shākir brothers, al -Albānī, al-ʿUthaymīn and Ibn Bāz. All sides in these 
debates accept the necessity of restrictive conditions before making the 
momentous decision of declaring takfīr on anyone, but especially the 
rulers –  but they disagree as to the applicability and implications of 
those conditions,  which relate to the state of the ruler’s beliefs,  
specifically,  whether they believe their act ions to be valid. While the 
Loyalists contend, based on the interpretation of the same body of texts, 
that  the mere application of manmade laws –whether occasional or 
systematic –  is not sufficient evidence of those crucial beliefs, the 
Jihādīs and the Act ivists disagree. Each side, as we have seen, choose to 
rely on partial and particular readings of the texts and arguments of their 
sources in order to come to their conclusions.    
It  is  very evident that when the Loyalists first published their works, 
they believed that they were simply representing and defending the view 
of the senior scholars in this matter and therefore defending Salafism 
against the “innovations” of the Muslim Brotherhood and the thought of 
the takfīrīs .  This assumption can be attributed to the fact  that  most of 
them belong to the circle of al -Albānī whose opinion that applying 
manmade laws constitutes minor kufr  was always very clear due to the 
various debates he carried out against  the Jihādīs.  The Loyalists were not 
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fully aware that  the other senior scholars held a different position, which 
left them in a state of surprise and disbelief to see the verdicts of the 
PCRV issued against  them and not their opponents.  
Additionally,  the scholars of PCRV seem to be aware of the position of 
al-Albānī on manmade laws, for this reason their criticisms against the 
books of the Loyalists were not about the opinion that  the application of 
manmade laws constitutes minor kufr .  Rather, their criticism was about 
the method employed by the Loyalists to reach this verdict.  The PCRV 
did not explicitly declare the opinion of the Loyalists to be wrong but 
they condemned other issues in the books such as “twisting” the words 
of the scholars cited, and the claim that there is a consensus amongst the 
scholars that the replacement of sharīʿah  is major kufr  only when it is  
accompanied with ist iḥlāl  one’s the heart.  
This chapter has also, illustrated that the pro -takfīr  position can be 
traced to the teaching of many early authoritative salafī scholars.  
However, while most of the Activist s have observed the senior scholars’ 
warning against the haste in applying this injunction to individual rulers, 
the Jihādīs surpass this warning on the basis that  there is  no valid excuse 
for anyone to apply manmade laws. The persistence of the Loyalists in 
denying that some authoritative scholars held the pro -takfīr  posit ion 
reflects their determination to cut off any link between Salafism and the 
armed rebellions that were taking place in some parts of the world in the 
nineties. Hence, the view of the Lo yalists on manmade laws can be 
explained as a reaction to the bloodshed caused by the Jihādīs at the time 
rather than a pure theological conviction alone.  
Finally,  the fault  line between those who believe that the replacement of 
sharīʿah  by a manmade laws system constitutes major kufr  and those 
opposing them is,  to a large degree, the difference between those who 
consider this act  of replacement a sufficient indication to the kufr  in the 
heart and those who do not. Our next chapter will examine how the 
disagreement over takfīr  based on such replacement have shifted the 
intra-Salafī  debates into an even deeper disagreement namely, what 
really constitutes īmān  and what acts can and cannot cause kufr .  
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Chapter Five: Īmān and Kufr 
Introduction 
As we have seen, there has been serious disagr eement among Salafīs 
over the status of the ruler who applies manmade laws. In this chapter, 
we shall  delve deeper into the doctrinal  aspects of that debate,  showing 
especially how it relates to two fundamental issues: (i) what constitutes 
īmān  (faith), and (ii) what acts can take a Muslim out of the fold of 
Islam into kufr .  In general , disagreements related to Islamic 
jurisprudence are common amongst the Salafīs  and rarely provoke 
adversarial  responses. Even when such disagreements do occur,  the tone 
of the responses amongst the debating parties is  usually very 
harmonious. On the contrary,  with regards the disagreements over 
matters of ʿaqīdah (creed), one finds stricter and punitive responses 
amongst the opposing views. This is especially true when it come s to 
fundamental questions such as what exactly constitutes īmān;  when a 
Muslim becomes kāfir  (non-Muslim); and which types of beliefs,  
sayings, or acts would nullify one’s status as a Muslim. Towards the end 
of the 1990s, disagreements over this type of q uestions became the main 
topic of intra-Salafī polemics and a great cause for divisions and 
accusations of deviation from the teachings of Salafism.  
The purpose of the present chapter is  to investigate the intra -Salafī 
polemics over this type of questions  or what is known in the Salafī  
literature as masāʾil al-īmān  wa al-kufr wa al-takfīr  (the issues of faith,  
unbelief and declaring someone to be non -Muslim). This chapter will reveal 
certain intricate details that underlay the disputes between major Salafi scholars in a 
way that has not been examined before. For example, the major work by Daniel Lav, 
Radical Islam, claims that al-Albānī has the same views on īmān as al-Ḥalabī in that he 
does not consider actions to be part of īmān; however, he does not address the dramatic 
changes in al-Ḥalabī’s views on īmān outlined here.  This is, in part due to his use of the 
later editions of al-Taḥdīr. My analysis here has found that an analysis of the first 
edition – which instigated the entire controversy – reveals that al-Ḥalabī implicitly 
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conceded to the criticisms against his book by adopting the views of his critics in the 
later editions, without admitting or acknowledging his errors. The chapter  begins by 
highlighting the importance of ʿaqīdah  in Salafism. 
The Importance of ʿAqīdah in Salafism 
Essentially,  all protagonists of Salafism dedicate a great part of their 
lives to religious education. This is true even in the case of the Jihādīs, 
who, as Wiktorowicz accurately notes, “devote most of their time to 
education and the acquisition of religious knowledge: they spend more 
time with the Quran than a Kalashnikov.” 1  Salafī  religious education 
includes a wide range of disciplines such as Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), 
Arabic language, and the sciences of ḥadīth ,  but the study of ʿaqīdah  
(creed) enjoys the greatest  importance within their educational system. 
ʿAqīdah  is given such importance because of their belief that  there is 
only one correct interpretation in the vast majority of matters related to 
this discipline. 2 According to the teachings of Salafism, Muslims must 
endeavour to understand matters of ʿaqīdah  in the same way that  the 
salaf  understood them and should not subject them to later 
interpretations.  
The great importance given by the Salafīs  to ʿaqīdah  can be seen clearly 
by looking at  Saudi universities in the 1960’s.  Just before and during the 
reign of King Faysal (1906-1975), Saudi Arabia adopted an open -door 
policy towards non-Saudi Islamists as part  of its  ideological cold war 
against the “progressive” bloc led by Egypt’s Nasser. 3  This policy 
allowed many non-Salafī  scholars to not only seek refuge in the kingdom 
but also to teach in i ts educational institutions. Indeed, many non -Salafī 
scholars were permitted to teach different subjects across a number of 
universities.  Examples of  such émigrés include the Syrian scholar ʿAbd 
                                                     
1 Wiktorowicz,  “Anatomy of the Sa laf ī  Movement ,”  212.  
2 Al-Fawzān,  Al-Khilāf  f ī  a l - ʿAqīdah lā  Yuqbal ,  v ideo recording ava ila b le  at :  
ht tps: / /www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyNrQDVefTA (accessed 03 /01/2016)  
3 Lacroix,  Awakening I s lam the Pol i t ics o f  Relig ious Dissent  in  Contemporary Saudi 
Arabia ,  40–41.  
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al-Fattāḥ  Abū Ghuddah (1917 -1997) 4 who taught the ḥadīth  sciences at  
the Imām University in Riyadh and Muhammad ʿAlī al -Ṣābūnī (b.  1930) 5 
who was a scholar of Quran exegesis in Mecca. However, despite this 
open-door policy towards non-Salafī  scholars, teaching the subject  of 
ʿaqīdah  remained “the exclusive prerogative of the Wahhābī  ʿulamāʾ  and 
under no circumstances would they delegate its teaching” as Lacroix 
correctly notes. 6 The exceptions to this rule were those who shared the 
same interpretation of ʿaqīdah ,  such as the members of the Egyptian 
association Anṣār al-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyyah . 7  
This policy adopted by Saudi Arabia reflects the general stance amongst 
the kingdom’s scholars in regard to the existin g disagreements over 
religious matters amongst Muslim scholars.  Their approach is relaxed 
and tolerant in most religious disciplines except the field of ʿaqīdah .  
This is  because, in the Salafī  view, there is  no room for interpretive 
differences or religious pluralism in ʿaqīdah ,  since they believe that  
early Muslim community (their absolute social and religious model) 
shared one single view in relation to most ʿaqīdah matters.  Salafīs point  
out that only by the end of the reign of the third Caliph ʿUthmān b .  
ʿAffaān (d. 656) did newly invented  interpretations in matters of ʿaqīdah  
start to appear amongst Muslims, with the Khawārij  being the first 
“heretical” sect to emerge in Islamic history.  According to the 
Permanent Committee for Research and Legal Verdic ts:  
There was no difference or disagreement among the 
Companions [of the Prophet]  or those following them from 
among ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamāʿah  (adherents to the Prophet’s 
                                                     
4 Abū Ghuddah was a  prominent  Syr ian scholar  and one of the supreme leaders o f the 
Syrian branch of t he Musl im Bro therhood.  He was accused by a number of Sa laf ī  
scholars such as al -Albānī  and Bakr  Abū Zayd of numerous deviat ions in c reed.   
5 Al-Ṣābūnī  i s  a  reno wned Syrian scholar .  He moved  to  Saudi Arabia in 1962 where  
he taught a t  i t s  universi t ies and mo sques.  Al -Ṣābūnī  s t ir red some controvers ies in  
the kingdo m af ter  the publicat ion of his famous book on Quran exegesis  Ṣafwat a l -
Tafāsīr .  A book tha t  i s  according to  the S a lafī s  champions the ashʿarī  posi t ion on 
divine at tr ibutes.  
6 Lacroix,  Awakening I s lam the Pol i t ics o f  Relig ious Dissent  in  Co ntemporary Saudi 
Arabia ,  47.  
7 Ibid.  
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traditions and Muslim community) with regard to Islamic 
ʿaqīdah .  This is because they all believed in what is mentioned 
in the Qur'an and the Prophetic Traditions. Moreover,  they 
never introduced new practices into the religion. This was the 
reason for their unity and agreement on the same beliefs and 
the same method… 8  
On the other hand, disagreements over issues related to other disciplines 
such as Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh ,  exist and even amongst the Salafī  
scholars, and are well -tolerated. Take for instance the jurisprudential 
disagreement over the ruling on covering the face for Muslim women. In 
his book Jilbāb al-Marʾah al-Muslimah ,  al-Albānī openly opposes the 
traditional view held by the vast majority of Saudi scholars including Ibn 
Bāz and Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn ,  who believe that Muslim women have to 
cover their faces.  For al -Albānī, such view has no solid basis in the 
scripture. Although al -Albānī’s opinion drew numerous responses from 
Salafī scholars who opposed him, 9  the dispute remained amicable and 
neither side claimed to represent at  the single truth or portrayed the 
opponents as deviants from Salafism. Neither were such legal 
disagreements confined to the opposition be tween non-madhhab  
affiliated scholars, such as al -Albānī and Saudi scholars,  who are trained 
as ḥanbalīs .  Rather,  such disagreements also exist amongst the Saudi 
scholars themselves. For example, Ibn Bāz and Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn  
disagree over many legal issues , such as the length of time for which one 
is allowed to shorten the prayer while one remains a traveller. 10 
Given the high status accorded to the subject of ʿaqīdah  in Salafī 
thought, disagreements over issues related to this area of religion 
inevitably lead to more acrimonious debates. Such can sometimes 
escalate to the point of mutual accusations of deviation from the 
teachings of Salafism altogether.  
                                                     
8 See verdict  number 21008 at :   www.al i fta .ne t  (accessed 03/01/2016)  
9 See for  example :  Al-Tuwīj r ī ,  al-Ṣārim al -Mashhūr ʿa lā Ahl  al -Tbarru j  wa a l -Sufūr .  
10 For an account o f the d isagreements be tween a l -Albānī,  Ibn Bāz and Ibn al -
ʿUthaymīn  see a l -Brayk,  al- Ī jāz f ī  Baʿḍ  mā Ikh ta laf  f īh  a l -Albānī wa Ibn  al-
ʿUthaymīn  wa Ibn Bāz .  
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Īmān, Khawārij and Murjiʾah in Salafism 
Before examining the intra-Salafī  disputes over the concept of īmān  
(faith) and the mutual accusations of khārijism  and murjism (following 
the notions of the Khawārij  and Murjiʾah respectively),  it  is important to 
provide an overview on the basic Salafī  terminology and ideas in this 
matter: their definition of īmān ,  their account of the Khawārij  and the 
Murjiʾah  perceptions of this concept.  
Linguistically, īmān  derives from the Arabic verb ʾāmana ,  which carries 
two meanings. The first meaning is to provide security to someone as in 
the Quranic verse “wa āmanahum min khaw f”11 (Who provides them with 
security against  fear.) The second meaning is to believe in someone or 
something as in the Quranic verse “āmana al-rasūlu bimā unzila ilayhi 
min rabbih…”12 (The Messenger believeth in what hath been revealed to 
him from his Lord…) Moreover,  the active participle derived from the 
verb āmana  in the latter meaning is muʾmin ,  which is translated as 
“believer” in English. The infinitive of the verb is īmān ,  which translates 
as “belief.”  
Despite (or perhaps due to) the fact that the con cept of īmān  constitutes 
a central question in Islamic theology, īmān  has various definitions due 
to the disagreements within the Muslim community over its nature. Since 
the early Islamic days, disputes over the nature of this concept have even 
divided the stability and the unity of the nascent Muslim state.  
According to the teachings of Salafism, the dispute over the nature of 
īmān  was the cause of one of the first civil wars during the reign of the 
fourth caliph, ʿAlī  b.  Abī Ṭālib (35–40/656–61).  The dispute started soon 
after the battle of Ṣiffīn  (657),  which took place between two Muslim 
armies; one led by the fourth Caliph ʿAlī b.  Abī Ṭālib and the other one 
by Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. A zealous section from ʿAlī’s camp, who 
later became known as the Khawārij ,  expressed their discontent with the 
decision taken by their leaders to accept the arbitration of two 
                                                     
11 Quran ,  106:4.  
12 Quran ,  2 :285.  
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Companions in order to settle the dispute between the two camps. The 
Khawārij  considered the arbitration to be a violation of the teachings of 
Islam and withdrew from the camp of ʿAlī  to a nearby vil lage, where 
they appointed a new leader. It  is due to this exodus and secession 
(khurūj) from the army of the fourth Caliph that this group gained their 
name. The Khawārij  considered themselves to be the only true Muslims 
and declared both the camps of ʿAlī  and Muʿāwiyah, in addition to the 
vast  majority of the companions of the Prophet,  to be apostates,  for 
accepting the ruling of men over the rule of God. For the Khawārij ,  
appointing arbitrators was a violation of the injunctions of the Quran 
that “The Command rests with none but Allah,” 13 which they interpreted 
to mean that only God has the authority to arbitrate,  not human beings.  
This secession led to another bloody war (the battle of al -Nahrawān in 
658) between the Khawārij  and the camp of ʿAlī before the former 
assassinated him in 661. It is at these bloody times that questions 
concerning the nature of īmān ,  and its opposite, kufr ,  became disputed 
and a great  cause of fraction amongst Muslims. Question s over which 
sinful acts can nullify one’s īmān  and take him or her out of the realm of 
Islam formed the core of these debates.  The Khawārij  evolved to become 
the most radical group amongst Muslims concerning these questions and 
as a response to their radical views, another group later became known 
as the Murjiʾah  emerged in opposition.  
Based on certain proof -texts which indicate that sinful  Muslims may be 
punished for their sins but will eventually receive salvation from 
hellfire, the Murjiʾah  argued that  sinful  acts can not be considered to be 
a cause for kufr  since salvation is only for Muslims. As such, they took a 
lenient position in relation to sinful acts by excluding outwardly acts 
(for example,  praying or fasting) altogether from the essence of īmān .  
The Murjiʾah  argued that failure or errors in such matters cannot be a 
cause for declaring takfīr  on Muslims. It  was because of their exclusion 
of the category of acts from the definition of īmān  that the Murjiʾah  
                                                     
13  Quran ,  6 :57.  
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earned their name, which is  derived from the Arabic verb arjaʾa  (to 
delay or postpone):  the Murjiʾah  make  outwardly acts fall behind īmān .  
On the other hand, the position of Khawārij  is entirely the opposite. The 
Khawārij  considered all  outwardly acts to be an integral part  of īmān  and 
consequently argued that it  is not possible for anyone to have īmān  
without the proper performance of these acts. On this basis, the Khawārij  
held that a Muslim guilty of major sins, either by committing what is 
forbidden or failing to fulfil an obligation, is out  of the realm of Islam.  
Salafism as Holder of the Moderate Position 
Following the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah in his widely circulated 
treatise al-ʿAqīdah al-Wāsiṭiyyah  (The Creed of the Wāsiṭ),  the Salafīs  
portray themselves as the holders of the moderate and middle position 
with regards to these questions and the concept of īmān  in general.  In  
their view, their position is between “the excessiveness” of the Khawārij  
and the “negligence” of Murjiʾah . 14 In fact, the self-perception of Salafī  
as the holders of  the moderate position is not confined to the concept of 
īmān  but it  also includes several matters of ʿaqīdah  upon which there are 
disputes amongst Muslims.  
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the basis of the deviation of both the 
Murjiʾah  and the Khawārij  in regards to the above questions stems from 
their erroneous perception of īmān:  considering i t to be a constant and 
indivisible entity ( lā yatabaʿʿaḍ). He thought that this perception led 
both groups to assume that īmān  must be either present or absent as a 
whole and as such, it  cannot increase or decrease. 15  Consequently,  the 
Murjiʾah  and Khawārij  adopted completely opposite views in relation to 
the components of īmān .  Following Ibn Taymiyyah, the Salafīs  disagree 
with both groups, insisting that īmān  is divisible and as such it increases 
with good deeds and decreases with sinning. Hence, the Salafīs agree 
with the Khawārij  on considering the actions of the limbs (external or 
                                                     
14 Al-ʿUthaymīn,  Sharḥ  a l - ʿaqīdah al -Wāsi ṭ iyyah ,  71.  
15 Ibn Taymiyyah,  Kitāb a l - Īmān ,  176.  
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outwardly actions) to be an integral component of īmān  but maintain that 
committing major sins only decreases one’s īmān  and does not 
completely nullify it.  They also reject the completely permissive 
position of the Murjiʾah  - that  the commitment of major sins does not 
affect one’s īmān  at all.  The Salafī  perception of īmān  can be summed up 
in the following chart:  
 
The “speech of the heart” implies inner conviction; it  refers to 
knowledge, and “factual belief” ( taṣdīq qalbī ) in God, the messenger and 
the commandments of Islam. The “action of the heart” includes a number 
of actions such as intention, sincerity,  and fear of God as well as the 
commitment to abide by the tenets of Islam. These two components,  
according to the teachings of Salafism, represent the basis (aṣ l) of īmān .  
The Salafīs also maintain that one cannot have these two componen ts 
(aṣl  al-īmān) without the other two (the utterances of the testimony of 
faith and the performance of some duties).  Following to Ibn Taymiyyah, 
they believe that  it  is  not conceivable for a person to believe in the 
testimony of the Is lamic faith and wilfully abstain from uttering it .  
Likewise, having the acts of the hearts necessitates the presence of the 
acts of the limbs.  
īmān
speech
speech (belief) of the 
heart (eg. belief in God, 
belief that God forbade 
alcohol...)
speech of the tongue 
(uttering the testimony 
of faith)
act
acts of the heart (eg. 
intention, acceptance of 
what God has forbidden 
...)  
acts of the limbs (e.g. 
praying, fasting ...)
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It is not conceivable for a person to have a firm īmān in the heart that God 
Has commanded upon him the prayer, almsgiving, fasting and the 
pilgrimage yet remain all his life without prostrating once before Him, 
fasting [a day] of Ramadan, giving zakāt for His sake, and visiting His house 
(i.e. kaʿbah). This is unconceivable, and it only occurs with the presence of 
hypocrisy and heresy (zandaqah) in the heart not with correct īmān.16 
However,  this complex definition of īmān  does not mean that  all of these 
components are equal in terms of their ability to cause kufr ,  as the next 
section elucidates.  
Takfīr in Salafism 
Takfīr  is the declarat ion that an individual (or a group of people) who 
self-  subscribes to Islam is in fact  non-Muslim. The basis or the cause 
for such declaration depends on the definition of īmān  adopted by the 
person practicing takfīr .  For instance, the Murjiʾah’s exclusion  of 
external acts from the essence of īmān  is  the reason behind their 
restriction of the application of takfīr  to matters of belief of the heart 
only. Conversely,  the Salafīs’ inclusion of actions in īmān  implies that 
the cause of kufr  can be in the form of a belief, speech or an act.  
However,  this is  not to say that  any transgression (major or minor) in 
itself is kufr .  Unlike the case of the Khawārij ,  major sins such as 
drinking alcohol or adultery are not considered to be causes for kufr  in 
Salafism. 
We do not consider any of the people of our qiblah (i.e. Muslims) to 
be unbelievers because of any wrong action they have done, as long as 
they do not consider that action permissible.17 
In terms of actions of the limbs, Salafism can be distinguished from both 
the Murjiʾah  and  the Khawārij  by two points Firstly,  they divide the 
actions of the limbs into two categories. The first category includes 
actions that  do not in themselves cause kufr  unless accompanied by 
further evidence of the presence of kufr  in the heart,  as in the case of 
major sins. The second category refers to what they term as actions of 
(kufr  aʿmāl kufriyyah ,  sing, ʿamal kufrī .)  These actions cause kufr  
                                                     
16 Ibn Taymiyyah,  Majmūʿ  al -Fatāwā ,  372.  
17 Ibn Abī al -ʿ Izz,  Sharḥ  a l- ʿaqīdah a l -Ṭaḥāwiyyah ,  295.  
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without the need to further investigate what is  in the heart of the 
perpetrator. To give an example of this  category, Salafīs often refer to 
acts such as contempt of the Quran by kicking it or putting i t in a filthy 
place, the practice of magic and the prostration before tombs. Secondly, 
they distinguish between  the actions of the limbs as a category ( j ins al-
ʿamal) and as single acts (āḥād  al-ʿamal).  This is to say that there is  a 
difference between a person abandoning the actions of the limbs 
altogether, so he or she does not perform any of the commandments of 
Islam, and a person who omits a single du ty or more. The former is  not a 
Muslim even if he or she utters the testimony of faith and self -ascribes 
to Islam while the latter’s status as a Muslim depends on which of the 
two mentioned categories the abandoned act belongs.  
Accusations against Salafism 
It  is this expansive perception of īmān ,  kufr  and consequently, the causes 
of takfīr  that has driven and st ill  drives many non -Salafī scholars, 
especially the Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs ,  whom the Salafīs consider to be 
Murjiʾah ,  to accuse Salafism of intolerance towards fellow Muslims. 
They accuse them “of being latter -day khārijīs ,  who are intolerant and 
extremist  heretics seeking to sow dissent and division ( fitnah) among 
Muslims by engaging in the reprehensible practice of anathematisation or 
excommunication of fellow Muslims.” 18 Such charges can be traced back 
to the time of Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb himself, who, along with his 
followers came under severe criticism from some of their contemporary 
scholars for what was deemed to be a revitalisation of the creed of the 
Khawārij . 19 
These accusations are  simply the natural result  of the conflict ing 
perceptions of īmān  between the Salafīs  on one hand and the Ashʿarīs  
and Māturīdīs  on the other. Unlike the Salafīs, both the Ashʿarīs  and 
Māturīdīs  consider  the actions of the limbs to be only a condition for the 
perfection of īmān  and not an integral  part  of it .  Such a conception 
                                                     
18 Haykel,  “On the Nature  of Salaf i  Thought and Act ion,” 41 .  
19 Amongst  those scholars  is  al legedly Ibn ʿAbd al -Wahhāb’s brother  Sulaymān b.  
ʿAbd a l -Wahhāb , .  See :  Commins ,  The Wahhabi Mission and  S audi Arabia ,  22–23.  
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entails  that the minimum threshold of īmān  required for one to be 
considered a Muslim is lower than that in Salafism. Accordingly,  the 
Salafīs  are, in theory, inclined to declaring takfīr  on a person or group of 
people (which is the ground for all  accusations of khārijism  and 
murjiʾism) more easily than the Ashʿarīs  and Māturīdīs .  
Takfīr between Theory and Practice 
However,  the fact  that  Salafīs, in theory, include more grounds for takfīr  
than the Ashʿarī  and Māturīdī  scholars does not mean that they do make 
such declarations randomly or even casually.  The Salafīs  distinguish 
between declaring an act, statement,  or belief to be kufr  (takfīr  
nawʿ/muṭ laq) and the declaration that a particular individual perpetrator 
is kāfir  (takfīr  ʿayn).  Essentially,  not everyone who commits kufr  
automatically becomes a kāfir ,  because a person guilty of kufr  may have 
an excuse that prevents him or her from falling out of the fold of Islam. 
According to the senior scholar Bakr Abū Zayd:  
Muslims must  dist inguish between declaring takfīr  as a general  rule 
( takfīr  mu ṭ laq)  on those who commit  one of  the null if iers of Islam and 
declaring a specific individual  as kāfir .  For if  the belief,  speech, acts,  
doubt or abandonment was kufr  then Muslims must declare that 
whoever  did or said this kufr  is  kāfir  but without specifying an  
individual [ to be kāfir ]20 
In theory, this distinction is accepted by all Salafīs and is a subject  that 
is extensively present and discussed in their literature when dealing with 
the concept of takfīr .  Even the Jihādīs,  who are often branded as takfīrīs  
for their excessive use of takfīr ,  adopt this distinction, as Wagemakers 
observes. 21  Although this distinction does not eradicate the notion of 
takfīr  altogether, it  is effective in terms of restricting its practice.  
The reasoning behind this dist inction is that  a person may commit a 
major kufr  out of ignorance, compulsion, mistake, or misconception. 
These four conditions are known as the impedime nts or obstacles 
(mawāniʿ) of takfīr .  The Salafīs  stipulate that an individual who commits 
                                                     
20 Abū Zayd,  Darʾ  a l -Fitnah ʿan Ahl a l -Sunnah ,  48.  
21 Wagemakers ,  “An Inqui ry into  Ignorance:  A J ihādī -Salafī  Debate  on Jahl  as an 
Obstac le to  Takfīr ,”  301–304.  
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kufr  does not become a kāfir  “except after the proof has been established 
against him.” 22 Establishing the proof refers to ensuring the absence of 
all these impediments. As such, to declare an individual to be kāfir ,  the 
scholar engaging in such practice must make sure that (i) the perpetrator 
is not ignorant of the sinfulness of that act or belief of kufr  (ii) the kufr  
was not committed under coercion and duress such as torture or real 
threats of death (iii)  the intent of the individual must also be 
investigated because one may say or do something without intent. For 
instance, one may step on the Quran or throw it in a dirty place by 
mistake. Although the action is kufr ,  such a person is excused for having 
no intention of committing such an act . (iiii) The fourth impediment 
relates to committing kufr  based on false interpretations ( taʾwīl). This 
impediment for instance, is the main reason restraining the Salafīs from 
declaring takfīr  on individual Muʿtazil īs  who hold that Quran is created, 
although their belief is considered outright kufr . 23  
Although all  Salafīs agree in theory on th is distinction (between 
committing kufr and being a kāfir), occasionally scholars can disagree 
over particular cases due to the inherently subjective process of 
assessing the presence/absence of these impediments. There is no doubt 
that  for all  Salafīs,  Ibn Taymiyyah represents the most authoritative 
source in matters of creed and in particular the issue of īmān .  His 
definit ions and elaborations are widely quoted and his theorising is 
accepted in all  debates.  For this reason, one finds all debating Salafīs 
trying to demonstrate that his views on īmān  and kufr  correspond with 
their own. However,  despite sharing the above perception of īmān  and 
agreeing on the same authoritat ive sources upon which this perception is 
based, several  questions related to the conc ept of īmān  and kufr  have 
been subject to debates within contemporary proponents of Salafism. 
                                                     
22 Ibn Ibrāhīm,  Fatāwā wa Rasāʾ i l  Shaykh  Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm  12/190- 191; Ibn 
Tymiyyah,  Majmūʿ  al -Fatāwā  12/260-268  
23 Ibn bāz,  Ḥukm al- In t i sāb i lā  Mathhab Yuʾmin bi -anna al -Qurʾān Makhlūq ,  
avai lable a t : www.binbaz .org  (accessed 05/05 /2016) ;  Ibn Tymiyyah,  Majmūʿ al -
Fatāwā  12/272  
168 
 
Most of these debates revolve around how to understand the relationship 
between one’s outwardly deeds and īmān  and kufr .  
The Loyalists’ Anti-Takfīr  
A detailed look into the Loyalists’ anti -takfīr  writings shows that  al -
Ḥalabī and al -ʿAnbarī were not the first authors to write in this genre as 
other earlier pamphlets and authors are also indirectly mentioned in the 
debates. For instance, the book of the Jordanian s cholar Murād Shukrī  
Iḥkām al-Taqrīr li  Aḥkām al-Takfīr  (Scrutinising the Specif ications of  
Takfīr)  is  referred to a number of times as being the first book 
supporting the views of the Loyalists in regard to the questions of īmān ,  
kufr  and takfīr .  Nowadays,  however,  most of these writings have 
disappeared. This is perhaps because their authors were not as well 
known as al -Ḥalabī or maybe simply because the books of al -Ḥalabī and 
al-ʿAnbarī have expanded on the opinion of anti -takfīr  sufficiently to 
become the main sources for the holders of this opinion. What is  clear 
however is that most of these writ ings belong to the same circle of 
quietists in Jordan, a circle that was close to al -Albānī, who has always 
encouraged staying away from politics entirely.   
The Loyalists elsewhere did not engage in the debates over īmān  and 
kufr  until  later stages,  which indicates that  Jordan is the birthplace of 
this genre. One can also notice in these debates that the anti -takfīr  
writ ings came about as a response to the growth  of the Jihādī  t rend in 
Jordan. This growth reached i ts peak with the arrival en masse of 
Palestinians who had been expelled from Kuwait  in 1991 as a result  of 
“Yāsir ʿArafāt’s decision to back Iraqi dictator Ṣaddām Ḥusayn against 
the international coalition amassing against him.” 24  Joas Wagemakers 
divides these Palestinians into two main groups, one of which is the 
“Salafī-oriented Palestinians,  some of whom had spent time in 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 25 Amongst this group was al -Maqdisī, whose 
writings began to spread and reach a wide number of Salafīs in Jordan.  
The main concern of al -Maqdisī in his writ ings, as Lav notes,  was the 
question of takfīr of the rulers. 26 The reason for this is because until  al -
Maqdisī’s  arrival, Salafism in Jordan was predominantly a quietist  
movement. Al-Maqdisī, showing his discontent with the Salafī  setting, 
stated: “I found that  the views of Murjiʾah  have become widespread in 
this country these days.” 27 These Murjiʾah ,  from his point of view, were 
those scholars who did not pronounce takfīr  on modern rulers that 
abandoned sharīʿah  in favour of manmade laws.  
Thus, when al -Ḥalabī published his first book al-Taḥdhīr  in 1996, his 
main purpose was to denounce those who “hasten in declaring kufr  on 
modern-day rulers because of their failure to rule by sharīʿah .” 28  The 
question of declaring kufr  on the rulers, he argues, is  one of the most 
controversial  questions in present times and thus should be left  to the 
senior scholars to settle and not to those who “cast  doubts over the 
ʿulamāʾ ,  and slander them in order to weaken their credibili ty amongst 
the masses and [in turn]  to replace them as authorities.” 29  Al-Ḥalabī’s 
reference is to the Activists and Jihādīs  who were at  the time beginning 
to question some verdicts of the senior scholars on certain polit ical 
issues.  Some senior and many loyalist  scholars in Saudi Arabia also 
shared this concern at the time. Such concern is perfectly understandable 
given the horrific events perpetrated by the Jihādīs in the 1990s in 
Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere.  
However, any stance that opposes the takfīr  of the rulers who are seen as 
authoritarian could always be interpreted as a pro -regime position. 
Therefore, the Loyalists were also keen to clarify that their position was 
not merely political or intended to defend the governments;  rather it  is  
                                                     
25 Ibid. ,  41–42.  
26 Lav,  Radical  Is lam and the Revival  o f  Medieva l  Theology ,  136.  
27 Al-Maqdisī ,  Imtāʿ  a l -Naẓar ,  2 .  
28 Al-Ḥalabī ,  al-Taḥth īr  min Fi tnat  al -Takfīr ,  6 .  
29 Ibid.  
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induced by their compassion, and their keenness to serve the interest of 
the nation. Al-ʿAnbarī, for instance, asserts this motivation in his 
introduction to the fifth edition (2005) of his book, which  was amongst 
the first  books by the Loyalists to elucidate their position regarding 
present-day rulers. He affirms that his willingness to expound on the 
matter is “for the good of people in order to avoid turmoil , bloodshed, 
setbacks…that usually follow declaring takfīr  on the rulers unjustly…” 30  
Nevertheless, had al -Ḥalabī published the transcription of al -Albānī with 
the comments made by Ibn Bāz and Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn  without adding his 
own comments and preface,  perhaps the whole debate over īmān  and kufr  
would not have occurred or at least , would not have generated the same 
degree of controversy. In fact,  the transcription of al -Albānī’s verdict as 
well as the comments of Ibn Bāz were already published in 1995, a few 
months before al -Ḥalabī published his book, in two magazines:  al-
Majallah as-Salafīyyah  and Majallat  al-Muslimūn .  Later on, another 
Salafī  called Abū Lūz, in a book that also bears the same name - Fitnat 
al-Takfīr  - published them together with the comments of Ibn  al-
ʿUthaymīn, along with a compilation of verdicts by other senior scholars 
on the question of takfīr  in general. However, none of these works was 
criticised by the Jihādīs or Activists. This is because unlike al -Ḥalabī’s,  
the main work of Abū Lūz in his book was merely a collection an d 
edition; Abū Lūz did not offer much by way of interpretation. The 
different level of reaction to the two works indicate that the controversy 
is not over the position taken by senior scholars against the takfīr  of the 
ruler, as their opinions were already well  known, but rather that  the 
disagreement is  regarding the reasoning and religious foundation upon 
which they oppose declaring takfīr  in such cases. For this reason the 
disagreement shifted from the takfīr  of the ruler who rules according to 
manmade laws to more profound debates on the nature of īmān  and kufr .  
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The Loyalists’ Two Criteria of Takfīr 
Moreover, believing that  their opponents have drifted away from the 
Salafī posit ion on manmade laws, the Loyalists sought to refute their 
opponents’ view by  providing detailed accounts of what constitutes  kufr  
and when one ceases to be a Muslim. Al -ʿAnbarī  for instance, devoted 
half of his book to this purpose. Similarly,  al -Ḥalabī spent considerable 
time on this issue in his introduction to Fitnat al-Takfīr  and in his 
Ṣayḥat Nathīr ,  before publishing further books to defend his position on 
the concept of īmān .   
To explain when one ceases to be a Muslim; both authors cite Ibn al -
Qayyim’s typology of major kufr ,  which includes six categories:  
1-  Kufr of  takdhīb  (outright rejection): this case occurs when one is 
completely unconvinced by Islam in his heart and expresses this 
conviction clearly with his tongue. Examples of this are atheists 
and those who profess other religions (while rejecting the 
prophesy of the Prophet  Muhammad).  
2-  Kufr of  juḥūd (denial): This is  the case when one is certain in his 
heart that Islam is the truth, yet denies this conviction with his 
tongue. This juḥūd  can either be in terms of the religion of Islam 
as a whole or at the level of denying one of its obligations.  
Examples of this are those Jews at  the time of the Prophet who 
admitted that he is  a Prophet  but refused to submit to Islam; also a 
person who accepts Islam and yet denies that Islam commands 
Muslims to fast  the month of Ramaḍān.  
3-  Kufr of  ʿinād  (stubbornness or abstinence):  this applies to those 
who deep down in their hearts are convinced by the message of 
Islam and that  Muhammad is a messenger sent by God and who 
also affirm this conviction by the tongue (i.e. they do not deny or 
reject  anything).  Yet, they refuse to submit and surrender to its  
commandments. The examples given for this type are the examples 
of Iblīs and Abū Ṭālib, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, as 
explained in the following statement by Ibn Taymiyyah:  
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When Iblīs refrained from the prostration (to Adam)  as  he was 
commanded to do, he did not deny that  this command was an 
obligation as he was addressed directly by Allāh,  but he turned 
away out of arrogance and became amongst kāfirūn .  Likewise,  the 
case of Abū Ṭālib;  he believed (kāna muṣaddiqan)  what the 
messenger  told him but he did not  follow him out  of fanaticism 
towards his own religion, fear of ignominy i f  he submitted, and out 
of arrogance. 31 
This type is also referred to as kufr of  istikbār  (arrogance) or ibāʾ  
(refusal).  
4-  Kufr of iʿrāḍ  (avoidance):  thi s case pertains to the persons who 
turn away from Islam completely neither accepting its message nor 
rejecting it .   
5-  Kufr of  nifāq (hypocrisy):  a hypocrite is the one who is not 
convinced by Islam in his heart , but exhibits Islam outwardly by 
declaring the Islamic testimony of faith and acting as a Muslim in 
order to either avoid getting harmed or to benefit from such status.  
6-  Kufr of  shakk (doubt): this case relates to those who have doubts 
about Islam or some of its  teachings or who are hesitant to accept 
it .  
Both authors then go on to expound on how ruling by manmade laws 
does not fit  in any of these types of major kufr .  Interestingly,  despite the 
fact that both authors arrive at the same conclusion —that  ruling by 
manmade laws does not cause major kufr  without the aforementioned 
conditions—they seem to have different views on when a Muslim 
becomes an apostate.  
As for al -Ḥalabī,  he tends to hold a much tighter cri terion in this matter. 
He restricts the causes of apostasy to two matters. (i)  iʿt iqād ,  which he 
further divides into two types: takdhīb  or juḥūd;  and (ii) istiḥlāl ,  which 
is to consider an impermissible act  to be permissible and vice versa. 32 He 
brings a number of quotes to support  this contention. One of these is  a 
statement by the famous ḥanafī  scho lar Abū Jaʿfar al -Ṭaḥāwī: “one does 
                                                     
31 Ibn Taymiyyah,  Majmūʿ  al -Fatāwā ,  20/57.  
32 Al-Ḥalabī ,  Ṣayḥat Nathīr bi  Kha ṭar al -Takf īr ,  39.  
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not become kāfir  …and since he became Muslim by accepting Islam 
likewise his apostasy does not occur unless he denies Islam.” 33  
Although, this view seems to be in contradiction with Ibn al -Qayyim’s 
typology of major kufr  mentioned above, since it only includes the first 
two types,  al-Ḥalabī, however, denies any contradiction. Instead, he 
builds on al -Ṭaḥāwī’s statement to dist inguish between the first  two 
categories and the other four, contending that the remaining catego ries 
are not related to the causes of apostasy in the case of Muslims, but they 
in fact , pertain to types of kufr  in the case of those who are originally 
non-Muslims (kāfir aṣlī).  He states:  
The one who is confirmed to be a  Muslim, he becomes external  
to the fold of Islam only by denying i t  ( i .e.  Islam) or rejecting 
i t .  As for the doubter,  the obstinate, the one who turns away,  
or the hypocrite,  such a person is inherently not Muslim. 34  
Essentially,  this criterion rejects the declaration of takfīr  on Muslims 
based on acts alone unless accompanied by either the condition of juḥūd  
or takdhīb .  The position of al-Ḥalabī is  even clearer when he lays down 
his principle regarding what he brands as “the ruling on abandoning 
acts” (al-ḥukm ʿalā al-matrūkāt).  He firmly proclaims that pronouncing 
takfīr  should not be based on the mere abandonment of an act, as this is 
the very view of Khawārij  rather that it  must be according to inner 
abandonment (al-tark al- iʿtiqādī). By al-tark al-iʿtiqādī  he means the 
abandonment tha t  is out of “ juḥūd  and renunciation ( takdhīb  or 
istiḥlāl).” 35  
Based on this perception of takfīr ,  al-Ḥalabī starts building his 
arguments against his opponents on the question of manmade laws. In 
one of these arguments that are related directly to the ques tion of ruling 
by anything other than sharīʿah  law, al-Ḥalabī cites the following 
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34 Ibid,  9 .   
35 Ibid,  27.  
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statement of Ibn Taymiyyah as a confirmation for his view. The 
statement reads:   
Many people embrace Islam yet  despite that  they only rule 
according to the tradit ional customs that  are put by their  
leaders.  If  such people know  that  it  is  not permissible to rule 
except by what Allah has revealed, yet  they do not abide by i t  
( lam yaltazimū dhālik ) ,  rather they have made it  permissible  
( istaḥallū)  to rule according to what oppose s the revelation of 
Allah, then they are kuffār .  Otherwise they are ignorants . 36 
Al-Ḥalabī puts the same words in bold as a proof that  Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
words are in accordance with his own cri terion of takfīr .  He then argues 
that Ibn Taymiyyah made it clear that the bases for declaring takfīr  on 
the ruler who does not rule according to Islamic principles are these 
three conditions: maʿrifah (knowledge), iʿtiqād  ( inner belief) and 
istiḥlāl, in  the absence of these conditions,  such an act does not imply 
kufr but rather that the perpetrator is  merely ignorant. 37 
Unlike this strict and narrow criterion for deciding when a Muslim 
ceases from being a Muslim and becomes kāfir ,  al-ʿAnbarī’s view on the 
causes of apostasy is fairly broader. The difference between the tw o men 
can be narrowed down to two points.  First,  al -ʿAnbarī does not restrict 
the causes of apostasy to juḥūd ,  ist iḥlāl  and takdhīb  but he also adds the 
cases of obstinacy, avoidance and doubt. 38 In fact , al -ʿAnbarī  considers 
this point  to be the first of three important religious principles:  
A Muslim does not become kāfir  except by committing one type of 
major kufr…meaning by rejecting something that  is known by 
necessity in Islam, or  not complying by i t  out of obstinacy, aversion 
or arrogance, even if  such  a person is muṣaddiq  (has factual  belief) . 
Or by turning away,  neither believing i t  or denying i t ,  or by 
remaining in doubt and uncertainty about i t . 39 
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37 Al-Ḥalabī ,  al-Taḥth īr  min Fi tnat  al -Takfīr ,  16.  
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The second point of divergence is related to whether outwardly acts can 
be indicative of what is in one ’s heart. In other words,  is it  possible to 
determine whether an action has been done out of juḥūd  for instance, 
without the need for verbal or written confession by the perpetrator?  
For al-ʿAnbarī , although he concedes that  those types of kufr  signify 
various conditions in one’s heart , he holds that they can also be 
demonstrated by one’s outwardly acts. 40 His view entirely contradicts al -
Ḥalabī’s affirmation in Ṣayḥat Nadhīr  that inner kufr  be it together with 
juḥūd  or any other condition cannot be demonstr ated by outwardly acts 
alone. In fact , al -Ḥalabī considers the view that outwardly acts 
demonstrate what is  in the heart,  to be “the wide -open door for the 
thought of Khawārij .”41 
However,  despite their distinct  criteria of takfīr ,  al -Ḥalabī and al -
ʿAnbarī  do not seem to have had any conflict against each other.  On the 
contrary, al -Ḥalabī praises the latter’s book and states that he benefited 
from it but without any mention of this dissimilarity that  we have 
discussed here. This is a clear indication that th e question of what 
constitutes īmān  and kufr  is not the central  aim for the Loyalists’ anti -
takfīr  writings but rather that  it  is  the question of manmade laws that 
they are concerned with.  
Outwardly Acts Can Cause kufr 
That said, one may think that since t he two criteria lead to the same 
conclusion, then the difference between them should not matter.  
However, when this difference is put and understood within the context 
of the debates and how it  affects the arguments of their opponents in 
regard to the question of manmade laws, this difference becomes very 
important. This is to say that  as explained in the previous chapter, the 
protagonists of the takfīr  view differentiate between the systematic 
application of manmade laws, as in the form of secular constitutions that  
replace the laws of Islam, and any incidental ruling by something other 
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than sharīʿah .  The former form is regarded to be a major kufr  based on 
the argument that  such act is  an indication that  the perpetrator prefers 
such laws to sharīʿah .  The criterion of al -Ḥalabī does not allow room for 
such argument while al -ʿAnbarī’s does.  
Broadly speaking, in spite of their agreement on the questio n of 
manmade laws, the elaborations by al -ʿAnbarī on the concept of kufr  and 
takfīr  are closer to the views of his opponents than they are to al -
Ḥalabī’s. This can be attributed to al -ʿAnbarī’s religious training, which 
unlike al-Ḥalabī, he received in Saudi institutions. As mentioned earlier,  
Saudi educational institutions give the study of ʿaqīdah  much greater 
importance compared to other religious disciplines such as fiqh  and 
ḥadīth .  Additionally,  the elaborations of Ibn Taymiyyah on the question 
of īmān  and takfīr  are deeply taught and widely adopted in Saudi 
academia. The same cannot be said about the Jordanian Salafī  milieu —in 
which al-Ḥalabī and his fellow Salafīs are based—that is known to focus 
on studying the field of ḥadīth .  The impress of al -Albānī on the 
epistemological framework of Jordanian Salafism as distinct from the 
theological  emphasis of the Saudis plays a significant role in the 
alternate conclusions that both parties draw in this dispute.  
Moreover,  instead of taking the same short path as al-Ḥalabī, of 
completely rejecting the possibility of kufr  based on acts alone, al -
ʿAnbarī  takes a different line of argumentation against  their common 
opponents.  The bottom line of his argument is to prove that the 
application of manmade laws (as an ac t) does not belong to the category 
of acts of major kufr .  In order to do so, he first reiterates that the 
teachings of Salafism divide outwardly sinful acts into two types;  a type 
that takes one out from Islam completely and that applies to those acts 
that  indicate the presence of denial, rejection, arrogance, or any of the 
other kufr  in the heart.  The second type of sinful  acts does not take one 
out of the religion unless accompanied with denial  or rejection. He then 
moves on to prove that the action of replacing sharīʿah  by manmade laws 
belongs to the second type and not the first . And so, he provides 
numerous quotes from classical and modern scholars proclaiming the 
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existence of a consensus amongst them that  ruling by something other 
than sharīʿah  does not cause kufr  unless accompanied by the necessary 
conditions of juḥūd  and istiḥlāl .  
Choosing this path of argument means that  al -ʿAnbarī  does not entirely 
reject the idea that certain outwardly acts can nullify one’s īmān ,  as al-
Ḥalabī does. Rather,  he rejects the argument of their opponents that the 
act of applying manmade laws instead of sharīʿah  falls under the first 
type of sinful acts.  And this is the very point that  separates him from 
these opponents.  
The root of this divergence rests in the opponents’ content ion that  
abstaining from implementing sharīʿah  implies several types of kufr ,  and 
the contention of al -ʿAnbarī  that  this view is “extremism.” This 
extremism, from his point of view, reveals misunderstanding of the 
established typology of kufr ,  based on the teachings of the salaf .  As an 
example of this misunderstanding he focuses on kufr  of ʿinād ,  which his 
opponents as he claims, deem to be the “mere abstaining from a religious 
duty” and this misapprehension of the doctrine of kufr is what makes 
them view the omission of a sharīʿah  rule to be kufr  of ʿinād .  He argues 
in contrast:  
kufr  of ʿinād  does not  pertain to the case of  mere abstaining ( laysa 
mujarrad al - imtināʿ)  from a religious duty while affirming i ts 
obligation (maʿa al- iqrār bihā) .  Rather,  i t  must be accompanied by 
hatred for the truth, aversion and arrogance. 42 
The Opposing View 
After the publication of the anti -takfīr  books, and the involvement of al -
Ḥalabī in most of them, it  is  not a surprise to find him turning into the 
main target for the subscribers of the opposite views. Al -Ḥalabī himself 
anticipated some responses as he clearly alludes to this in his 
introduction 43 but he did not expect these responses to come from people 
who until that  time were st ill  considered to be on the same side. In the  
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early editions of al-Taḥdhīr ,  it  is obvious that al -Ḥalabī’s quarrels and 
arguments are directed primarily against  the Jihādīs  including al-Ṭarṭūsī ,  
al-Maqdisī and Abū Qatādah, whom he mentioned by name. 44 Only, in the 
later editions,  al -Ḥalabī started directing his arguments against a wider 
range of opponents that  includes even the PCRV scholars.  
One of those people from whom al -Ḥalabī was not expecting any 
cri ticism is Abū Ruḥayyim who was at that time considered to be part of 
the same circle of “Jordanian quietist Salafī  scholars” as opposed to the 
circle of al -Maqdisī and the Jihādīs . 45 Abū Ruḥayyim and al -Ḥalabī who 
were st ill  on talking terms at the time agreed to meet and debate the 
cri tiques levelled by the former against  some theological stances 
addressed in al-Ḥalabī’s book al-Taḥdhīr .  The debate,  which would later 
become the cornerstone in the schism within “Jordanian quietist Salafīs”,  
took place in 1997 in the house of Muhammad Ibrahim Abū Shaqrah, 
another Salafī scholar from the same circle. At t he time, Abū Shaqrah as 
Wagemakers and Lav note “was widely seen as the most senior Salafī 
shaykh in Jordan after al -Albanī.” 46 And hence, both agreed on him to be 
the arbitrator and the moderator of the debate. The debate which lasted a 
couple of hours ended up with Abū Shaqrah siding with Abū Ruḥayyim 
against al-Ḥalabī as a result of what he later described as Abū 
Ruḥayyim’s “superior proof, his eloquence and the exactness of his 
knowledge.” 47 
Nonetheless, this debate that was intended to rectify the emergi ng rift in 
this circle of “quietist Salafīs” resulted in the exact opposite. Just few 
months later, Abū Ruḥayyim published his criticism in a book under the 
title Taḥdhīr  al-Ummah min Taʿlīqāt al -Ḥalabī ʿalā aqwāl al -Aʾimmah 
(Warning the Muslim Community against the comments of al-Ḥalabī on 
the Statements of the Scholars) to which, Al -Ḥalabī replied by authoring 
Ṣayḥat Nadhīr .  It  is  not known whether the two authors have met or 
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spoken to each other after the debate but what is certain is that  both 
continued to refute each other’s views and exchange accusations and 
later were joined by others. At this point, it  became very clear that the 
differences over īmān  and kufr  are not merely a contention between 
Jihādīs and non-Jihādīs over revolting against the ruler ,  but there was 
clearly something else going on.  
The existing secondary sources dealing with these disputes within the 
quietist Jordanian Salafīs propose two different motives behind this 
schism. The first  account confines it  to the different theological  s tances 
on the question of īmān ,  kufr  without any mention to any other motives. 48 
The second disagrees, contending that the causes of the conflict 
“originate less in theological and doctrinal  differences than in conflicts 
over religious authority.” 49 The contention of this second view is based 
on the assumption that the theological stances taken by Abū Ru ḥayyim 
and later adopted by Abū Shaqrah are not completely alien to the 
teaching of Salafism. This is to say that  these stances do not represent 
the views of the Jihādīs alone—whom Al-Ḥalabī and co. regard as 
fallacious and not Salafīs—  but are also the views of the senior scholars 
in Saudi Arabia who are,  along with al -Albānī,  revered by quietist  
Salafīs in Jordan. As such, this account argues, since Abū Ru ḥayyim and 
Abū Shaqrah advocate a view on kufr  that  is  approved by some senior 
scholars then that should be enough evidence for their opponents that 
they are not upon a deviant creed as the Jihādīs. Hence, their 
discontentment with them that  is the basis of t he rift  is  not driven by 
theological differences but by something else. 50 
Although, there is  no doubt that “Salafīs are quite human” who can be 
driven and motivated by “ambition, leadership and perhaps even plain 
and simple vanity”,  as this account conclude s,  it  is  not clear why this 
should be the case for all contestants in these debates. Take for instance 
the case of Abū Shaqrah. If we suppose that  he had leadership ambitions 
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then why would he change his position since he was already regarded as 
the second most important scholar after al -Albānī? Would it  not be more 
sensible from his side to continue with the same views, especially given 
that  most Jordanian Salafīs—upon whom Shaqrah was seeking 
leadership—belong to the quietist branch that focuses on al-taṣfiyah wa 
al-tarbiyah  (purification and education)? 51  Surely leadership cannot be 
the motive for such a change of heart especially with the potential  
dangerous polit ical implications of his new views on īmān  and kufr  that 
could possibly cost him the freedom he had always enjoyed.  
Nevertheless, the question that arises here is why Abū Shaqrah “did not 
start distancing himself explicitly from al -Albānī’s views on faith (and 
certainly not by labelling such views as “murjiʾī”) until after the latter’s 
death?” 52 To answer this question we need to look at the chronological  
context of all  of these disputes.  As mentioned earlier, the dispute over 
īmān  started with the publication of Shukrī’s Iḥkām al-Taqrīr  in 1993, 
which was directed against  the Jihādīs. However,  apar t  from one 
response by a relatively unknown Saudi Salafī  author, 53 the book did not 
really generate as great disputes as the later publications. This is  maybe 
due to the fact that Shukrī himself was an unknown scholar at the time or 
maybe because he “repented” soon after the publication of his book if we 
are to believe the aforementioned accounts about the discussions he held 
in Saudi Arabia. 54 
It  is only after the publication of al -Ḥalabī’s al-Taḥdhīr  that the 
responses started flowing from different angles,  from the Jihādīs and 
non-Jihādīs,  which finally led to his debate with Abū Ru ḥayyim in 1997, 
two years before the death of al -Albānī. Thus, we are talking about a  
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period of two years for someone like Abū Shaqrah in his mid -sixties to 
change major theological  stances,  which he spent decades teaching and 
defending. 55 Such change would naturally going to need some time to be 
established, especially when we take into consideration the fact that this 
change was on a vital issue such as ʿaqīdah ,  and his new opinion would 
go against the view of a highly venerated senior scholar like al -Albānī.  
After all,  even if Abū Shaqrah was convinced by the arguments levelled 
by Abū Ruḥayyim against al -Ḥalabī during the debate, the former is  
hardly a match for al -Albānī in terms of knowledge and status.   
Hence, it  is  almost certain that  Abū  Shaqrah in that two years period 
before the death of al -Albānī has been in a state of intellectual 
revisionism. He was pondering and mulling over his views, which he had 
always believed to be the Salafī creed on īmān  and kufr ,  and the 
objections levelled by Abū Ruḥayyim. These revisions became 
convictions only when the other venerated senior scholars expressed 
their opinions in a series of verdicts 56 against several books in support  of 
his old views, including the two books of al -Ḥalabī and the book of al -
ʿAnbarī . The language used in these verdicts was direct and very precise, 
not only accusing these books of supporting the creed of Murjiʾah  but 
also stating that  the authors and publishers of t hese books must “repent 
to Allāh” and “thrive to learn religious knowledge at the hands of 
trustworthy scholars.” 57 Only one of these verdicts however, was issued 
before the death of al -Albānī and that  is  the verdict  against  the book of 
Shukrī in June 1998. 58 
The weight of these verdicts within the Salafī  circles should not be 
overlooked as can be demonstrated by the reaction of al -Ḥalabī himself 
to the first verdict against the book of Shukrī, a book whose publication 
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he himself had been involved with.  Soon after the verdict , al -Ḥalabī 
distanced himself from the book stating that  it  represented the views of 
its author and not his. This, despite the fact that  it  was written on the 
front of the book that it  was “read, revised and published by al -Ḥalabī” 
according to various reports. 59  This reaction by al -Ḥalabī shows the 
supremacy and power enjoyed by the Saudi senior scholars within the 
Salafī circles inside and outside Saudi Arabia.  This involvement of the 
PCRV, whose members are themselves politically quietist s and non-
militants, indicates that these charges of irjāʾ  do not just denote political  
quietism only but also to doctrinal differences.   
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Why Neo-Murjiʾah? 
In September 2000, the PCRV issued its  verdict banning the two books 
of al-Ḥalabī and deeming the views “he added to the sayings of scholars 
in the introduction and commentaries” 60 to be based on the creed of the 
Murjiʾah. This is remarkable,  “given that  much of the book actually 
consists of the statements of al -Albānī, Ibn Bāz and Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn,” 
as Lav rightly notes. 61  Although the verdict is very concise,  the 
cri ticisms levelled against al -Ḥalabī are very similar to those put 
forward by the Jihādīs like al -Maqdis ī  and non -Jihādīs like Abū 
Ruḥayyim. They all revolve around al-Ḥalabī’s criterion for takfīr ,  
which they believe represents a restriction of apostasy to the kufr  in the 
heart at the exclusion of outwardly acts. The only difference between 
these critics is the tone in which they were expressed. Whereas the 
PCRV chose to address their objections as advice, albeit rather severe,  
the others are highly polemical and have no hesitation to say outright 
that al-Ḥalabī is a murjiʾī .  The two main points in most of the debates 
that followed these between al -Ḥalabī,  his supporters and detractors,  
were about the relation between outwardly acts and īmān .  The first point 
related to the Loyalists’ criteria of takfīr  and the second pertained to 
whether outwardly acts were a condition for the validity or the 
perfection of īmān .  
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The Criteria of Takfīr 
The firs t point of criticism pertains to the criteria of takfīr  adopted by 
the Loyalists which, according to their critics, 62  are based on the 
teachings of the Murjiʾah  for the Loyalists fail to address the 
interrelation between outwardly acts and īmān  of the heart .  As mentioned 
before in this chapter, the Loyalists have two criteria of takfīr ;  (i)  a 
restrictive one adopted by al -Ḥalabī,  which rejects the idea that  inner 
kufr ,  be it juḥūd  or any other condition, can be demonstrated by 
outwardly acts alone and (ii)  al-ʿAnbarī’s less restrictive cri terion that 
is closer to their critics’ than to al -Ḥalabī’s.  For this reason, it  is no 
surprise then to find that  the harshest  critiques over īmān  and kufr  are 
directed more towards al -Ḥalabī than al -ʿAnbarī. For instance, the 
verdict  of the PCRV against  the book of al -ʿAnbarī  does not mention the 
question of irjāʾ  at all.  In reality,  i ts main condemnation is over 
“twisting” text proofs and the statements of the scholars on the matter of 
manmade laws, while in the case of al -Ḥalabī, their verdict  is explicit, 
describing his books as “based on the invalid and innovated madhhab  of 
Murjiʾah.”63 
Essentially,  unlike the criterion of al -ʿAnbarī, the criterion of al -Ḥalabī 
did not receive much support  even within the loyalist  ranks a nd as such, 
it  did not survive for long. This is  especially true after the verdicts of 
the PCRV were issued. In fact , there is  enough evidence to support  the 
idea that even al -Ḥalabī gradually changed his position to adopt the 
criterion of al -ʿAnbarī. His numerous writings published after the 
verdicts of the PCRV, although aimed at  refuting the accusations of irjāʾ  
levelled against  him, also contain a very different criterion to the one he 
set out in his previous books. For instance, the third edition of al -
Ḥalabī’s book al-Taḥthīr ,  which was published in mid 2002, two years 
after the PCRV verdict,  contained significant amendments.  The sections 
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in which his restricted criterion of takfīr  was clearly defined were either 
omitted completely or amended to expand  the causes of kufr  to include 
outwardly acts.  For example,  al -Ṭaḥāwī’s statement, upon which he built 
his contention that only two of Ibn al -Qayyim’s categories of major kufr  
can cause apostasy,  was omitted completely. 64 Instead, al -Ḥalabī added 
clear statements that  apostasy is not restricted to juḥūd  and takdhīb ,  as 
unequivocally expressed in the following quote:  “An apostate is he who 
left the religion of Is lam into kufr  by an act,  word, belief or doubt.” 65 
Likewise, his principle regarding the declaratio n of takfīr ,  based on acts 
of omission which restricted to juḥūd ,  renunciation, takdhīb  and ist iḥlāl ,  
was expanded by appending the following expression to his existing 
statement:  “or other types of major kufr .”66 
Although al -Ḥalabī rejects the importance o f these changes, 67  they 
nevertheless represent an implicit recognition of the non -Salafī nature of 
his former criterion. Indeed, it  seems that  al -Ḥalabī’s eagerness to find 
religious justifications for the Loyalists’ subservient stance towards the 
state in his previous books led him to overlook the salient feature of Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s argument against  the Murjiʾah ,  that is , his assert ion that 
the Murjiʾah  exclude outwardly acts from the essence of īmān .  In other 
words,  they reject  the idea that outwardly acts can cause kufr .  In point  of 
fact , this change in al -Ḥalabī’s criterion of takfīr  perfectly supports 
Lav’s observation that the vigorous quietism of the Loyalists “is more a 
construct of this period of ferment than a smooth continuation of 
classical Wahhabism.” 68 
Nonetheless, the criterion of al -ʿAnbarī which was later adopted by al -
Ḥalabī and most of the Loyalists did also receive i ts share of criticism, 
although to a lesser degree. This is  despite the fact  that  it  is based on a 
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more demanding threshold for īmān  and an expansive standard for the 
causes of kufr .  These criticisms, as well as the Loyalists’ counter 
criticisms, stem mainly from different understandings of Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s theory of the interrelationship between outwardly acts and 
īmān  of the heart . The basis of this theory is that each religious duty 
implies three fundamental  principles:  (i) iqrār  or taṣdīq  (affirmation or 
belief) (ii)  ilt izām  (adherence or commitment) and (iii)  ʿamal al-ẓāhir  
(outwardly acts). 69  The first principle implies that one  must have the 
belief and affirmation in the heart that  the duty is  binding. That is  the 
belief that a certain act is permissible or forbidden. The second principle 
refers to the adherence of the heart  to this duty,  which involves the 
acceptance of the duty and abidance with it.  The locus of these two 
principles is  the heart  unlike the third principle which refers to 
performing the duty outwardly.  For instance, the religious duty regarding 
the consumption of alcohol implies: firstly, the necessity of the be lief 
and the affirmation that drinking alcohol is forbidden, secondly, that 
Muslims must adhere to this religious injunction and commit to it .  
Thirdly,  Muslims must actually abstain from drinking alcohol in their 
daily lives.  
As such, there are three ways in which Muslims can fall short of 
fulfilling a religious duty.  The Salafīs agree on their evaluation of two 
of these ways/cases and disagree over the third. They agree that the 
failure to fulfil  the first  principle causes kufr .  Hence, denying that  
drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam takes the perpetrator out of the 
fold of Islam. Also, they agree that the mere failure to fulfil the third 
principle does not cause kufr  as long as the first two principles are met. 
Hence, a Muslim who consumes alcohol while havin g iqrār  and il tizām  
in the heart is  a sinful Muslim, not kāfir .  The second principle, namely 
the absence of iltizām  of the heart  is where the disagreement rests.  
However,  the disagreement is not whether the absence of ilt izām  of the 
heart can cause kufr  or not as they all  follow Ibn Taymiyyah view that it  
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does. The disagreement is over how the presence or absence of iltizām  
can be determined. In other words,  since iltizām  is  a state of the heart, 
what type of outwardly manifestation can be recognised as an ex pression 
of this state? This case of the absence of iltizām  in one’s heart  is also 
known as imtināʿ  (abstention) and all Salafīs consider it  as falling under 
the category of kufr of  ʿinād ;  nonetheless they have two distinct views 
on how it can be recognised and determined.  
The Loyalists again are more restrict ive,  as they believe that  the mere 
outwardly abstention from performing a religious duty can never be 
considered as a manifestation of the case of imtināʿ . 70  Instead, they 
stipulate that  the abstention must be out of arrogance or hatred for the 
truth or the Prophet.   
kufr  of ʿinād  does not apply to the one who merely abstain from 
performing commandments as long as he affirms [belief in] them, 
rather that  must be accompanied by despise and hatred for  the truth 
and must be done out of arrogance. 71 
Thus, al though in theory the Loyalists’ criteria of takfīr  acknowledge 
and adopt the idea that  outwardly acts can cause kufr  and can be an 
indication of kufr  in the heart, they do in fact stipulate the presence of 
other inner conditions with these acts.  In other words,  outwardly acts can 
be an indication of the absence of il tizām  but only when the motive 
behind these acts is arrogance and hatred for the religion or part of i t .  As 
such, this view takes the cause of kufr  back to one’s heart which raises 
the question again:  how it  can be determined that an outwardly act  is  
performed out of arrogance or hatred? This is precisely the reason why 
the critics of the Loyalists believe that  the understanding of the 
Loyalists is based on the Murjiʾah’s perception of īmān  and kufr  and not 
Salafism. 
For the critics, the absence of iltizām  in one’s heart  can be simply 
determined by certain outwardly acts of omission regardless of the inner 
motives behind them. This is not to say that all outwardl y acts of 
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omission establish or prove the absence of ilt izām .  Rather, there are 
certain types of outwardly acts that  can not be performed by a person 
who has ilt izām  in the heart even if this person claims otherwise.  The 
cri tics distinguish between occasio nal or even frequent failure to fulfil  a 
religious duty (muṭlaq al-tark) and total abstention or abandonment of 
performing that duty (al-tark al-muṭlaq). The first type does not indicate 
that the culprit has no commitment in the heart unlike the second typ e 
that  cannot emerge from a person who has iltizām  in his/her heart . 72 
This view is the main basis for the distinction the critics of the Loyalists 
make between the case of incidental failure to rule by sharīʿah  and the 
implementation of a manmade system of  laws. The first act, though a 
violation of the religious duty to rule by sharīʿah ,  it  does not necessari ly 
imply that the perpetrator has no adherence or commitment to rule by 
sharīʿah  in the heart. As such, it  can not be regarded as kufr  without 
further investigation of the motives. On the other hand, the abolition of 
sharīʿah  as source for decrees represents a decisive indication that  such 
person has no adherence or commitment in the heart to rule by it.  That is 
because,  if the ruler has the commitment and the will  in the heart  to rule 
by sharīʿah ,  he would never implement manmade laws or if he was 
appointed after the implementation of manmade laws, he would at least, 
strive to re-establish the rule of sharīʿah .  Without this, the systematic 
implementation of manmade laws indicates that  the ruler is  content with 
them. 73 
The Loyalists’ rejection of this distinction is based on their perception 
of the systematic implementation of manmade laws to be similar to the 
case of a judge who repeatedly fails to rule in  accordance with 
sharīʿah . 74  In other words,  the Loyalists believe that since incidental  
failure to rule by sharīʿah  does not cause kufr ,  then it does not matter 
how often this failure reoccurs. Thus, for the Loyalists, the act itself has 
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no real  effect on one’s status as a  Muslim without certain conditions in 
the heart  such as ist iḥlāl ,  juḥūd ,  arrogance and hatred. For this reason, 
they believe that declaring takfīr  based on the mere act of implementing 
manmade laws is the view of Khawārij  and not Salafism. 75 
On the other hand, the crit ics believe that  although the Loyalists 
champion the correct Salafī definitions of īmān ,  kufr  and takfīr ,  they do 
in practice adopt the views of the Ashʿarīs  who do not consider any 
outwardly act  to be kufr  unless accompanied by the conditions of the 
heart. 76 This belief is  further fostered by the Loyalists’ contention that 
the category of outwardly acts ( j ins al-ʿamal) is  a condition for the 
perfection of īmān  (shar ṭ  kamāl) and not for its  validity (shar ṭ  ṣiḥḥah . )  
Acts between the Validity and Perfection of Īmān 
The dispute over the question of jins al-ʿamal  became a great point of 
contention in the intra -Salafī debates after the publication of al -Ḥawālī’s 
book Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  in 1996. Essentially,  the view of al -Ḥawālī  
regarding this point can be summarised in the following statement:  
Abandoning the four pil lars and all  outwardly acts is kufr  outwardly 
and inwardly.  Since i t  is  an abandonment of  the category of actions 
( l iʾannahu tarkun l i  j insi  al -ʿamal)  which consti tutes a pil lar of the 
composite reali ty of īmān ,  and without which this reali ty does not 
exist .77 
He further argues that only the Murjiʾah  believed that īmān  of the heart 
(speech and acts of the heart) is enough for a person to be a Muslim 
without having the category of outwardly acts . This view basically,  is 
shared by most Salafīs including a number of the Loyalists especially in 
Saudi Arabia. 78  The holders of this view also believe that  there is  a  
                                                     
75 Ibid ,  57.  
76 Abu Ruḥayyim, Ḥaqīqat al -Khilā f  bayna a l -Salafiyyah al -Sharʿ iyyah  wa 
Adʿiyāʾ ihā f ī  Masāʾi l  a l - Īmān ,  20,27.  
77 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhirat  al - ʾ ir jāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr al - I s lāmī ,  656.  
78 Discussions on this quest ion on the websi tes run by Saudi Loyal is t s  ind ica te great  
disagreements and confusion amongst  them.  So me of them supported the PCRV and 
opposed the views of a l -Ḥalabī  fro m the star t  and others supported him ini t ial ly,  and  
then turned  against  him af ter  mid -2000s.  Nowadays,  i t  seems that  only a  few Saudi 
Loyal is t s  are  s t i l l  support ing the views of a l -Ḥalabī  on the questions o f īmān .  
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consensus amongst the salaf  on this question and thus, whoever 
disagrees with this view has (whether he is aware of it  or not) fallen in 
the misconception of Murjiʾah . 79 
However,  al-Ḥalabī and his close circle do not seem to agree with this 
view, insisting instead that  there is  no consensus amongst the salaf  on 
this matter and that  the salaf  in fact , had different views in regards to 
the abandonment of the four pillars of Islam and outwardly acts. Some of 
the salaf  held that the abandonment of any of the four pillars is kufr  and 
some of them considered only the abandonment of prayer to be kufr .  
However,  there are also amongst the salaf  who believed that only the 
abandonment of the testimony of Islam is cause for kufr . 80 As such, the 
view that īmān  of the heart  with the testimony of Islam is enough for a 
person to be a Muslim without having the category of outwardly acts is  
in fact one of the views of the salaf  and not the view of the Murjiʾah .81 
In other words, al -Ḥalabī and his circle believe that īmān  consists of (i) 
a foundation (aṣl) which includes the īmān  of the heart  (speech and acts 
of the heart) and (ii) a branch ( farʿ) which refers to outwardly acts. To 
be considered Muslim, it  is enough to have the aṣl  because outwardly 
acts are not a condition for the validity of īmān ,  but only a condition for 
its perfection (shar ṭ  kamāl). 82  Thus, for the holders of this view, the 
absence of outwardly acts may decrease īmān  but it  does not nullify it .   
In spite of the fact  that  al -Ḥalabī and his supporters quote a number of 
statements by Ibn Taymiyyah in order to support their view, their cri tics 
believe that their view is just  another proof that  al-Ḥalabī and his 
supporters are not able to distinguish the teachings of Salafism on īmān  
and kufr  from that of the Ashʿarīs . 83 As a matter of fact,  the view of al -
Ḥalabī and his supporters seems to be inconsistent with Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
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82 Ibid .  
83 Abū Ruḥayyim,  Ḥaqīqat  al -Khi lāf  Bayna a l -Sala fiyyah al -Sharʿ iyyah  wa 
Adʿiyāʾ ihā f ī  Masāʾi laAl - Īmān ,  19.  
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argument on the impossibility of the presence of valid īmān  in one’s 
heart without outwardly acts.  
It  has been clarified that  the  religion (dīn)  comprises of speech and 
acts.  And i t  is  unconceivable for a person to be a believer in God 
and His messenger with his/her heart  and tongue without having 
performed an outwardly duty,  no prayer,  no almsgiving, no fasting 
or any of the other dut ies.84 
In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that  the view of the possibility of the 
presence of īmān  in one’s heart without outwardly acts (acting upon it)  
is “the innovation of irjāʾ.”85 This raises the question of the true reasons 
behind the reluctance of al -Ḥalabī and his supporters to accept the view 
of senior scholars especially given that  a great number of Loyalists in 
Saudi Arabia rejected al -Ḥalabī’s view.  
According to Abū Ruḥayyim, the reason that led al -Ḥalabī and his 
supporters to this confusion is th eir reliance on certain late ḥadīth  
scholars who “usually do not expound on matters of creed according to 
the methodology of the pious salaf .  Their discourse on these issues lacks 
accuracy.” 86  One of these scholars for instance is the fifteenth -century 
scholar Ibn Ḥajar al -ʿAsqalānī (1372-  1449) whom the Salafīs criticise 
for holding a number of non-Salafī theological stances (mukhālafāt 
ʿaqāʾidiyyah ). 87 The most famous of these alleged non-Salafī theological  
stances is  his stance towards the question of God’ s attributes which all 
Salafīs believe i t to be an Ashʿarī  position.  
However, what is important for our purposes here is al -ʿAsqalānī’s view 
on īmān  to which Abū Ruḥayyim refers in his critiques against  al -Ḥalabī. 
This pertains to certain passages in al -ʿAsqalānī’s prominent book Fatḥ  
al-Bārī  in which he affirms that the salaf  considered acts to be part  of 
īmān .  However, similar to al -Ḥalabī he maintained that the salaf  did not 
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86 Abū Ruḥayyim,  Ḥaqīqat  al -Khi lāf  Bayna a l -Sala fiyyah al -Sharʿ iyyah  wa 
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mean that  outwardly acts are a condition for the validity of īmān ,  but 
only a condition for its perfectness.  
The difference between them (Muʿtazilah)  and the salaf  is  that  they 
considered acts to be a condition in i ts validity and the salaf  
deemed them to be a condition in i ts perfectness. 88 
Although there is no direct mention of al -ʿAsqalānī in either of the 
mentioned books of al -Ḥalabī,  Abū Ruḥayyim  may have a case in 
believing that these scholars had adopted the views of al -ʿAsqalānī.  
Indeed, in his commentary on one of al -Albānī’s books, al -Ḥalabī refers 
to this particular passage in Fatḥ  al-Bārī  as a support for al -Albānī’s 
assertion that  “all  good [outwardly]  acts are a condition for the 
perfection [of īmān]  in the view of ahl al-Sunnah  contrary to the 
Khawārij  and Muʿtazilah.” 89  Likewise,  in a later book he published in 
2000, al-Ḥalabī cites this passage as evidence against his critics to prove 
that  the absence of outwardly acts does not nullify īmān .  For him, since 
Ibn Bāz, who edited the book, did not underline any observation against 
it  therefore that means that Ibn Baz agrees th at  outwardly acts are only a 
condition for the perfectness of īmān . 90 
This is rather odd, given that in a number of other occasions, Ibn Bāz 
clearly rejects al -ʿAsqalānī’s statement, asserting that outwardly acts are 
“not a condition for the perfection of īmān  but a part of it .” 91 Also, al -
ʿAsqalānī’s position on īmān  has been cri ticised by a number of 
influential Wahhābī scholars. In fact ,  the cri tique of al -ʿAsqalānī’s 
position on īmān  goes back as early as Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself. 
According to his grandson ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥasan (1779-1868),  when 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb visited the city of al -Aḥsā in Saudi Arabia, he held 
a discussion with its  scholars in which:  
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He asked [the host]  to bring the first  volume of fatḥ  al-Bārī  to show 
him the error of al-ḥāf iẓ  ( i .e.  al -ʿAsqalānī)  on the question of īmān .  
He [then] explained to him how the Ashʿarīs  contradicted the 
textual tradit ions which al -Bukhārī  put as  t i t les in his book. 92  
Nevertheless, it  is almost certain that the dispute over this question 
stems from the dissimilar intellectual background that al -Ḥalabī and his 
foes belong to. As mentioned before, al -Ḥalabī’s intellectual  
preoccupation is chiefly in the field of ḥadīth  and prior to writ ing al-
Taḥthīr  he is not known to have written any works related to  ʿaq īdah .  In 
addition, before the 1990s, details on matters of īmān  and kufr  and the 
differences between Salafism and Ashʿarīs  and Māturīdīs  on them were 
not household topics within the Salafī  circles outside Saudi Arabia.  This 
is especially true with respect to the circle of al -Albānī in Jordan whose 
main concern, in addition to their preoccupation with the science of 
ḥadīth  and manuscript editing, had always been the question of the taqlīd  
of the four legal schools.  This is  not to say that  they did not consid er the 
field of ʿaqīdah  to be important, but their interest in  ʿaqīdah  at the time 
focused on the main points of divergences that  distinguish them from 
their classical foes namely the Ashʿarīs ,  Māturīdīs  and the Ṣūfīs .  This 
pertains to the question of God’ s attributes and the veneration of saints.  
After all,  Salafism in Jordan was not a dominant teaching force in the 
religious circles.  Therefore, its proponents were engaged in defending 
the very idea of Salafism first  before dwelling deeper into the details  of 
ʿaqīdah .  
On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia where Abū Ru ḥayyim undertook his 
postgraduate studies,  and where Salafism was dominant and its  teachings 
were flourishing, the case was different. As such, it  is  not hard to 
believe that al -Ḥalabī made a mistake;  missing the fact that it  was not 
only al-ʿAsqalānī’s position on God’s attributes that had been criticised 
by authoritative Salafī  scholars,  but also his views on īmān  and his very 
statement which al -Ḥalabī quoted to support al -Albānī.  
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Further, it  is worth mentioning here that al -Albānī’s statement and his 
books were also under scrutiny by a number of Activists and Jihādīs in 
this period, as will  be discussed in the next chapter.  Therefore, it  is 
likely that  al -Ḥalabī, in his attempt to defend his teacher’ s (al-Albānī) 
statement relied on al -ʿAsqalānī’s statements without knowing that it  has 
been cri ticised by other authoritative Salafī scholars.  The critiques by 
senior scholars put him in a difficult position as admitting that he was 
wrong in regard to this question of j ins al-ʿamal  would harm his 
credibility as a scholar given the sensitivity and importance of creed in 
the teachings of Salafism. We can speculate therefore,  that when al -
Ḥalabī did eventually realise his mistake, it  was too late for him to 
openly admit it ,  but his subsequent writ ings,  in which he tried to move 
past  his controversial statements, shows the seriousness with which 
Salafīs conduct their doctrinal debates.  
Summary  
Based on the discussion above, this chapter has shown that intra -Salafī  
dispute over what acts can/cannot take a Muslim out of the fold of Islam 
into kufr  has led to two main views: a restrictive view championed by a 
number of Loyalists close to al -Albānī’s student al -Ḥalabī,  and a less 
restrictive view held by senior scholars in Saudi Arabia, together with 
the Activists, the Jihādīs as well as a number of Saudi Loyalists. The 
latters’ view relies entirely on the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, whereas the 
former combines Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas with the ideas of a number of 
ḥadīth  scholars such as al -ʿAsqalānī and al -Ṭaḥāwī, on the basis of the 
somewhat mistaken belief that  these sources are in concurrence with 
each other.  
The senior scholars’ rejection of the Loyalists’ restrictive criteria of 
takfīr  highlights the highly doctrinal  process,  by which takfīr  is  defined 
in Salafism. This is to say that  although takfīr  can be at  times employed 
as a political weapon, it  is  not always the case. The practice of takfīr  in 
Salafism represents first  and foremost as an integral  aspect of their  
creed. Had  takfīr  been a mere political weapon, one would expect these 
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Senior Scholars,  who are known for their political  quietism and 
opposition to the Jihādīs,  to champion the views of the Loyalists or at 
least condone them. The fact that the senior sch olars issued numerous 
verdicts against  the books of the Loyalists, which in turn were directed 
against the Jihādīs and their violent acts against the state,  is  a clear 
indication that  the dispute over the question of takfīr  is not merely 
political but primarily theological . The dissatisfaction of senior scholars 
with the Loyalists’ views on takfīr  is so deep to the extent of crit icising 
even the Loyalists’ use of labels such turmoil or ideology to describe the 
practice of takfīr  in their books. The senior scholars insist  that takfīr  is 
an Islamic injunction that can not be labelled as such or simply ejected 
from the teachings of Islam.  
This chapter has also revealed that the views of the Loyalists on the 
questions of īmān  and kufr  are characterised by incons istency and 
vacillation, which suggests that they are more a construct of their desire 
to prove their stance on manmade laws than a conviction. Another 
plausible explanation for the Loyalists’ inconsistency and vacillation is 
certain statements of al -Albānī on these matters.  Al -Albānī, as the 
previous chapter has shown, was very clear in his arguments against the  
Jihādīs that the implementation of manmade laws is not major kufr .  In 
his arguments, al -Albānī uses the dichotomy of kufr iʿtiqādī  and kufr 
ʿamalī  to refer to major and minor kufr  respectively and he also states 
that  outwardly acts are a condition for the perfectness of īmān .  This led 
to the belief that he restricted major kufr  to the conditions of the heart to 
the exclusion of outwardly acts, which  in turn led his students to adopt 
this position and defend it .  Consequently,  al -Albānī himself became a 
target for the crit iques and accusations of irjāʾ  as examined in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Six: Al-Albānī and Irjāʾ 
Introduction 
It  has been mentioned earlier in th is study that al -Albānī,  along Ibn Bāz 
and al-ʿUthaymīn were the most prominent Salafī scholars in the 1990s. 
All Salafīs including the Jihādīs 1  acknowledge their highly status as 
knowledgeable scholars and appreciate their contributions to the growth 
of Salafism in present days. However, due to their different intellectual  
roots, the three scholars had different religious preoccupations. Ibn Bāz 
and al-ʿUthaymīn grew up in an environment in which the study of 
ʿaqīdah  and the writ ings of Ibn Taymiyyah represented the core of the 
curriculum. This environment influenced their religious preoccupation, 
focussing it on matters of ʿaqīdah .  On the other hand, al -Albānī “at the 
age of twenty, adhered to the Reformist tradition that was so fashionable 
among the “peripheral ʿulamāʾ” of Damascus.” 2  The focus of this 
tradition was the rejection of taqlīd  and the call  for a renewal of ijtihād .3 
This intellectual tradition led al -Albānī to focus on the science of 
ḥadīth ,  which eventually earned him the title of muḥaddīth a l-ʿaṣr  (the 
greatest scholar of ḥadīth  of the era).  This is  not to say that al -Albānī 
had no interest  in ʿaqīdah  or in the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah. Al -
Albānī has edited and published a number of manuscripts on ʿaqīdah  and 
of Ibn Taymiyyah, 4  but his status and reputation within Salafism, 
especially in Saudi Arabia, owes more to his knowledge of ḥadīth  and 
fiqh  than ʿaqīdah ,  especially when compared to Ibn Bāz and al -
ʿUthaymīn.   
Based on the above premises,  it  appears that  a number of al-Albānī’s 
views concerning matters of kufr  and īmān  have become a significant 
source of tension and dispute between the Salaf īs. In addition, given the 
abovementioned difference in specialisation  coupled with the fact that 
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most of the Loyalists who were accused of holding the  views of irjāʾ  
were close to the circle of al -Albānī in Jordan, it  was only a matter of 
time before al -Albānī’s views on īmān  and kufr  came under scrutiny. 
This is especially true given that both al -Ḥalabī and al-ʿAnbarī,  in 
defence of their own views on īmān  and kufr ,  claim that  al -Albānī had 
read their (criticised) books and agreed with them.  Therefore, it  is  
essential to discuss his position and the accusations of irjāʾ  levelled 
against him.  Hence, this chapter provides an account of the accusations 
of irjāʾ  levelled against al -Albānī and examines the views of this 
eminent scholar on the issues of īmān  and kufr ,  which, as we know, are 
directly associated with the matter of legitima cy of rulers in Salafī 
thought.   
Al-Ḥawālī’s Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ 
It  is believed that  the Activist scholar al -Ḥawālī was the first to start the 
accusations of irjāʾ  against al -Albānī.  This section offers an overview of 
al-Ḥawālī’s  key work on the subject - Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  -  and the main 
reasons behind these accusations.  
Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  was first published in Egypt in 1996, and republished in 
1999. Originally,  it  was a doctoral thesis which al -Ḥawālī submitted to 
the university of Umm al -Qurā in Saudi Arabia sometime around 1986. 
Al-Ḥawālī wrote both his MA and doctoral  projects und er the 
supervision of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Qu ṭb, the younger 
brother of Sayyid Qu ṭb. Ẓāhirat al -Irjāʾ  is  believed to be the first 
written work by a prominent Salafī scholar wherein there is a direct 
critique of al-Albānī pointing to his similariti es with the Murjiʾah  in 
regards to the conception of īmān  and kufr .  However,  this book was not 
necessari ly the trigger behind “the birth of the intra -Salafī  polemic.” 5 
This is because al -Ḥawālī’s primary target in his book is the 
understanding of īmān  and kufr  by past  and contemporary Ashʿarī  and 
Māturīdī  scholars  who have dominated the theological discourse for 
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centuries.  Only a few comments in the last  chapter address al -Albānī.  In 
fact , what distinguishes al -Ḥawālī’s book from other intra -Salafī 
writings on the topic of īmān  and kufr  is  that it  does not adopt a 
polemical style and neither al -Albānī nor the Loyalists were al -Ḥawālī’s  
focal targets,  as they were to become for later Jihādī and Activist  
authors.  Thus, the assertion that  “much of the last  chap ter of al-Ḥawālī’s  
book, which deals with the question of whether the abandoning of a 
major religious obligation is apostasy, is directed against al -Albānī” 6 is a 
bit of an exaggeration. Had Lav had access to the original copy of the 
dissertation of al -Ḥawālī, he would have noticed that the last  chapter in 
the two published editions is identical to the original thesis with the 
exception of the few added comments that  level criticisms against  al -
Albānī’s position on īmān .  Had Lav also paid attention to the publication 
date of al-Albānī’s book Ḥukm tārik al -Ṣalāh  (The Ruling on One who 
Abandons the Prayer)—the book that  al-Ḥawālī singles out for criticism 
in Ẓāhirat  al-Irjāʾ—  he would have noticed that al -Albānī’s book was 
first published in 1992, six years af ter al-Ḥawālī submitted his doctoral  
dissertation. This underscores the point that  the initial research and 
impetus behind al -Ḥawālī’s dissertation was not the targeting of al -
Albānī (as al -Albānī’s views on the topic have not even surfaced at the 
time.)  
Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  does not deal  with irjāʾ  and the Murjiʾah  as a “heretic” 
group that  should be refuted, as most of Salafī  writers tend to do in their 
writings against other sects. Rather, it  looks at irjāʾ  as an ideology that  
has developed over centuries to become what he sees as an established 
and accepted creed for the majority of Muslims throughout Islamic 
history.  According to al -Ḥawālī ,  the phenomenon of irjāʾ ,  which is a 
heretic innovation in the view of all  Salafīs,  should be understood as an 
extreme reaction to particular historical events. The magnitude of the 
turmoil brought by the Khawārij  onto Muslim life throughout history has 
led to the invention and shaping of the phenomenon of irjāʾ . 7 He believes 
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that irjāʾ  should not be restricted to a disti nct theological sect ( firqah) 
but rather as an intellectual persuasion ( fikr) that is deeply rooted not 
only in the thought of general Muslims but also found its way in the 
teachings of many medieval, modern and present -day scholars. For this 
reason he mindfully titled his work “The Phenomenon of irjāʾ  in Islamic 
Thought” and not “in Islamic History.”  
Al-Ḥawālī’s Views on Irjāʾ 
Broadly speaking, it  is safe to say that  al -Ḥawālī’s readings of the notion 
of irjāʾ  are largely derived from Ibn Taymiyyah’s argum ents against the 
Murjiʾah  in his famous books kitāb al-Īmān  and al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl .  In 
fact , had al -Ḥawālī  published his thesis without his crit icisms of al -
Albānī, it  could have served as a standard reference on the “orthodox” 
Salafī  view on īmān  and kufr  rather than being part  of the genre of intra -
Salafī  disputes. This is  especially true given the fact  that al -Albānī 
himself, despite being criticised in the book, praised it  sincerely,  while 
adding some reservations regarding what he labelled as “some 
extremism” 8 in its tone.  
[the book is]  very beneficial  in terms of refuting ʿulamāʾ  al-kalām  
who oppose the ahl al-ḥadīth’s understanding that  īmān  increases 
and decreases as well  as actions being part  of īmān . 9 
According to al -Ḥawālī, the main difference between the salaf  and the 
Murjiʾah  perceptions of īmān  is that the latter limit  the nature of īmān  to 
its literal meaning. He summarises the Murjiʾah’s  perception of īmān  as 
similar to a philosophical  theory. Upon being informed about it ,  a person 
either believes in i t (ṣaddaqa bihā ) or rejects it .  If  that person accepts it  
in his heart , then the aim has been achieved, even if he does not verbally 
declare i t ( iqrār). 10 
Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  consists of five chapters,  but only the last two chapters 
are relevant to our subject here. These two chapters address the 
                                                     
8 Al-Albānī,  al-S il si lah a l -Ḍaʿīfah ,  14/949.  
9 Ibid .  
10 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhira t  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  2 /531.  
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relationship between outwardly acts  and īmān  of the heart and then 
discuss the question of whether abandoning outwardly acts al together  
can be a cause for kufr .  According to al -Ḥawālī,  the scholars of the salaf  
believed that outwardly acts are always tied together with īmān  of the 
heart, so it is not possible to conceive of īmān  without one or the other. 11 
In order to elaborate the essence of the dispute between the position of 
the salaf  and that  of the Murjiʾah  on how the actions of the limbs are 
related to īmān ,  al-Ḥawālī asserts that there can only be four possible 
scenarios:  
1-  Both īmān  of the heart and outwardly acts are present together.  
2-  Both are absent  
3-  Outwardly acts are present whilst īmān  of the heart  is absent  
4-  Īmān  of the heart is  present whilst outwardly acts are absent  
As for the first three scenarios, al -Ḥawālī states that there is no 
disagreement between the salaf  and the Murjiʾah  that in the first instance 
such a person is Muslim; in the second a kāfir ;  in the third a hypocrite. 
The difference of opinion lies in the fourth scenario.  The Murjiʾah  
equate the fourth scenario with the first.  Not only do they class such an 
individual as a Muslim but they also go as far as saying that the 
perpetration of all sins and the abandonment of all  commandments does 
not reduce īmān  in the least . 12 Following the argument of Ibn Taymiyyah 
mentioned in the previous chapter, al -Ḥawālī  argues that  the fourth 
scenario is an impossibility in the view of the salaf  because they believe 
that the absence of aʿmāl al-jawāriḥ  (actions of the limbs ) is a clear 
indicator that īmān  al-qalb is absent.  ( īmān  of the heart) Or in other 
words, the presence of īmān  al-qalb  necessitates the presence of aʿmāl 
al-jawāriḥ .  
This position might  sound similar to that of the Khawārij  who declare 
takfīr  on the basis of committing sinful actions.  However,  al -Ḥawālī 
points out that  there is  a difference between abandoning a single action 
                                                     
11 Ibid ,  2 /637.  
12 Ibid ,  2 /638.  
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(āḥād al-aʿmāl) and the category of outwardly acts. The Khawāri j 
declared takfīr  on the basis of isolated acts,  while the cause of kufr  in 
the view of the salaf  was the abandonment of good deeds altogether.  The 
exception to this is the abandonment of the four pillars of Islam after 
proclaiming the testimony of faith.  Al-Ḥawālī  insists that  the five daily 
prayers,  almsgiving (zakāh),  fasting the month of Ramaḍān, and 
performing the pilgrimage to Makah are different to all other actions. 13 
Whoever does not commit himself to performing these pillars in his heart 
(man lam yaltazim fiʿlahā bi  qalbih) cannot be a Muslim. This view 
coincides with the position of Ibn Taymiyyah in his famous verdict  on 
the Mongols in which he labels them ṭāʾi fah mumtaniʿah  (li t .  abstaining 
group).  Ibn Taymiyyah states that  according to all  Muslim  scholars,  it  is 
obligatory to fight every group of people that turn their back on 
submitt ing to any commandment of the sharīʿah  which are clear and 
agreed upon, even if such people pronounce the declaration of faith. Ibn 
Taymiyyah extends his verdict  to include those who abstain from 
adhering to other commandments such as “the prohibition of shameful 
deeds, adultery,  gambling, alcohol drinking or other illegal deeds…” 14 
The Ruling on Abandoning the Prayer 
Al-Ḥawālī then, shifts his attention to refute those  who hold that 
abandoning the prayer is  not kufr .  Salafīs accept that while early 
scholars unanimously viewed abstaining from performing prayer out of 
juḥūd  (denying its obligation) as apostasy, they (the early scholars) 
differed regarding the one who does  so merely out of laziness. In the 
latter case,  there are two main opinions. The first  opinion, which is 
believed to be the view of the majority of classical scholars ( jumhūr), 
contends that  such negligence of prayer does not amount to kufr .  This 
position is widely accepted and advocated by the scholars of the Ḥanafī ,  
Mālikī  and Shāfiʿī  Schools. It is also believed to be one of two opinions 
attributed to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. The other opinion of Ibn Ḥanbal 
represents the second view (albeit a minority) in class ical Islam that the 
                                                     
13 Ibid ,  2 /656  
14 Ibn Taymiyyah,  al-Fatāwā a l -Kubrā  3/557  
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one who neglects prayer is kāfir  even when he does so without the 
condition of juḥūd .  In present-day Saudi Arabia the vast majority of 
scholars hold this lat ter opinion.  
Al-Ḥawālī follows the Saudi opinion in arguing that the ṣaḥābah  
unanimously held the opinion that  the person who does not pray is guilty 
of major kufr  and that the dispute arose only after the time of the 
ṣaḥābah .  However,  al-Ḥawālī gives the argument an interesting twist  by 
asserting that there are two types of abandonm ent (tark):  (i)  the one who 
does not pray at al l ( lā yuṣallī bi i ṭlāq) and (ii)  the one who prays 
sometimes and neglects it  at other times ( yuṣallī aḥyanan wa yatruku 
aḥyānan).  He states that  with the exception of the Ḥanafīs,  the 
disagreement between the other early jurists (Mālik, Shāfiʿī,  Aḥmad and 
their peers) is over the ruling on the one who neglects the prayer 
intermittently (i .e. the second type only) . As for the first type, he argues 
that there is  no disagreement between these early scholars that  s uch 
abandonment is  kufr .  Al-Ḥawālī insists that different opinions regarding 
the first type of tark  (not praying at al l) only emerged amongst later 
scholars, whose opinions should not be taken seriously because they 
were affected by the creed of the Murjiʾah, the inventors of this 
position. 15  Al-Ḥawālī  writes several pages to explain the reasons why 
some of the later fuqahāʾ  wrongly attributed the opinions of the Murjiʾah  
to these early scholars. The most important of these reasons is the 
“wrong belief” 16  that  declaring the kufr  of someone because of the 
abandonment of prayer is  the position of the Muʿtazilah  and Khawārij ,  
and the aim of these later fuqahāʾ  was to distance their imams from these 
deviant beliefs. At this point,  Al -Ḥawālī accuses al -Albānī of making the 
same alleged mistake as such fuqahāʾ .  Then he adds another accusation; 
that  in his short treatise Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  al-Albānī was advocating 
what al-Ḥawālī  believes to be the position of the Murjiʾah .  
  
                                                     
15 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhira t  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  2 /257.  
16 Ibid ,  2 /658.  
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Al-Albānī’s Ḥukm Tārik al-Ṣalāh 
This book of al-Albānī’s,  which was first published in 1992 under the 
supervision of al -Ḥalabī, was originally a study and commentary by al -
Albānī on the authenticity of a ḥadīth  known as ḥadīth al-shafāʿah  
(intercession).  It was part of his famous seven volume wor k on ḥadīth ,  
titled al-Silsilah al -Ṣaḥīḥah .  In the preface to the first  separate edition 
(1992), Al-Albānī states that  due to the importance and the great 
usefulness of this study, he opted to publish it  as a separate book, so he 
asked his student al -Ḥalabī  to write a preface and prepare i t for  
publication. 17 The ḥadīth ,  which is the core of the study, reveals that in 
the day of judgement, Muslims who have entered paradise would 
intercede with God for the forgiveness of those sinner Muslims who have 
entered hellfire saying:  
O God, our brothers used to pray, fast ,  and perform pilgrimage and 
Jihād with us, you put them in hellfire!” after several  intercessions 
however,  a great  number of  sinner Muslims are taken out from 
hellfire fayukhrijūna khalqan kathīran .  The last  group are those 
who have done an atom’s weight of good,  then Muslims say to God: 
“no one with any good has been left  in hell fire.” At that  point  God 
says:  “angels have interceded, the Prophets have interceded, and 
Muslims have interceded, only the most merciful  remains (to 
intercede),  then He takes a  handful  from hellfire and extracts  a 
group of people who never  performed any good deed, and who are 
completely burnt .” After these people are  brought back to l ife,  
people of paradise say:  “these are  God’s  freedmen ʿutaqāʾ  al -
Raḥmān ;  He let  them enter paradise without  performing any action 
or good deed. 18  
After studying various narrations of the ḥadīth  confirming that  the 
ḥadīth  is actually authentic,  al -Albānī in his regular method used 
throughout al-Silsilah ,  offers his own understanding and interpretation 
                                                     
17 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  25 .  
18 Ibid,  27–29.  
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of the ḥadīth  or what he calls fiqh al-ḥadīth  (the jurisprudence of the 
tradition.)  
Al-Albānī deduction from this ḥadīth  is very basic;  since sinful Muslims 
who used to perform congregational prayers would be taken out of 
hellfire among the first  group then, the other retrieved groups certainly, 
compromise of other sinful Muslims who may have fulfi lled some good 
deeds during their lifet ime, but certainly they have not carried out the 
congregational prayers.  Based on this assumption, al -Albānī stresses that  
since this ḥadīth  is authentic, then it  should be taken as decisive 
evidence (naṣṣ  qāṭʿī) against those who pronounce takfīr  on the one who 
abandons the congregational prayers out of laziness without d enying its 
obligatory nature ( tārik  al-ṣalāh kasalan ). He then urges that the dispute 
over this question between those scholars “who are united by one creed, 
part of which is refraining from pronouncing takfīr  on people based on 
their major sins…” 19  should be put to bed. This statement can be 
understood as an indirect  reference to his fellow Salafī  scholars in Saudi 
Arabia where an opinion contrary to his own was widely adopted.  
From a Salafī perspective,  the dispute over this question is considered an 
on-going jurisprudential disagreement that is traced back to the very 
early classical scholars, and is less generally unlikely to be a reason for 
accusations of deviancy. Yet, al -Albānī was clearly not content to leave 
the matter open to debate. He was seriousl y displeased with some of the 
verdicts pronounced by those who declare kufr  on people who abandon 
prayer out of laziness;  seeing such verdicts as signs of excessive 
enthusiasm for declaring takfīr .  For this reason, after concluding that the 
ḥadīth  is a decisive proof, he goes on to make a plea to the readers of his 
book to revise their views and refrain from “declaring takfīr  on those 
Muslims who do not pray but believe that it  is an obligation…for 
declaring takfīr  on Muslims is a great concern.” 20  
                                                     
19 Ibid,  37.  
20 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  62 .  
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More over,  al-Albānī does not merely support  and favour one of the two -
mentioned opinions but instead asserts that the question should be 
examined minutely:  “Whoever chooses (the opinion of) takfīr  without 
details  is  wrong and whoever chooses non -takfīr  is  wrong, the correct  
position is to elaborate (al-ṣawāb al-tafṣīl).” 21 By tafṣīl ,  he means two 
points: (i) that  mere negligence should not be considered enough proof 
to pronounce kufr  on a Muslim, (ii)  if a person who has abandoned 
prayer ( tārik al-ṣalāh) is ordered by the authority to pray and warned 
that he would be executed if he does not pray, yet chooses execution 
over praying, then such a person cannot be a Muslim. The reason for kufr  
here, in the view of al -Albānī,  is not the abandonment of prayer but 
because this person’s persistence in not praying is a clear indication of 
his juḥūd . 22 
Interestingly,  al -Albānī insists that this view is not only his own but that  
of a host of Ḥanbalī  scholars, including Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al -
Qayyim, the two classical scholars to whom Saudi scholars ascribe their 
views. Al-Albānī does not hide his exasperation with the predominant 
opinion among the Saudi scholars on this matter. This becomes very 
obvious when he asserts that unlike what “some of his later followers” 
ascribe to Ibn Ḥanbal,  the correct opinion of Ibn Ḥanbal is the same as 
his own, i.e.  in favour of tafṣīl .  Such a claim is very significant and it  is  
what prompted Lav to suggest:  
Had al-Albānī presented his view as solely his own conclusion based 
[sic]  the ḥadīth-based methodology he champions, he may have aroused 
somewhat less opposition on this issue. As it was his claim that he 
represented the majority views of the ḥanbalīs and neo -Ḥanbalīs became 
an additional source of  contention because it prompted other Salafī s to 
defend their own claim to represent this tradition. 23  
Although Lav’s suggestion is correct to a certain extent, it  is not an 
adequate explanation al -Ḥawālī’s intransigent dispute with al -Albānī.  
                                                     
21 Ibid,  53.  
22 Ibid ,  47.  
23 Lav,  Radical  Is lam and the Revival  o f  Medieva l  Theology ,  113.  
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This is  because in truth,  both al -  Ḥawālī and al-Albānī hold very similar 
views regarding the ruling on tārik  al-ṣalāh .  To be more precise,  one can 
extract  two scenarios from al -Ḥawālī’s book, where tārik al-ṣalāh  is 
deemed to be kāfir.  The first is when one abandons ṣalāh  altogether or 
what al-Ḥawālī refers to  as al-tark al-muṭlaq  or al-tark al-kullī .  The 
opposite of this is muṭlaq al-tark  (mere abandonment/negligence), which 
refers to the one who prays sometimes and does not at other times. The 
second scenario is  the one who is ordered by the authorities to pr ay yet  
he choses to be executed over performing the prayer. Al -Ḥawālī  here 
adopts the argument of Ibn Taymiyyah that such a person cannot be 
Muslim. Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument is centred on human nature,  
contending that it  is impossible for any person who be lieves in their 
heart in the obligation of the prayer to persist  in the abandonment of 
prayer up to the point of being killed. In his view, believing in its  
obligation, along with knowing that  they are to be killed if they do not 
pray, is enough motivation  for anyone who is able to perform the prayer 
to do it.  
When a person abstains from praying up to the point  of  being 
kil led,  such a person [by necessity] does not believe in i ts 
obligation in their  heart  and is not committed to i ts  
performance. Such a person is kāfir  by the consensus of al l  
Muslims. 24 
In Ḥukm Tārik al-Ṣalāh, al-Albānī,  comes to a conclusion very similar to al -
Ḥawālī’s,  with regard to the second scenario. Also using Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s argument, he concludes that  
whoever  is summoned [by the Muslim auth ority] to pray and 
threatened that  he would be kil led if  he does not abide and then he 
is kil led [for not abiding], then he is definitely kāfir  (kāfir yaqīnan) 
–his blood is permissible,  he will  not  be prayed upon and not be 
buried in a Muslim graveyard. 25  
                                                     
24 Ibn Taymiyyah,  Majmūʿ  al -Fatāwā ,  22/32.  
25 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  52–53; a l -Albānī,  al-Si ls i lah  al -Ṣaḥīḥah ,  1 /177–
178.  
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In examining al -Albānī’s book, one cannot find any discussion on the 
first scenario –  that is , a person who abandons prayer altogether.  
However, one can discover the view of al -Albānī in a later book that was 
published posthumously by al -Ḥalabī tit led al-Durar al-Mutalaʾliʾah bi  
Naqḍ  al-Imām al -ʿAllāmah al-Albānī Firyah Muwāfaqatihi  li  al -Murjiʾah  
(Gleaming Pearls in the Destroying the False Claim that Imam al -Albānī 
Agrees With the Murjiʾah ). In one of the comments,  al -Albānī appears to 
agree with the two points of al-Ḥawālī that:  
1-  Whoever abandons prayer altogether is  from the category of the 
non-Muslims. The one who abandons it most of the t ime is closer 
to the non-Muslims [than the Muslims] and he resembles them 
more in his state [of belief]. And whoeve r prays occasionally and 
does not on other occasions then he is  wavering [and] swaying 
between kufr  and īmān ,  and the judgment [in this case] is based on 
[his state] at  the end of his l ife.  
2-  Neglecting to safeguard the prayer ( tark al-muḥāfaẓah) 26  is  
different to neglecting the prayer altogether,  which [in the latter 
case] is kufr . 27  
Closer inspection of a l-Ḥawālī’s crit icism of al -Albānī reveals that  the 
dispute is  not regarding the ruling on tārik al-ṣalāh  from a purely fiqhī  
perspective, but about more ser ious issues relating to ʿaqīdah .  Likewise,  
al-Albānī’s exasperation with those who pronounce takfīr  on tārik al-
ṣalāh  should not be understood as an objection to pronouncing takfīr on  
tārik al-ṣalāh  altogether.  Rather,  his exasperation is directed toward t he 
verdicts of some Saudi scholars in which they rule that neglecting even 
one single prayer without any valid excuse is kufr .  Such verdicts are 
what al-Albānī considers extremism in takfīr .   
One such scholar with whom al -Albānī was exasperated was Ibn Bāz .  In 
one of his verdicts, Ibn Bāz was asked about the ruling on the one who 
                                                     
26 Safeguarding the prayer  (as  ment ioned in the Qur’anic verse (70 /34)  re fers to  the 
f irm commitment to  observe the five da ily p rayers and  to  maintain  the  due t imings,  
condit ions and r i tual  const i tue nts.  
27 In his  agreement,  a l -Albānī states :  “we be lieve this i s  a  good e laborat ion.”  See:  al -
Ḥalabī ,  al-Durar a l -Mutalaʼ l iʼah ,  127–128.  
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neglects a single prayer.  He responded: “one prayer or ten, if he 
deliberately neglects it  until  its  due time has passed, such as not praying 
fajr  prayer to the point  of sunrise, t hen he has committed kufr .” 28 
Although, one cannot determine the exact percentage of scholars who 
hold this view in Saudi Arabia, this ruling seems to be widespread across 
the country.  It is also the view adopted by the scholars of the Permanent 
Committee for Research and Issuing Verdicts. 29  
Having said that, the question that arises here is since al -Albānī holds 
views that are similar views to those of al -Ḥawālī on the ruling on tārik  
al-ṣalāh ,  what then is the substance of al -Ḥawālī’s criticism of al -
Albānī’s book?  
Al-Ḥawālī’s Critique of Ḥukm Tārik al-Ṣalāh 
To answer this question, one needs to look at  the historical  context in 
which Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ  was published, especially given the fact that the 
comments on al -Albānī were not part of the original thesis. As 
mentioned above, when al -Ḥawālī first published his book in 1996, the 
Salafīs were already engaged in internal debates regarding several issues 
related to poli tics, with every side trying to prove their stance. The most 
important writ ings by the loyalists, which emerged as a result of these 
debates, share two common factors. First, the authors were mainly 
scholars who are considered to be close to al -Albānī’s circle in Jordan, 
such as al-Ḥalabī, who is responsible for the publication of at  least three 
of these books. Second, in order to  refute what they considered to be 
excessiveness in takfīr ,  these scholars engaged deeply in questions 
related to the concept of īmān  and kufr ,  a field within Salafī religious 
studies that has traditionally been a specialty of Saudi scholars.  
Criticism of al-Ḥalabī’s Preface 
Although it is  not known whether al -Ḥawālī had access to al -Ḥalabī’s 
books (as he was under arrest during the period of publication of most of 
                                                     
28 Ibn Bāz,  Fatāwā Ibn Bāz ,  29 /179.  
29 Fatāwā al -Lajnah  al -Dāʾimah ,  6 /39–40.  
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these books), it  would not be farfetched to surmise that by adding these 
comments,  al-Ḥawālī might be indirectly refuting these writers close to 
al-Albānī.  This assumption seems plausible when we consider that  al -
Ḥalabī was also behind the publication of the crit icized book.  
This suggestion is further supported by two other facts. First, it  can be  
observed from the apologetic tone of al -Ḥawālī that he is eager to find 
excuses for al -Albānī.  For instance, he casts doubts that  the book was 
written by al-Albānī himself by referring to it as “a booklet attributed  to 
Shaykh al-Albānī.” 30 In other instances, he simply assumes that  al -Albānī 
did not intend to write a comprehensive piece of research on the question 
of tārik al-ṣalāh .  Instead, the book is merely a result  of a commentary on 
one ḥadīth ,  to which he was rushed into publishing by “some of his 
brothers.” 31 
Second, despite the fact that al -Ḥawālī does not mention al -Ḥalabī by 
name; his frustration with the preface the latter wrote for Ḥukm Tārik al -
Ṣalāh  is  very obvious. A third of the comments against the book are 
directed against the preface. The reason for this is what al -Ḥawālī  
believes to be a contradiction in the book, between the position of al -
Albānī on the second scenario explained above (which is the same as Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s view) on the one hand, and some statements found in the 
preface writ ten by al -Ḥalabī on the other (that the one who continues to 
abandon prayer up to the point of being killed dies Muslim). One of 
these statements in the preface of Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh  reads:  
As for  the one who neglects  the prayer  without an excuse but  out 
of laziness , whilst  bel ieving in i ts obligation, the correct  stance is 
what the jumhūr  have affirmed, that  he is not kāfir .  Also, in regard 
to the one who leaves a single prayer unti l  i ts  due t ime has passed,  
such as one who leaves ẓuhr  (noon prayer) unti l  the sun sets,  or  
[ leaves] maghrib  (sunset  prayer) unti l  fajr  (dawn prayer).  [The 
correct  stance is that]  he should be given the chance to repent in 
the same way a murtadd  (apostate) is given the chance to repent 
and is  then [only] executed if  he does not repent.  Then his  body 
                                                     
30 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhirat  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  2 /518.  
31 Ibid,  2/759.  
210 
 
will  be washed (ghusl) ,  be prayed upon him and buried in a 
Muslim graveyard,  along with carrying out al l  other Islamic ri tes. 32  
The other statement in the preface is a quote from the renowned Shāfiʿī  
jurist al-Sakhāwī (1428 -  1497), in which the classical  scholar interprets 
the ḥadīth  texts that  imply the kufr  of tārik al-ṣalāh to mean “the one 
who neglects it  while denying its obligation.” 33 Such statements do not 
only contradict what al -Albānī favours inside the main body of his book 
regarding the ruling on tārik al-ṣalāh,  but they also restrict the cause of 
kufr  to juḥūd .  And that is the very position that al -Ḥawālī  believes to be 
the view of Murjiʾah .  Thus he wrote his entire book, the Ẓāhirat  al-Irjāʾ ,  
in order to repudiate that  view.  
Although these statements in the preface of Ḥukm are actually part of a 
long passage quoted by al -Ḥalabī from another volume of al -Albānī’s al-
Silsilah al-Ṣaḥīḥah ,  al-Ḥalabī criticises al -Ḥalabī for adding them, 
characterising them as al -Ḥalabī’s  own views on the question of tārik al-
ṣalāh ,  not al-Albānī’s.  This was a reasonable assertion, given that  al -
Ḥalabī quotes only the first part of al -Albānī’s argument against the 
opinion of takfīr ,  in which al -Albānī seems to favour the view of al -
Sakhāwī in an absolute manner, and in doing so, fails  to mention that al -
Albānī has in fact  reiterated the argument of Ibn Taymiyyah to refute al -
Sakhāwī’s view that the one who is executed dies Muslim. 34  In al-
Ḥawālī’s opinion, by adding these misleading statements,  al -Ḥalabī has 
caused serious confusion amongst the Salafīs about the correct posit ion 
of al-Albānī on the matter. From al -Ḥawālī’s perspective,  the 
contradiction between the preface and the content of the book is relat ed 
to the two most essential points in the book: (i) The basis ( manāṭ  al-
ḥukm) for pronouncing kufr  on one who does not pray; (ii)  The ruling on 
the one who persists in refusing to pray to the point that he is executed 
for it .  
                                                     
32 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalā t ,  18.  
33 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalā t ,  17.  
34 Al-Albānī,  al-S il si lah a l -Ṣaḥīḥah ,  1 /177–178.  
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Regarding the second point, i t  is indisputable that  al -Albānī’s ruling on 
this case is kufr .  Al-Ḥawālī’s annoyance is with the fact  that the quotes 
chosen by al -Ḥalabī for the preface imply that  such a person is not kāfir  
(since he will be offered all Islamic rites)—contradicting the real 
position of al -Albānī in the actual  book. As for the first  point, the basis 
for the ruling of kufr  given by al -Albānī, according to al -Ḥawālī, is a 
person’s juḥūd ,  which is adequately proved by the act of choosing death 
over prayer .  Al-Ḥawālī here cor rectly points out that the quotes chosen 
for the preface of Ḥukm misleadingly suggest that Al -Albānī believed 
that choosing death over prayer is insufficient to prove the state of 
juḥūd.   
The criticism articulated by al -Ḥawālī regarding al -Ḥalabī’s preface ,  and 
his plea to al-Albānī to supervise the publication of his own books 
himself instead of relying on al -Ḥalabī, reveal two important issues.  
First,  that  despite his crit icism, al -Ḥawālī still  held al -Albānī in great  
esteem. Second, al -Ḥawālī viewed al-Ḥalabī as an unreliable writer who 
had not yet  grasped the concepts of īmān  and kufr  becomes apparent.  
However, despite the respect shown by al -Ḥawālī for al -Albānī, he does 
criticise his book for allegedly containing traces of irjāʾ .  
Traces of Irjāʾ in al-Albānī’s Book 
In the last chapter of Ẓāhirat al-Irjāʾ ,  al-Ḥawālī strongly asserts that the 
book of al -Albānī is  based entirely on the views of Murjiʾah .  Elsewhere 
in the book however,  it  seems that he is reluctant to label al -Albānī as an 
out and out murjiʾī .  This appears to be a struggle in al -Ḥawālī’s 
conceptualisation and thought in regards to how he should approach a 
contemporary Salafī  scholar for whom he has a great respect especially 
when there is a dispute on a point  of doctrine about which he has v ery 
strong views.  
Ultimately,  the main reasons for this charge of irjāʾ can be narrowed 
down to three factors. The first is  the failure of al -Albānī to clarify his 
view on the one who abandons prayer altogether. The second is related to  
the reasoning given  by al-Albānī for the cause of kufr  in the scenario of 
the one who choses death over performing the prayer. The third factor 
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relates to the implications of the literal interpretation of ḥadīth al-
shafāʿah  suggesting that  intercession is afforded to those w ho have not 
performed any single outwardly duty at  al l.  
Al-tārik al-kullī (total abandonment of prayer) 
With regard to the first factor, because al -Albānī does not explicitly 
declare his position regarding the ruling on the one who abandons prayer 
altogether in the cri ticised book (in the way he is explicit  in declaring 
kufr  on the one who chooses death over prayer),  this appears to have led 
al-Ḥawālī  to assume that  al -Albānī holds that  “the one who does not pray 
altogether can be afforded the intercession and therefore salvation from 
hellfire.” 35  It  is perhaps inevitable that one would come to such 
conclusion if one relies only on Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh  without looking at  
al-Albānī’s posthumously published book, to which al -Ḥawālī had no 
access at the time of writing his refutation. If one relies merely on what 
is found in Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  one would arrive at  the same 
conclusion as al -Ḥawālī,  that  al -Albānī does not consider al-tārik al-
kullī  to be sufficient to take a person out of the fold of Islam. The re ason 
for this is associated with al -Albānī’s interpretation of ḥadīth al-
shafāʿah,  where he asserts that  apart from the first group, all  other 
salvaged groups exclusively consist of people who do not perform the 
prayer.  
When Muslims were allowed by God to plead on behalf of their  
brethren who used to perform prayers and fast  [with them] and 
others in the first  intercession, they took them out of  hellfire based 
on the [prayer] sign [on their  foreheads].  Thus, when they were 
allowed to plead in the subsequent  intersessions, and took many 
people out of hellfire,  by necessity, there were no muṣallūn  
(performers  of prayer) amongst these people. Rather they were 
people with [other] good deeds. 36  
In the above quote,  al -Albānī does not specifically provide detailed 
explanation of the term “muṣallūn” and does not differentiate between 
                                                     
35 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhirat  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  452.  
36 Al-Albānī,  Ḥukm Tārik al -Ṣalāh ,  34 .  
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the one who abandons prayer altogether and the one who does so 
occasionally.  His vague account causes somehow confusion to say the 
least, given that we know for certain that he holds that the one who 
abandons the prayer altogether is  kāfir,  as shown in his comments on  al-
Ḥawālī’s book. Nevertheless,  such an interpretation of the ḥadīth  can 
only suggest that al -Albānī considers the one who abandons the prayer 
altogether to be within the realm of Islam. Likewise,  al -Ḥawālī  assumes 
that  al-Albānī’s interpretation of the ḥadīth  can only imply that  “al- tārik 
al-kull ī  (the one who totally abandons prayer) is afforded the 
intercession” and therefore remains a Muslim. Such a view, in the 
opinion of al -Ḥawālī , represents “the very sayings of the Murjiʾah.”37  
Moreover,  al-Ḥawālī  believes that by relying on the books of fiqh  as 
opposed to the books of ʿaqīdah  when studying the question of tārik al-
ṣalāh ,  al-Albānī has fallen into the trap of confusing the meaning of 
some terms that are used in both types of genres to represent dive rgent 
meanings.  This different usage of terms in the two disciplines is  a result  
of the distinct manner in which they approach religious matters.  Al -
Ḥawālī explains that because the books of ʿaqīdah  deal  with matters 
from a mere theoretical perspective, they usually tend to give general  
rulings without paying much attention to how these rulings are applied. 
On the other hand, the main concern of fiqh  is the application of these 
religious rulings to individual cases. Therefore, a question like the 
ruling on  tārik al-ṣalāh  is  dealt with differently. 38 
One of the terms differed upon is the term juḥūd ,  which he argues, is 
used in the books of ʿaqīdah  written by the salaf ,  to denote a different 
meaning to that found in in the books of f iqh.  The salaf  used this term to 
refer to one’s inner refusal  to perform an obligation (ʿadam al-inqiyād 
wa al-istislām li amr Allah ). 39 This is  contrary to the use of later fuqahāʾ  
who restrict  its  meaning to denying  the obligatoriness (or the 
prohibitiveness) of a religious duty tha t  Allāh has decreed by way of 
                                                     
37 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhirat  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  a l -Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  2 /660.  
38 Al-Ḥawāl ī ,  Ẓāhira t  al - I rjāʾ  f ī  al-Fikr a l - I slāmī ,  2 /659–660.  
39 Ibid ,  2 /705.  
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obligation (or prohibition). To demonstrate his point , al -Ḥawālī quotes 
the following reply by a notable figure from the salaf ,  Sufyān b.  
ʿUyaynah, when asked about the creed of the Murjiʾah :  
The Murjiʾah  hold that  a person who testif ies that  there is  no god 
but Allah, while having no commitment in his heart  to observe the 
obligations ( farāʾiḍ) ,  is  guaranteed Paradise. And they place the 
absence of commitment equal to the performance of other sins  
(rukūb al-maḥārim) .  [However ,]  they are not the same [according to 
us].  This is because committing sins without ist iḥlāl  is  a sinful  act  
whereas neglecting obligations purposely,  without ignorance or 
valid excuse, is kufr . 40 
Thus, in reference to prayer, when the salaf  declare a person guilty of 
juḥūd  to be kāfir ,  they refer to two shortcomings; (i) the absence of inner 
commitment to perform the prayer, even if this person admits that it  is  
an obligation and that  he is sinning by not fulfil ling it ,  (ii)  the denial 
that Allāh has decreed it  upon Muslims. As for the later fuqahāʾ ,  the 
juḥūd  of prayer is  restricted only to latter.  
For al-Ḥawālī, this dissimilarity in the usage of this term is the reason 
that  led some later scholars (l ike al -Albānī) to “wrongly” think that  some 
of the salaf  have considered al- tārik al -kullī  to be Muslim and therefore 
consider this issue to be a matter of acceptable disagreement between the 
salaf . 41  Al-Ḥawālī  questions this assumption arguing for a clearer 
separation in conceptualising the ruling on tārik al-ṣalāh,  between the 
theoretical subject matter of ʿaqīdah  and the practical concerns of 
fuqahāʾ .  For him, later works of fiqh  were mistaken in popularising the 
idea that there are two opinions amongst the salaf  in regard to the ruling 
on tārik al-ṣalāh.  According to him, there is no such disagreement 
amongst the salaf  as they unanimously declare tārik al -ṣalāh  to be kāfir .  
As far as there is any disagreement, i t  is  solely confined to the practical 
implementation of the ruling of kufr  (i .e.  the cri teria for a judge to 
decide that a particular person has abandon prayer).  In other words,  this 
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dispute should not be regarded as an absolute disagreement ( al-khilāf fī  
dhālik laysa ʿalā i ṭ lāqihi). 42 
To clarify his point , al -Ḥawālī  ci tes two different rulings on tārik al-
ṣalāh .  The first type is based on outwardly manifestation ( al-ḥukm ʿalā 
al-ẓāhir),  which pertains to the status of tārik al-ṣalāh  in this world. 
This is  the main concern of fuqahāʾ .  The other ruling is that  of the 
scholars of ʿaqīdah, who are mainly concerned with the ruling on the 
inner state of the person (al-ḥukm ʿalā al -bāṭ in.) The disagreement 
amongst the salaf  is  only on the former and not on the latter. In other 
words, from a theoretical perspective, there is no disagreement amongst 
the salaf  on the kufr  of the one who persists in his heart to neglect  the 
prayer ( tārik al- iltizām.) The disagreement amongst them is on how one 
can determine that an individual has no i ltizām,  since such determination 
rests on the subjective criteria of individual scholar s. As such, al-Ḥawālī  
believes that considering one who does not pray altogether as Muslim is 
not a Salafī  creed but is a Murjiʾah  one that  subsequently permeated the 
views of later fuqahāʾ .  For this reason, we find him advising al -Albānī 
not only to “reth ink his position on the question and write on it 
extensively” but also to pay attention to the fact  that “ruling on someone 
to be a Muslim on al-ẓāhir  (externally) does not necessary mean he is a 
Muslim in al-bāṭin (internally) .”43  
Al-Ḥawālī  clearly sees a  similarity between the way the Murjiʾah  
interpret ḥadīth al -shafāʿāh  and the manner al-Albānī builds his 
arguments on the question of tārik al -ṣalāh .  This is to say, instead of 
simply understanding the “several texts” that explicitly declare the 
abandonment of prayer to be kufr  in their literal  meaning then interpret  
ḥadīth al-shafāʿāh  accordingly,  al -Albānī chooses to do the exact 
opposite: going beyond the literal interpretation ( taʾwīl) based on ḥadīth 
al-shafāʿah ,  the latter being open to a wide range of interpretations. 
Amongst the texts ci ted by al -Ḥawālī is the account of the tābiʿī  ʿAbd-
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Allāh b. Shaqīq, who states, “the Companions of Muhammad did not 
consider the abandonment of any action to be kufr  except for the prayer.” 
For al-Ḥawālī , this accoun t  constitutes an irrefutable evidence of the 
consensus of the salaf  on this issue of tārik al-ṣalāh ,  which should 
therefore not be opposed, especially since al -Albānī himself deems this 
text to be authentic. 44 
Al-Ḥawālī’s anxieties with the method used by a l -Albānī are so deep, 
that  he compares it  to the interpretation used by al-muʿaṭṭ ilah wa al-
mufawwiḍah  in understanding the question of al-ṣifāt . 45  In al-Ḥawālī’s  
assessment,  one can detect a fear of an inevitable danger that can result 
from two things. First, the great position al -Albānī enjoys within the 
Salafī  ranks gives great potency to his ideas (or anything he says for that  
matter), which have an almost ḥujjiya-like (authoritative) status. Second, 
the fact that using this kind of taʾwīl  presents an opportunity for other 
sects to attack the Salafīs’ own argument against the use of taʾwīl  in 
understanding the texts of al-ṣifāt  (God’s attributes).  For this reason, he 
warns al-Albānī stating that  “giving permission to alter the texts which 
inform [us about  the] consensus of the ṣaḥābah  (concerning the ruling on 
tārik al-ṣalāh), which was authenticated by al -shaykh al -Albānī in more 
than a book, and giving permission to oppose i t,  opens the door for 
abrogating all  foundations of ʿaqīdah  that is based on thei r consensus.” 46 
The restriction of Kufr to the heart 
The second factor for al -Ḥawālī’s charges against  al -Albānī relates to 
what the former perceives as an agreement between al -Albānī’s position 
in regard to the one who prefers death to prayer and the posit ion of the 
Murjiʾah  who restrict causes of kufr  to inner belief. Despite holding the 
same ruling as al -Ḥawālī that the perpetrator in this case dies as a kāfir ,  
it  is very clear that the latter is not content with the cause of kufr  given 
by al-Albānī. Look ing at the reasoning given by both authors in this 
case, one finds two distinct grounds upon which they build their 
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arguments against the position of the jumhūr  (the majority of scholars) . 
The jumhūr  as stated beforehand in the statement of al -Sakhāwī quoted 
by al-Ḥalabī, consider the person who choses death over prayer to have 
been died as a sinful Muslim. According to this view, the execution is 
just  one of the punishments (ḥudūd) that are carried out to discipline 
certain sinful behaviours. For this reason, one finds al -Sakhāwī stating 
that  Muslims should carry out all  Islamic rites on the body after the 
execution. Both al -Ḥawālī and al -Albānī oppose this view and instead 
pronounce it  impossible for such person to be a Muslim by quoting the 
argument set by Ibn Taymiyyah against  the jumhūr . 47 However,  they end 
up giving distinct reasons for why such person is a kāfir .  
For al-Albānī, the cause of kufr  in this case is  the juḥūd  of the prayer. 
This juḥūd  is  indicated by this person’s persistence in abandoning p rayer  
until  death. 48 The reason for this lies in his view that  no outwardly act 
can be a cause for kufr by itself unless it  is  accompanied with an 
indication that  the motive behind it  is  inner belief ( al-kufr al-iʿtiqādī . )49 
In the same line of reasoning we also find him arguing in several 
sections in his book that whoever states that performing the prayer is a 
condition for the correctness of one’s īmān  or declares someone to be 
kāfir  merely because of abandoning it  has taken a similar posit ion to that  
of the Khawārij . 50 Based on that he states:  
Pronouncing takfīr  on the Muslim (al-muwaḥḥ id)  based 
[merely] on an action (he does),  is  not permissible unti l  i t  
becomes clear that  he is in denial  ( jāḥ id) ,  even of a part  of  
what Allāh has decreed. Such as the one wh o is threatened to 
be executed if  he does not pray, as  explained before. 51 
On the other hand, we find that al -Ḥawālī takes a harder position as he 
interprets the action of preferring death to prayer differently.  For him 
such persistence shows the absence of  ilt izām  in the heart  and not juḥūd .  
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This means such person might well still  have the belief that  the prayer is 
an obligation but for other reasons he has no commitment to perform it .  
His posit ion is summarised in the following statement.  
That [the persistence in the heart  to abandon the obligation] is the 
real  cause for kufr  not the denial  of i t  [being an obligation] juḥūd  
wujūbih .  Such persistence is known for certain when he was put 
under the sword and refused to perform it . 52 
His view is part  of a long a rgument in his last  chapter that  deals with the 
question of whether the abandoning of one of the major religious 
obligations is  cause for kufr .  According to al -Ḥawālī ,  the Murjiʾah  
“wrongly” st ipulate the presence of either istiḥlāl or  juḥūd  in the heart 
in order to consider speeches or outwardly acts to be kufr .  By doing so, 
they restrict kufr  to inner belief, to the exclusion of outwardly acts, a 
position that he describes as “great deviancy” ( ḍalāl ʿaẓīm). Al-Ḥawālī  
argues that istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  are just two types of kufr  amongst several 
other types,  such as takdhīb  (disbelief) ʿinād  (resolute refusal) istikbār  
(arrogance) shakk  (scepticism) along with others.  As such, he views that  
it  would be incorrect to make one type a condition for another. He 
further insists that calling for istiḥlāl  or juḥūd  to be present all times in  
order to make takfīr  implies that no one can become kāfir  as long as he 
says that he does not deny the permissibility or impermissibility of the 
duty.   
As mentioned earlier, all of these arguments were put forward by al -
Ḥawālī as part of his original thesis, and therefore are not directed 
primarily against al -Albānī. The main reason for directing his criticism 
against al-Albānī becomes apparent at  the end of the chapter, where al -
Ḥawālī writes over ten pages to discuss the meaning of ḥadīth al-
shafāʿah  with the aim to refute what he calls the “specious textual 
arguments” 53 of the Murjiʾah .  According to al-Ḥawālī , this ḥadīth  is  one 
of several texts used by the Murjiʾah  to restrict kufr  to al-kufr al-iʿtiqādī  
to the exclusion of outwardly acts. He believes that because the Murjiʾah  
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built  their entire creed on the principle that  outwardly acts are not part 
of īmān  and therefore could never be a cause for kufr ,  they had to find 
answers to the textual evidences put against  them by “ ahl al-sunnah ,” in 
which there is a clear-cut declaration of kufr  based on actions alone. The 
Murjiʾah  focused on the type of ḥadīth al-shafāʿah  in order to occlude 
the apparent meanings of the other texts and argue  that they meant in 
those cases the necessity of istiḥlāl  and juḥūd is implied. Thus, it  is no 
wonder that al-Ḥawālī would see the grounds for kufr  given by al-Albānī 
as a clear case of limitation of kufr  to inner belief alone. 54 
Further, what irritates al -Ḥawālī  most is  that  the Murjiʾah  hold that the 
istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  represent a condition in the heart that cannot be known 
to us unless the person explicitly declares it .  According to him, the salaf  
believed that istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  as well as being a condit ion in the heart,  
could also be manifested by an outwardly act or a speech. 55 Therefore,  
had al-Albānī related the cause of kufr  to juḥūd  without further arguing 
that  outwardly acts cannot be a cause for kufr  on their own unless they 
indicate kufr  in the heart, al -Ḥawālī may not have seen much similarity 
between his position and the Murjiʾah .  
As an example for how istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  can be manifested by 
outwardly acts, al -Ḥawālī cites a famous ḥadīth  narrated by a companion 
of the Prophet named al-Barāʾ Ibn ʿĀzib.  The companion reports that  his 
uncle was sent by the Prophet to kill a man for marrying his step -mother 
after the death of his father. Marrying one’s mother in law was a pre -
Islamic tradition that Arab men used to perform as a practice to show 
respect of the deceased father. In Islam this tradition was declared 
forbidden according to the Quran verse “And marry not women whom 
your fathers married - except what is past: it  was shameful and odious - 
an abominable custom indeed.” 56 Al-Ḥawālī also cites the interpretation 
of Ibn Kathīr of the verse, in which the latter states that whoever 
performs this act is  kāfir .  He then asserts that this story represents a 
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proof that the conditions of istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  do not necessarily need an 
explicit confession by the perpetrator to be established, rather that  they 
can also be manifested by an outwardly act. This is to say that  in this 
story,  since the Prophet did not need to ask the perpetrator whether he 
believed that his act  of marriage was permissible or not, it  means that 
the Prophet  deemed the act  itself to be a manifestation of istiḥlāl .  The 
istiḥlāl  here does not constitute a denial of a religious duty but it  is the 
absence of il tizām  in the heart.  In other words,  had the culprit  committed 
adultery with his father’s widow, such act alone would not have been 
enough evidence that he is not committed to the injunction in the 
abovementioned verse.  In this case, further proof is needed such as an 
explicit declaration by the culprit that he does not accept this injunction 
or that he does not believe that his act is impermissible.  For t he act  of 
adultery can occur as a result  of mere lust as well as a denial of its 
impermissibil ity. However, the fact that a wedding took place means that  
such act can not be a result of mere lust  but that  it  can only be 
interpreted as a rejection of commitment to impermissibility.  
The literal interpretation of the ḥadīth 
The other reason behind al -Ḥawālī’s belief that the book of al -Albānī 
contains traces of irjāʾ  is the lat ter’s position in regards the category of 
outwardly acts.  From al -Ḥawālī’s point  of view, al-Albānī has followed 
the footsteps of the Murjiʾah  in considering the category of outwardly 
acts to be a condition for the perfection of īmān  and not for i ts validity. 57 
This conjecture is based on al -Albānī’s statement that “all good deeds 
are a condition for perfection [of īmān]  in the view of ahl al-sunnah  
contrary to the [view of] Khawārij  and Muʿtazilah.” 58  Although this 
statement can be interpreted to mean that  no individual (as opposed to 
the category of) outwardly act  is  a condition for the va lidity of īmān  by 
itself, 59 an opinion that is  recognised by all Salafīs, al -Ḥawālī does not 
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read i t as such. He assumes that al -Albānī is arguing that the category of 
outwardly acts is not a condition for the validity of īmān . 60  This 
assumption is intelligible given the manner in which al -Albānī interprets 
the following part of the ḥadīth al -shafāʿah :  
He (God) let  them (the last  group to receive salvation from hellfire) 
enter paradise without  having performed any action or good deed.  
Worried that one may understand from this passage that this group would 
include people who did not testify to the Islamic declaration of faith 
(shahādah)—given that  the declaration of faith is li terally counted as a 
good deed—al-Albānī resorts to a quote by al -ʿAsqalānī.  The quote 
clarifies that this group consists of people who have not performed any 
good deed in their lives beyond the affirmation of shahādah  (al-murād bi 
al-khayr al-manfī mā zāda ʿalā aṣl  al- iqrār bi al -shahādatayn). Al-
Albānī does not dwell on any details  regarding the interrelationship 
between acts and īmān  as the main focus of his arguments in the booklet 
is the longstanding jurisprudential disagreement on tārik al-ṣalāt .  
However, his interpretation implies that the affirmation of shahādah  is  
sufficient to assure one’s status as Muslim even when he/she has never 
performed a single religious good deed in their life.  
For al-Ḥawālī , al -Albānī’s interpretation of the ḥadīth  is too literal and 
it ignores other texts addressing the same matter as well as what has 
been established amongst the salaf :  that there is  no īmān  without the 
category of outwardly acts. It appears from al -Ḥawālī’s statements that 
the main feature which makes al -Albānī’s literal  understanding of ḥadīth  
al-shafāʿah  distinct  from “conventional” Salafism is the fact that the 
Salafī  methodology of extracting rulings does not rely only on examining 
and studying one text from the Quran or ḥadīth .  Rather, it  takes into 
consideration all the texts related to the matter as well as bearing in 
mind how these texts are understood and interpreted by the salaf .  Failing 
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to do so, and relying only on one text, as al -Albānī did with the ḥadīth 
shafāʿah ,  can lead the researcher to establish an opinion based on that 
single text and then be inevitably forced to defend  his position by far -
fetched interpretations ( taʾwīl) of all  other texts on the subject that do 
not fit  with his opinion. Such an approach is not consistent with the 
Salafī  methodology, in the view of al -Ḥawālī. 61 
Additionally,  al -Ḥawālī  is  convinced that b y interpreting ḥadīth shafāʿah  
to literally mean that the group salvaged from hellfire include people 
“who have done no good deed at al l,” would imply that tārik j ins al-
ʿamal (the one who abandons outwardly acts altogether) could receive 
salvation as well . Such an understanding means that the category of acts 
is in fact not a constituent part of īmān ,  since intercession is only 
afforded to Muslims. For him, such literal understanding contradicts the 
aforementioned Salafī principle laid by Ibn Taymiyyah, wh ich argues 
against the possibility of having valid īmān  in one’s heart without acting 
upon it.   
To refute the literal  understanding of al -Albānī, al -Ḥawālī resorts to a 
linguistic explanation he borrows from the classical scholar Ibn 
Khuzaymah (838-923).  He argues that  the negation of something in the 
rules of the Arabic language does not always mean absolute  negation. 
Arabs sometimes negate something to show its weakness and lack of 
completeness.  Hence, the expression “those who have done no good deed 
at all” denotes to lack of completeness  or perfection  of the deeds and not 
the complete absence of deeds,  when one takes into account the other 
texts addressing the matter. 62 As an example of such usage in Arabic,  al -
Ḥawālī refers to another ḥadīth  in which the Prophet  ordered a 
Companion who had just offered his prayer to “Go back and pray 
[again], for you have not prayed” because the Companion did not offer 
his prayer as it  should be.  The expression “ fa innaka lam tuṣalli” though 
literarily negates the occurrence of the prayer altogether, the Prophet’s 
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intention, obviously,  is to negate its  correctness and not to say that the 
prayer was not observed at all .  In view of that,  al -Ḥawālī  understands 
ḥadīth al-shafāʿah  as to mean that Muslims whose performance of th eir 
rel igious duties was not up to standard will be subject to salvation from 
hellfire.  
Furthermore, there are also several  expressions found in al -Albānī’s 
book, which al -Ḥawālī believes are a result of the influence of ʾilm al-
kalām al-madhmūm  (reprehensible dialectical theology) on some works 
of fiqh .  One of these reprehensible expressions is  found in an argument 
laid down by the renowned ḥanafī  scholar al -Ṭaḥāwī  in support  of the 
view against kufr  of tārik al-ṣalāh .  The bottom line of al -Ṭaḥāwī’s  
argument is  that a Muslim only becomes an apostate when he rejects 
those tenets that bring one into Islam in the first place (wa lā yakhruju 
al-ʿabd min al -īmān  illā bi juḥūd mā adkhalahu fīh. ) In his book, al-
Albānī quotes this argument and praises it ,  affirming that it  is not only 
“a good understanding and a solid argument that  cannot be refuted.” It 
also agrees with the position of Ibn Ḥanbal “that [ tārik al -ṣalāh] does 
not become an apostate merely on the grounds of abandoning the prayer 
but for refraining from praying after being ordered [by the authority] to 
do it .” 63  
Al-Ḥawālī  does not hide his shock about the failure of al -Albānī to 
identify the “great errors” in al -Ṭaḥāwī’s expression, which he deems it  
to be the result  of no more than the latter’s ḥanafī  background –  given 
that  Ḥanafīs  do not consider outwardly acts as an integral  part in the 
essence of īmān .  For him, such expression implies that there is  
absolutely “no belief or action” 64 that can cause kufr  as long as one does 
not deny the testimony of faith. Al-Ḥawālī contends that  this kind of 
statements is  amongst several reasons that helped in spreading the 
phenomenon of irjāʾ  into the writings of some later fuqahāʾ.  Hence, 
someone like al -Albānī praising such a statement only reinforces his 
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original argument that irjāʾ  as a thought is not restricted to the Murjiʾah  
but i t  is  also present in the writings of “those who followed them without 
knowing.” 65 
In sum, the alleged traces of irjāʾ  in al-Albānī’s book levelled by al -
Ḥawālī are very similar in nature to the accusations we have seen in the 
previous chapter,  directed against al -Ḥalabī and other Loyalist scholars. 
Perhaps the key differences here are; firstly,  that the target of these 
charges was in this case a Senior Scholar and secondly, the status of  al-
Ḥawālī amongst the Salafī  enthusiasts at the time. Unlike a number of 
Jihādī ideologues such as al -Maqdisī and al-Ṭarṭūsī  who have accused al-
Albānī with irjāʾ  before al -Ḥawālī published his book, the latter was an 
established scholar at the time and a  well-known specialist in ʿaqīdah . 66 
Hence, it  is not surprising to find that his reservations on al -Albānī’s 
book circulating amongst a great number of Jihādīs and Activists and 
even find some of al -Albānī’s own students such as Abū Ruḥayyim 
becoming convicted that  al-Albānī does not consider outwardly acts to 
be a constituent element (rukn) of īmān . 67 
Abū Ruḥayyim on al-Albānī’s irjāʾ  
Ḥaqīqat al-Īmān  ʿind al-Shaykh al-Albānī  (the Reality of Īmān  
According to the View of Shaykh al-Albānī) of Abū Ruḥayyim was 
published two years after the death of al -Albānī. It is  a very short 
pamphlet but it  does nevertheless represent a sample of how the position 
of al-Albānī on īmān  and takfīr  is seen by many Activists and Jihādīs at  
the end of the 1990s. The book is more or less similar to al -Ḥawālī’s 
book in terms of relying on the same arguments of Ibn Taymiyyah. It  
also highlights the same points of the alleged errors in al -Albānī’s 
perception of īmān .  Yet, it  differs from Ẓāhirat al -Irjāʾ  in two important 
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ways, related to the purpose of their authors. First , as mentioned above, 
al-Ḥawālī’s aim in his book was to examine the spread of the Murjiʾahs’ 
views within contemporary religious circles,  especially amongst non-
Salafī  scholars.  The comments about al -Albānī were supp lementary and 
secondary to the purpose of al -Ḥawālī’s book. The case with Abū 
Ruḥayyim, as the t itle of his book reveals, is different. His aim is clearly 
to examine al -Albānī’s conception of īmān .  Secondly and more 
importantly,  al-Ḥawālī does not seem to be interested in examining 
whether or not al -Albānī holds the views of Murjiʾah .  Rather, the 
reservations of al -Ḥawālī  relate solely to al -Albānī’s book Ḥukm Tārik 
al-Ṣalāh .  For this reason, he tries in a number of occasions to find 
excuses for al -Albānī’s  “errors” and ask him to have another look at  his 
book and rewrite it . 68 Again, Abū Ruḥayyim is different, as he tries to 
prove that the traces of  al-Albānī’s irjāʾ  are not simply some errors in 
one book, but rather that they are in fact a prevailing tenden cy in his 
views on the questions of īmān  and takfīr .   
Essentially,  Abū Ruḥayyim examines a number of al -Albānī’s statements 
then asserts that  his teacher has contradictory statements regarding the 
interrelationship between outwardly acts and īmān;  On the one hand, al -
Albānī defines īmān  in terms of what he sees as the correct  Salafī 
definit ion, which includes belief in the heart,  affirmation of the tongue 
and acts of the limbs. But al -Albānī also makes other statements in 
which he considers the shahādah  to be sufficient to assure one’s status 
as a Muslim, and restricts the practice of takfīr  to matters of belief to the 
exclusion of actions.  For Abū Ruḥayyim, these contradictory statements 
is an indication that  al-Albānī does not consider the category of 
outwardly acts to be a fundamental  part of īmān  but only a separate 
condition for its perfection. 69  This is an accusation similar to that 
levelled against the Loyalists as we have seen in the previous chapter.  
Abū Ruḥayyim continues his argument by asserting th at the statements in 
which al-Albānī defines īmān  as including outwardly acts are not enough 
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evidence to wipe out the accusations of irjāʾ  levelled against him. This 
is because they are not as explicit as the other statements in which al-
Albānī asserts that  outwardly actions are only a condition for the 
perfection of īmān  not its validity,  and that the declaration of faith is  
sufficient to assure one’s salvation from hellfire. Amazingly, Abū 
Ruḥayyim has no hesitation to conclude that the position of his shaykh 
on īmān  and takfīr  corresponds with the position of the late Ashʿarī  
scholar al -Bayjūrī  and not the posit ion of the salaf . 70 
These observations by Abū Ruḥayyim, while generally true,  as we have 
seen in al -Albānī’s interpretation of ḥadīth al-shafāʿah ,  are very much 
open to dispute when one examines other statements of al -Albānī, which 
Abū Ruḥayyim did not include in his book. A number of other statements 
by al-Albānī are in fact  very similar to those of Ibn Taymiyyah, 
discussed in the previous chapter, 71 especially those on the impossibility 
of the presence of valid īmān  in one’s heart  without outwardly acts.  
These are the very statements of Ibn Taymiyyah which the Jihādīs and 
the Activists use in their argument that the actions are a sufficient 
condition for testing the validity of īmān .  Let us take the following 
statement by al -Albānī, for example  
Īmān  without actions is futi le for every time Allāh almighty 
mentions īmān ,  it  is [mentioned] alongside good deeds (al-
ʿamal al-Ṣāliḥ).  This is because it is not possible to imagine 
īmān  without good deeds except in the case of a person who 
says the testimony of faith then dies immediately.  This case is  
conceivable, but this is  not the case with a person that  utters 
the testimony of faith who has a prolonged li fe and does not 
perform any good deeds. The Lack of performing good deeds in 
this case is  evidence that such person states it  merely by his 
tongue and that īmān  did not enter into his heart. 72 
This statement clearly refutes the assumption that al -Albānī’s v iews the 
shahādah  to be sufficient to assure one’s status as a Muslim. Perhaps it 
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does support the assert ion of Abū Ruḥayyim regarding the contradiction 
found in al -Albānī’s statements, but it  certainly challenges the 
assumption that al -Albānī holds the position of the Ashʿarīs  in regards 
outwardly acts.  The Ashʿarīs  not only hold that  it  is possible for a person 
to have valid īmān  in the heart without having performed any act at all,  
but they also affirm that even the verbal declaration of faith is not a 
necessary condition to assure one’s salvation from hellfire. The verbal 
testimony of faith is the only thing necessary for the judgment of an 
individual’s status in this world (aḥkām al-dunyā). 73 This is not what al -
Albānī believed, at  least , not consistentl y. In fact , in a number of 
statements, al-Albānī seems to agree with the Jihādīs and the Activists 
that  actions can also be a cause for major kufr  regardless the belief of 
the perpetrator.  
There are also actions that can cause kufr  iʿtiqādī  (i .e. major 
kufr) for they possess explicit indication of the kufr  of the 
perpetrator liʾannahā tadullu ʿalā kufrihi dilālatan qa ṭʿiyyatan 
yaqīniyyah .  This is because his action substitutes the 
utterances of the tongue such as he who knowingly and 
intentionally steps on the Quran. 74 
Again, this statement seem to be in contradiction with other statements 
cited by al -Albānī’s cri tics to argue that  he restricts takfīr  to matters of 
belief to the exclusion of acts. In truth,  this kind of statements by al -
Albānī does actually raise more questions than answers concerning his 
exact position on īmān  and takfīr .  
Further, these contradictory statements prove that al -Albānī’s views on 
īmān  and takfīr  are more complex than assumed by his critics and some 
of the recent literature.  
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Al-Albānī’s View: an Assessment 
Essentially,  al -Albānī’s views are neither purely conventional Salafī nor 
pure Ashʿarī  but a combination of the two. This is to say that  al -Albānī, 
contrary to the conventional Salafī  posit ion, considers outwardly acts to 
be a condition for the perfection of īmān ,  but at the same time, he adopts 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory on the impossibility of having valid īmān  
without actions. Such a combined position is what Ibn Taymiyyah 
ascribes to a number of Ḥanafī  theologians.  According to  Ibn 
Taymiyyah, the Ḥanafī  theologians unanimously agree on the exclusion 
of outwardly actions from īmān  but hold two different positions in 
regards the interrelationship between acts and īmān .  The first group 
consider outwardly acts to be a required dimen sion for īmān ,  so for them 
the absence of acts necessitates the absence īmān  in one’s heart. The 
difference between Salafism and those theologians according to Ibn 
Taymiyyah is largely a semantic one ( lafẓī) and the salaf  considered 
their views to be an innovation involving certain terminology and 
behaviours,  but not a heresy related to essential  doctrines. This is  
because a large part of the dispute with them over acts is  merely 
semantic,  revolving around the proper term by which to refer to a given 
entity. 75 This is  not the case with the second group, who hold that  the 
absence of acts does not necessitate the absence of the īmān  in one’s 
heart. Al-Albānī is very similar to the first group as his abovementioned 
statement suggests.  
Yes,  one might argue that  al -Albānī’s literal  interpretation of ḥadīth  al-
shafāʿah  shows that  he does not hold that  the absence of outwardly 
actions necessitates the absence īmān  of the heart. However, that  does 
not determine his position because the purpose of al -Albānī in that  book 
is purely jurisprudential  and not creedal. It appears that al -Albānī’s 
focus on the jurisprudential aspect of the ḥadīth  in this book led him to 
contradict not only his view on the interrelationship between īmān  and 
acts but also his own view on the one who abandons prayer altogether.  
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As we have seen, al -Albānī holds that abandoning prayer altogether is  
kufr .  Such position  necessitates that abandoning acts altogether is 
similarly so. Hence, it  is al -Albānī’s determination to refute the view of 
those who argue that abandoning the prayer occasionally is kufr  that 
resulted in his failure to notice that  his li teral  interpretati on of ḥadīth al-
shafāʿah  is in fact in contradiction with his own opinion on tārik al-
ṣalāh .  
What does also foster our argument here about the position of al -Albānī 
is the fact that he does not restrict the practice of takfīr  to belief. As we 
have seen in his last  statement,  al -Albānī believes that  actions can also 
be a basis for takfīr  without the need to investigate the motivation in 
one’s heart.   
Yes,  it  is  true that  in a number of occasions  he argues that  the practice of 
takfīr  of Muslims cannot be based on mere actions without a clear 
indication that the action is performed out of istiḥlāl ,  iʿtiqād  and juḥūd .76 
However,  this alone should not be taken as a proof that he restricts the 
practice of takfīr  to belief as his crit ics and some western scholars 
affirm. 77 This is because al -Albanī’s use of terms such as juḥūd ,  istiḥlāl  
and al-kufr al-iʿtiqādī  is  different to the manner the Salafī  scholars in 
Saudi Arabia use them. The latter scholars use istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  as to 
mean rendering something that is ḥarām  to be ḥalāl  and the denial of a 
religious duty being an obligation respectively.  As such, this type of kufr  
in their view relates only to the speech of the heart  (i.e.  factual  belief 
taṣdīq qalbī ) and not the act  of the heart . 78  For this reason when al -
Albānī reasoned in his book that  the cause of kufr  in the case of the one 
who persists to abandon prayer until  death is juḥūd ,  al -Ḥawālī read it  as 
a restrict ion of kufr  to factual belief as aforementioned. 79 
As it happens, al-Albānī uses these terms in a different manner that 
surpasses factual belief. Unlike the Murjiʾah  who hold that the istiḥlāl  
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and juḥūd  represent a condition in the heart that cannot be known to us 
unless the person explicitly declares it , 80  al-Albānī affirms that  these 
conditions can also be known through a word or an act. 81 This entails that  
istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  in his usage, are not restricted to the belief that 
something is lawful or forbidden since such belief is a condition in the 
heart and no one can know for certain what other people rea lly believe. 
The assertion that istiḥlāl  and juḥūd  can be known through an act  shows 
that  al-Albānī’s use of these terms goes beyond factual  belief to include 
the acts of the heart .  In other words, when al -Albānī states that no act of 
commission or omission constitutes kufr  without a clear indication that  it  
has been performed out of istiḥlāl  or juḥūd ,  he does not mean that  acts 
can cause kufr  only when the perpetrator does not have the belief and 
affirmation in the heart  that the duty is binding (i .e. fact ual belief). The 
position that al -Albānī’s cri tics believe to be irjāʾ .  Rather, he means that 
for an act  to be a basis for kufr  it  needs to entail the absence of ei ther 
factual  belief (speech of the heart) or the acts of the heart.  Hence, when 
he argues that the one who abandons prayer altogether is  kāfir ,  his 
argument is based on the belief that  such act entails the absence of 
commitment in the heart of the perpetrator not the absence of factual 
belief as his critics read it.  After all people sometimes bel ieve that  
something is a binding duty yet they simply do not perform it .  
Ironically,  al-Albānī’s posit ion on acts is  very evident in al-Kufr Kufrān  
lecture, the very lecture Jihādīs such as al  al-Ṭarṭūsī criticize. In that  
lecture, as we have seen above in  al-Albānī’s position on manmade 
laws, 82 he differently to the Loyalists considers that  judging whether the 
act of replacing sharīʿah  with manmade system of laws is major kufr  to 
be a subjective matter. Such assertion indicates that  in principle, al -
Albānī does not oppose the idea that outwardly abstention from 
performing a religious duty can be considered as a manifestation of lack 
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of commitment and adherence in one’s heart . The difference between him 
and his critics is on whether this particular act can determine that the 
individual has no iltizām .  Hence, the position of al -Albānī within 
Salafism in regards the practice of takfīr  based on outwardly acts is 
milder than that of the Saudi scholars but is not as lenient as that of the 
Loyalists. The Loyalists hold that acts alone can never be considered to 
be a manifestation of lack of commitment and adherence in one’s heart 
without further investigation to whether this outwardly abstention is 
performed out of arrogance or hatred for the rule of God.  
Thus, al -Albānī’s distinctive use  of terms played a major role in 
convincing his cri tics that he restricts the practice of takfīr  to factual 
belief,  and therefore to accuse him of holding certain aspects of irjāʾ .  It  
also led some of those Loyalists close to him such  as al-Ḥalabī to adopt 
a more restrictive position towards the practice of takfīr  than the one 
that was widely accepted amongst the Salafīs in Saudi Arabia,  believing 
that  it  is the position of al -Albānī and therefore it  must be the correct  
Salafī  position .  
Summary 
This chapter presented a detailed study of the accusations of irjāʾ  that  
levelled against one eminent senior Salafī scholar. Those accusations,  
which centre on the definition of īmān  and kufr ,  and the necessary 
conditions for determining kufr ,  revealed both the common 
methodological features of Salafī argumentation, and the internal 
divergences. That while al -Albānī’s irritation with what he saw as the 
hastiness of Saudi scholars in pronouncing the verdict of takfīr  on 
Muslims who do not pray, combined with his focus on a single ḥadīth  
(ḥadīth al-shafāʿah) led him to interpret  this texts in a manner that was 
found to be unacceptable even by some of his own students. His different 
usage of religious definition and terms to the Saudi scholars, the cl aims 
by the Loyalists that  he read and approved their criticised writings,  and 
his reliance on “non -Salafī” writings led a number of Salafī  scholars, 
including those who respected him hugely,  to the belief that  he strayed 
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beyond the limits of Salafī princi ples and methods, which are based 
largely on the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah.  
Based on the discussion in this chapter, we can summarise that al -
Albānī’s approach to the question of takfīr  is sl ightly different to the 
fashion followed by those Salafīs who had  their religious training in 
Saudi Arabia. Al -Albānī’s approach is characterised by a great  
dependence on ḥadīth  as a central  mechanism of setting up religious 
opinions. This in turn led him to be influenced to a great  extent by the 
teachings of a number o f classical ḥadīth  scholars, especially al -
ʿAsqalānī,  whom he quotes at considerable length in his books. On the 
other hand, the approach followed by the Saudi Salafīs on takfīr  endorses 
certain general principles laid by Ibn Taymiyyah and early Wahhābī 
scholars as a guideline and they interpret  the texts of ḥadīth  accordingly.  
This is not to suggest that al -Albānī does not hold the same level of 
regard for Ibn Taymiyyah as the Saudi scholars. Quite the opposite, for 
al-Albānī often recommends that  people s tudy Ibn Taymiyyah’s Book of  
Īmān  in order to understand matters of īmān  and takfīr .  However, when it 
comes to definitions and terminology, al -Albānī is clearly less 
influenced by him than the Saudi scholars.  
This detailed study of the dispute over the cre ed of one key scholar  
shows the centrality of doctrines and interpretive methodology to the 
Salafīs, and that  poli tical affil iation s fail  to explain otherwise why those 
who respect each other so highly would argue with each other so 
violently and in public .  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This research set  out to examine the doctrinal  diversity within 
contemporary Salafism and identify the key elements and roots of the 
divergence between the proponents of this religious tradition. The 
research has also sought to enhance the un derstanding of Salafism in 
general and the causes of the intra -Salafī  disputes over politics and 
violence in particular. Salafism is a relatively new field of study in 
academia and the l iterature on topics relating to these intra -Salafī  
disputes is scarce and if it  is discussed,  it  is predominantly through the 
prism of political  and security studies.  Such non -Islamic studies 
approaches tend to overlook the fact  that  the Salafīs define their political 
views first  and foremost through doctrine.  This research sought to focus 
on the doctrinal underpinnings of these disputes by answering two main 
questions that  relate to what Salafism means:  
1-  What are the various Salafī views on the legit imacy of present -day 
rulers in the Muslims World and how to deal with them?  
2-  How the existence of dif ferent views within Salafism on what 
constitutes īmān  and kufr  contributed to these disputes?  
The schism within contemporary Salafism can be traced back to the early 
1990s when the Saudi government invited the American -led troops to its 
soil to defend the Kingdom against what was believed to be an imminent 
threat posed by Saddam Hussein. This schism took place mainly amongst 
the Salafīs inside Saudi Arabia before it spread beyond its  borders to 
reach almost every place where Salafism was present. This research has 
shown that this schism started as a mere legal disagreement over the age -
old jurisprudential question of whether Muslims are permitted to seek 
the assistance of non-Muslims in war. Generally,  jurisprudential  
disagreements are tolerated by all Salaf īs  and are very unlikely to cause 
any accusations of deviation. However,  this dispute evolved through 
various stages to turn into a fierce creedal dispute over who represents 
true Salafism. In the first  stage, the above legal dispute grew into 
disagreements between the Activists on the one hand and the Loyalists 
and Senior Scholars on the other,  over the correct Salafī  method to 
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oppose an evil doing by the ruler. Both the Loyalists and the Senior 
Scholars insisted that opposition to the ruler must be in the  form of 
Private advice and should not be overt or violent, while the Activists did 
not see any harm in overt  crit icism. The second stage was characterised 
by questioning both the legitimacy of present -day rulers in the Muslim 
World,  particularly their sta tus as Muslims for implementing manmade 
legal systems instead of sharīʿah .  The question of declaring takfīr  on the 
rulers due to the implementation of manmade laws drew an abundant 
literature and became at the heart  of all intra -Salafī debates towards mid -
1990s. This in turn led to the third stage of the disputes which revolves 
around the crucial  creedal issue of the relationship between one’s 
outwardly actions and one’s īmān .  It  is  at  this stage when accusations of 
deviancy from Salafism became a serious matter.  
At this later stage, it  has become clear that  in terms of takfīr ,  there 
exists two main tendencies within contemporary Salafism. On the one 
hand, there is  a traditional hard -line tendency led by the Saudi Senior 
Scholars which also includes the Act ivists and the Jihādīs. This view of 
takfīr  follows methodically and rigorously the teachings of Ibn 
Taymiyyah on the relationship between one’s outwardly actions and 
īmān .  It  can be summarised in the following two points: (i) the 
impossibility for a person to have valid īmān  in the heart  without having 
it manifested in their outer behaviour and actions;  (ii)  the causes of kufr  
are not restricted to matters of belief to the exclusion of acts, rather 
there are also certain acts of commission and omission tha t  can cause 
kufr ,  regardless of the culprit’s inner belief. On this basis, the followers 
of this tendency believe that the aboli tion of sharīʿah  as a system of law 
is kufr  because it reveals a lack of commitment to rule by sharīʿah .  
On the other hand, there is  a lenient tendency adopted by al -Albānī and 
propagated mainly by the Loyalist  trend. The followers of this tendency, 
though in principle accept the authority of Ibn Taymiyyah on questions 
related to īmān ,  they do not put the same emphasis on Ibn Taymi yyah’s 
terminology and arguments on the questions of īmān  and kufr  as the 
others. Rather, they do also consider the views of some other classical 
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scholars who have conventionally been charged with (traces of) irjāʾ  by 
Salafī scholars. As a result, their vi ews on takfīr  are more of a 
combination between the teachings of two different traditions. This 
combination of traditions is  the reason that  led al -Albānī to be the first 
Senior Salafī Scholar to adopt a less rigorous position towards the 
application of manmade laws instead of sharīʿah .  For the followers of 
this view, the application of manmade systems of law is not kufr  because 
it does not manifestly reveal the rejection or the denial  of sharīʿah  as a 
system of law. Lack of commitment in this view, cannot be determined 
by a mere act .  
The study has also shown that in addition to the creedal differences 
causing the rift within Salafism, the fact that  the implementation of  
manmade laws is a new phenomenon with no obvious precedent upon 
which scholars can draw has also played a role in these disputes. This 
finding supports the hypothesis presented earlier in this research that  the 
schism within Salafism cannot be linked merely to the subjective nature 
of applying religion to new legal affairs but also to some creedal 
differences. It also verifies that the prestigious position of al -Albānī 
within Salafism has led to a new tendency within Salafism in regards to 
the question of takfīr  as he was the first of the Senior Scholars to 
combine between these diverse tradit ions in matters of takfīr .    
Additionally,  the research has found that  in spite of the fierce intra -
Salafī  debates and the mutual accusations of deviancy from Salafism, 
contemporary Salafī  trends share a great  deal  of common doctrine. This 
shared doctrine is of two categories; a category they share with non -
Salafī  scholars such as the obligation upon Muslim judges and heads of 
the state to rule in accordance with sharīʿah ,  and another category of 
doctrine that  is unique to the Salafī  teaching. In this resea rch, several  
points of the latter category have emerged. First,  the expansive 
definit ion of shirk  which is a direct  result of their differentiation 
between tawḥīd al-rubūbiyyah  and tawḥīd al-ulūhiyyah  and the assertion 
that  the polytheists believed in the former but were not granted the status  
of Muslims before they accepted the latter. Second, the approach to 
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God’s attributes in the scripture that stresses on accepting the literal 
meaning of these attributes without investigation into their modality.  
Third, the rejection of a number of popular rituals due to the restrictive 
perception they adopt of what constitutes a reprehensible innovation in 
Islam. Fourth, the somehow relaxed attitude towards accepting legal 
opinions from outside one’s legal school and t he rejection of the 
traditional non-Salafī approach that often requires Muslims to choose 
one of the four Sunni schools and stick to i ts legal opinions. These 
identified points serve as a minimal definition of Salafism which can 
help scholars to dist inguish between non-Salafī  scholars from the Salafī 
ones.  
Notwithstanding this, there are also certain traits that distinguish each 
trend from the rest.  These traits can be easily attained from the labels I 
have chosen to give to each trend in this research.  
The Jihādīs are distinguished by their belief that  jihād  is the only means 
by which Muslims can establish an Islamic state and rid the ummah  (the 
Muslim nation) from its present predicament.  As a result, we find that  
the emphasis of the discourses of the theologians who belong to this 
trend (such as al -Maqdisī  and Abū Qatādah) rarely go beyond issues of 
al-ḥākimiyyah  and matters of īmān ,  kufr  and takfīr .  The proponents of 
this trend are heavily influenced by the inherited hostile attitude towards 
manmade laws found in the writ ings of a number of authoritative Salafī 
Scholars such as the late Grand Mufti Muhammad Ibn Ibrāhīm. However, 
they differ from these scholars in two points.  First,  the main concern of 
authoritative scholars is  the contestation of the very  idea of applying 
manmade laws instead of sharīʿah  theoretically whereas the Jihādīs’ 
concern is how to eradicate secularism by force.  Second, the 
authoritative scholars seem to believe that the correct method of 
challenging/removing  manmade laws and chan ging the status quo starts 
at the level of society first then goes up to the state, whereas for the 
Jihādīs it  is  the other way round.  
As for the Loyalists who are on the other end of the spectrum of the 
Jihādīs, their distinctive feature is the fact that they do not consider that  
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the implementation of manmade laws amounts to the nullification of the 
religious legitimacy of present -day rulers in the Muslim world.  Such 
feature distinguishes them from all other Salafī  protagonists including 
al-Albānī who believe that the application of sharīʿah  is an 
indispensable condition for the religious legitimacy of a ruler.  This 
feature has led them to call for an absolute subservience to present -day 
political authorities and consider all  forms of overt  criticism of 
governments, including political activism in the Muslim world, as a 
deviation from the teaching of Salafism. Essentially the Loyalists 
adopted al-Albānī’s principle of avoiding politics and his criticisms of 
the MB and then developed them into an attitude tha t makes every 
Islamist  group or figurehead engaging in politics including those of a 
Salafī  background, a legitimate target for their criticisms. For them, the 
danger incorporated in the “deviant” manhaj  of the Activists is greater  
than the danger of the secularists themselves;  therefore they made fellow 
Salafīs engaging in any form of political opposition a priori ty for their 
attacks over the secularists.  
Perhaps it  is  not inaccurate to say that  the commonality between the 
Jihādīs and the Loyalists is  the ir  narrow understanding of what 
constitutes Salafism, which is reflected in their exclusivist attitudes 
towards the other.  To reject the other,  both the Jihādīs and the Loyalists 
resort to an excessive use of takfīr  and tabdīʿ  respectively.  
The Activists are positioned in the centre of the spectrum of Salafism 
and they are distinguished by their overt  political activism in opposition 
of present-day rulers. Unlike both the Loyalists and the Jihādīs, the 
Activists accept political  activism and engagement 1  as a method to 
change status quo and for this reason they are more tolerant towards 
other non-Salafī Islamist groups engaging in politics such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its  figureheads.  They also oppose the use of violent 
means employed by the Jihādīs tho ugh; they are similar to them in terms 
                                                     
1 They accep t  pol i t ica l  par t icipat ion but  no t  a l l  o f them are act ive ly engaged  in the 
poli t ics o f the ir  respect ive countr ies.  
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of rejecting the legit imacy of the ruler who does not apply sharīʿah .  This 
similarity is the reason why on the one hand the Jihādīs do not consider 
them as deviant as the Loyalists and on the other hand, the Loyalists  
view their teachings as a combination between the ideas of the Jihādīs 
and the MB. 
Essentially,  it  can be said that contemporary Salafism has the aspects of 
both revolution and pacifism embedded in its teaching and opting for one 
of them depends on one’s personal judgement on the polit ical situation 
the person l ives in.  This judgement is  affected to a great extent by 
whether or not one considers the ruling according to manmade laws to be 
an act of kufr .  Those whose answer to this question is negative are 
pacifists, whereas those answering in positive have the potential to be 
revolutionaries.  
Further, this research has encountered a number of limitations, which 
need to be considered. First, it  has focussed on the disputes within 
Salafism in the 1990s a period that is considered the start of the schisms 
within this intellectual tradit ion. As a direct consequence of this 
limitation, the research has not examined the escalation of these disputes 
beyond this period nor other new disputes that have surfaced after the 
1990s. Second, since the 1990s there have been several disputes that 
have led to new schisms within some of these trends.  For instance, the 
Loyalists nowadays are divided into at least three separate groups 
accusing each other of a number of deviations  from Salafism. Further  
examination of the intra-Salafī disputes after the 1990s will undoubtedly 
add greatly to our understanding of the dynamics within this theological  
tradition. In addition, a separate study of the list of websites provided in 
the bibl iography will allow research into the online dynamics of Salafi 
debates around, but not limited to, these questions.  
Finally,  this study sought to offer a much needed insight of the 
underpinning doctrine behind the contradicting Salafī views on politics.  
It  is  my hope that  it  will  add significantly to the growing literature 
seeking to unveil the ambiguity surrounding Salafism and understand the 
causes of schism amongst its  protagonists.  
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Muhammad al-Maqdisī .  To my knowledge, this website contains the 
largest amount of the Jihādīs’  material.  
http://www.waqfeya.com: this website constitutes  one of the largest  
online Salafī libraries.  It  contains an abundant amount of free books in 
Pdf format.  
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https:/ /uqu.edu.sa/ : the website of the University of Umm al -Qurā  in 
Saudi Arabia.   
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